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Between 1865 and 1920, new gender expectations in the postbellum period, as well as the 
willingness to use the state to intervene in marriages led to social and legal reform that provided 
a mechanism to empower women and enforce their right to be free from violence. Women 
emerged from the Civil War more aware about the drawbacks of dependency. The postbellum 
period also witnessed massive changes with industrialization, which enabled women to 
participate in what were previously considered male pursuits. With their new awareness and the 
changes of industrialization, women negotiated a new definition of womanhood, which included 
the right to be free from intimate-partner violence. Reform organizations also reflected this 
change and pushed for recognition of this right. Courts, in turn, started to decide cases in favor of 
abused women, depriving men of the antiquated right of chastisement. After the 1890s, however, 
the issue of race in the South perverted intimate-partner violence into a method of 
disenfranchising African Americans. In the North, the rise of scientific experts by the 1920s 
helped conservative gender expectations to change public policies for abused women. These 
changes washed away progress towards addressing the problem of intimate-partner violence. 
This dissertation applies the lens of gender to intimate-partner violence from 1865 to 
1920 and offers insight to the history of gender and the law. It shows not only that gender is a 
process, created and recreated by the public depending on the historical context, but also that the 
social construction of gender has real consequences for men and women. Moreover, this 
dissertation complicates the view that history is necessarily progressive. Rather than a straight 
line, the path towards ending intimate-partner violence appears more like a wave with 
advancements and major setbacks. Change was not steady, and the social problem of abuse did 
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not become incrementally better over time. This perhaps does not offer solace to the modern-day 
movement against intimate-partner violence, promising things will get better over time, but it 
does encourage more critical analysis of the multifaceted problem of intimate-partner violence 
and the way evolving beliefs about gender have shaped American society’s reactions and 




In 1851, a white man, William Hussey, kicked his wife, Beulah, in the leg and punched 
her in the head; she then pressed criminal charges of assault and battery against him. The trial 
court judge instructed the jury that a husband had a right to “moderate chastisement” but not the 
right to “beat her [his wife] for mere wantonness and wickedness.”1 Found guilty of senseless 
violence, William Hussey appealed, and the North Carolina State Supreme Court reversed the 
decision, stating: 
We know that a slap on the cheek, let it be as light as it may, indeed any touching of the 
person of another in a rude or angry manner⎯is in law an assault and battery. In the 
nature of things it cannot apply to persons in the marriage state, it would break down the 
great principle of mutual confidence and dependence; throw open the bedroom to the 
gaze of the public; and spread discord and misery, contention and strife, where peace and 
concord ought to reign.2 
 
Frequently cited by other courts during the antebellum period, Hussey continued to affirm the 
male privilege of chastisement and the doctrine of domestic privacy, which protected intimate-
partner violence from legal intervention. 
 Thirty-three years later in 1884, a white man, Joseph Huntley, whipped his wife, Rachel, 
twenty times “with an ordinary switch the size of her little finger.”3 The whipping resulted in 
cuts that bled, but since Rachel could “go about as usual,” the lower court found the husband not 
guilty.4 Again, the North Carolina State Supreme Court reversed the decision, this time finding 
the husband guilty of assault and battery, saying: 
There was also damage done to the peace, decencies and proprieties of the public. Such  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     1 State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. (Busb.) 123 (1852).  
 
     2 Ibid.  
	  
     3 State v. Huntley 91 N.C. 617 (1884). 
	  
     4 Ibid.  
	  
2 
Offence [of beating his wife]…stir[red] up the wrath of the people, male and female, and 
provoke[d] them to violence and unlawful redress of the public grievance. Surely, if a 
man should thus violently whip a woman, or another man, or a boy, whom he could thus 
assault, it should be regarded as manifestly serious damage to the individual assailed, and 
like damage to the good order of society, to say nothing of its decencies and proprieties.5 
 
As illustrated by the changes in the courts’ rulings, by the 1870s and 1880s, the courts no longer 
recognized the male privilege of chastisement, and Joseph was convicted of assault and battery. 
 By the 1890s, southern courts had reinterpreted intimate-partner violence. In 1894, an 
African-American man, Milus Harris, slapped his wife several times and beat her with a board. 
The lower court, following cases similar to Huntley, found Milus guilty of assault with intent to 
kill. The Mississippi State Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision, arguing that 
Milus Harris was guilty of assault and battery but not assault with intent to kill. The opinion of 
the state supreme court went on to discuss what the judges believed to be the source of intimate-
partner violence ⎯ the “ belief among the humbler class of our colored population of a fancied 
right in the husband to chastise the wife in moderation.”6 The problem, the court insinuated, lay 
not with whites but in the black community. 
 By the first decade of the twentieth century, courts throughout other areas of the country 
shifted their stance on intimate-partner violence too. In 1915, William Copper of Indiana faced 
charges of assault and battery for beating his wife. He had reportedly worked all day and came 
home to find his wife at the movies. William built a fire, made his dinner, and waited. When his 
wife returned, William “made a few remarks” and then began to hit her.7 She called the police 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     5 Ibid.  
	  
     6 State v. Harris 71 Miss. 462, 14 So. 266 (1894).  
 
     7 “Wife at Movies and No Supper Justifies Beating Judge Would Blame No Man for Losing 




and pressed charges, but the court discharged the case. The judge chastised the wife for failing in 
her “domestic duties” and sympathetically told the husband, “I don’t blame any man for losing 
his temper under conditions similar to these.”8 The Copper case was permissive of the privilege 
of chastisement, reversing the rulings in the late nineteenth century. 
 Each of these four cases⎯Hussey, Huntley, Harris, and Copper⎯ illustrate views of 
various courts from the antebellum period to the early twentieth century, and each portrays 
different reactions from the legal system at different points in time. The case law history on 
abuse is one in which the courts interpret and reinterpret old assault and battery criminal statutes 
but not in a neat, linear progression towards solving the problem of intimate-partner violence. No 
clear evolution existed because the male privilege of chastisement was socially constructed, 
which allowed for periodic shifts in the courts’ stance on privacy, abuse, and a woman’s right to 
be free from violence. But what exactly prompted the courts to revoke its sanction of the male 
privilege of chastisement after the Civil War? Why did southern courts racialize intimate-partner 
violence? Why did northern courts lose interest in prosecuting intimate-partner violence in the 
criminal courts by the early 1900s? These four introductory stories point to a complex socio-
legal process.  
In this dissertation, I argue that new gender expectations in the postbellum period as well 
as the willingness to use the state to intervene led to social and legal reform that provided a 
mechanism to empower women and enforce their right to be free from violence. Women 
emerged from the Civil War more aware about the drawbacks of dependency, and in their new 
awareness, they renegotiated a different definition of womanhood, which required the right to be 
free from violence. Institutions also reflected this change and pushed for recognition of this right. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
      8 Ibid.  
	  
4 
Courts, in turn, started to decide cases in favor of abused women, depriving men of the 
antiquated right of chastisement. After the 1890s, however, the issue of race in the South and the 
return of more conservative gender expectations through scientific experts in the North washed 
away progress towards addressing the problem of intimate-partner violence. 
Historians, such as Linda Gordon and Elizabeth Pleck, look at the development through 
the lens of family. They show how families became less of a private entity. The public felt that in 
order to perfect mankind, it also was invested in fixing relationships within the family, 
particularly parent to child and husband to wife. Progressivism linked family stability with 
stability of the larger society, and consequently social institutions and the law intervened in 
incidents of abuse and neglect. The family approach to intimate-partner violence in the late 
1800s has definite merits since indeed the family dynamic changed during the period.9 But what 
about viewing intimate-partner violence⎯a gender based problem⎯ through the lens of gender? 
How did the construction and reconstruction of gender expectations influence the shifting legal 
views of intimate-partner violence? Depending on gender expectations, the courts provided or 
denied women legal assistance. However, to understand this odd pattern of development, it is 
necessary to begin with the antebellum views of intimate-partner violence. 
Like other cases in the first half of the 1800s, State v. Hussey clearly protected the male 
privilege of chastisement and denied women the right to be free from abuse. By this time, the 
antebellum women’s movement had gained momentum in the United States. The movement was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     9 See Linda Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family 
Violence: Boston, 1880-1960, (New York, N.Y., U.S.A: Viking, 1988) and Elizabeth H. Pleck, 
Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy against Family Violence from Colonial Times 
to the Present, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
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best articulated in the famous Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments in 1848.10 One of the 
central issues the declaration pointed to a social and legal problem⎯ that of the “law giving him 
[man] power to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement.”11 The antebellum 
women’s movement recognized women’s natural right to be free from violence and attacked the 
privilege of chastisement as a method of maintaining a patriarchy and disempowering women. 
Women’s advocates achieved little success on this issue. Only two states went so far as to pass 
legislation criminalizing wife beating in the 1850s, and a few, such as Connecticut, reportedly 
denied the male right of chastisement. Still, as Reva Siegel argues most states refused to 
intervene, which resulted in, as the Seneca Falls Convention noted, the “spread [of] discord and 
misery.”12 If any doubts to the male privilege of chastisement existed, the North Carolina State 
Supreme Court case State v. Black (1864) clarified the law’s view of abuse.13 The judges in 
Black justified wife beating, claiming that the husband was legally responsible for his wife and 
that courts could not violate the right of family privacy.  State courts tended to discourage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  10 “Report of the Woman’s Rights Convention, Held at Seneca Falls, New York, July 19th and 
20th,” (Rochester: John Dick at the North Star Office, 1848).  
	  
     11 Ibid. 
 
     12 Ibid.; Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy" (1996). 
Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1092. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1092  
States in the antebellum period generally (although not always) prosecuted a man who killed his 
female partner. Some states did intervene when men became violent to their female partners. 
Georgia and Tennessee, for example, passed laws criminalizing intimate-partner violence in the 
1850s. Some, such as Louisiana and Michigan, fined abusers in severe cases of abuse, but these 
states did not recognize the right of a wife to be absolutely free from violence. Victoria Bynum 
examined the Piedmont area in North Carolina in the antebellum era and found thirty-nine 
women swore out peace warrants against their abusive husbands in three counties from 1850 to 
1860. See Victoria E. Bynum, Unruly Women: The Politics of Social and Sexual Control in the 
Old South, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.) “Lesser” forms of abuse, 
such as slapping or injuries that were not permanent, were not seen as criminal, and were not 
prosecuted. This is not the case after the Civil War. 
 
     13 State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 262 (1864). 
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charges of assault and battery against a husband because judges feared the impact on gender 
roles. If a wife could issue a complaint against her husband, then she challenged his authority. 
This, as Black argued, led to “insubordination” from the wife.14 The idea of manhood during the 
period required a clear gender hierarchy and submission from the wife.15 Charging a man with 
assault and battery for hitting his wife chipped away at the status of men, and courts recognized 
the possible risk. Before the war, most courts were not prepared to radically alter the status of 
men and women by criminalizing intimate-partner violence. 
After the war, the country’s concern for intimate-partner violence developed from a 
complicated view of changing gender expectations.16 While the postbellum period attempted to 
resurrect antebellum notions of womanhood and confine women to the domestic sphere, changes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     14 Ibid.  
 
     15 For more on marriage and marriage roles, see Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History: From 
Obedience to Intimacy or How Love Conquered Marriage, (New York: Viking, 2005) and 
Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985).  For information on marriage in the 
3antebellum South, see Marli F. Weiner, Mistresses and Slaves: Plantation Women in South 
Carolina, 1830-80, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), Carol K.R. Bleser, In Joy and in 
Sorrow: Women, Family, and Marriage in the Victorian South, 1830-1900, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991). For other court cases discussing a husband’s control over his wife, see 
Commonwealth v. Neal & wife, 10 Mass. 152 (1813), Rex. v. Knight and wife, (notes 
thereto) 11 E. C. L. R. 335 N.C., and Franklin Robinson v. Elisha Reynolds, & Sally, his wife 15 
Am.Dec. 673, 1 Aik. 174, (1826). In Robinson v. Reynolds, the judge argued that if a wife was 
“unmanageable and disobedient” to her husband then “he ought to exercise his marital right and 
regulate her conduct.”  
 	  
     16 This dissertation mainly focuses on the North and the South. The West during the 1870s 
was still being settled, and as territories or newly recognized states, the West is more difficult to 
assess, particularly using newspapers and court cases. A few historians have examined intimate-
partner violence in the West during the period using petitions for divorce from Oregon that 
reached higher courts. For more information, see David Peterson, “Wife Beating: An American 
Tradition,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 23, No.1 (Summer 1992): 97-118; and 
David Peterson Del Mar, What Trouble I have Seen: A History of Violence Against Wives, 




resulting from the Civil War made a return to previous gender expectations of the nineteenth 
century not possible, at least immediately.17 As Drew Gilpin Faust argues in Mothers of 
Invention, many women witnessed firsthand the pitfalls of being a lady. Men could not always 
protect women, as evidenced on the home front during the war, which made self-reliance a 
necessity.18 After the Civil War, this reality made resurrecting womanhood problematic, yet still, 
newspapers consistently articulated the importance of submissive women and male protectors.19 
The rhetoric of civilized men versus savages also entered into the public discourse.20 Men who 
beat their wives were labeled “brutes,” “inhuman fiends,” and “unmanly,” by the press, the 
courts, and neighbors.21 By the 1870s, gender expectations shifted from ignoring the problem of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     17 Many historians of women’s history have shown that these “spheres,” were in reality, not as 
rigid as previously supposed.  Rather, the “spheres” were fluid as argued in Paula Baker’s “The 
Domestication of Politics: Women and American Society, 1780-1920,” The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Jun., 1984), pp. 620-647.  Acknowledging that fact, I use the term 
“sphere” not to counter those arguments but rather since to emphasize the expectation of gender 
performance.  I also use the term “ideal” here and throughout the dissertation. Carl Degler in 
“What Ought to Be and What Was: Women’s Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century,” American 
Historical Review 79 (1974): 1467-90 and Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz in Rereading Sex, (Knopf: 
New York, 2002) have been instrumental in showing how Victorian America did not necessarily 
live up to the widely circulated ideals. However, the enforcement of these ideals by families, 
communities, and those in power (courts, legislatures, etc.) is key in this discussion. 
 
     18 Drew Gilpin Faust, Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the 
American Civil War, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996): 17.  
 
     19 A few examples are: The Columbus Daily Inquirer  Jan. 19, 1870; Macon Weekly 
Telegraph June 6, 1871; Macon Weekly Telegraph April 8, 1873; Morning Republican July 28, 
1873;  Wheeling Register April 5, 1877; Wheeling Register October 22, 1881. 
 
     20 Gail Bederman, Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the 
United States, 1880-1917, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).      
 
     21  A few examples are: The Columbus Daily Inquirer May 11, 1870; The Times Picayune 
March 30, 1871; Morning Republican July 9, 1873; Wheeling Register June 18, 1875; Times 
Picayune August 30, 1882. 
	  
8 
intimate-partner violence to criminalizing it. Manhood involved relinquishing the privilege of 
chastisement, and womanhood included the right to be free from violence.  
The new attack on intimate-partner violence extended legal and social protections to 
African American as well as white women. Newspapers throughout the 1870s condemned wife 
beating in all couples and described black battered wives similarly to white women who were 
abused with the words “pitiful,” “weak,” and “fearful.”22 This portrayal of black women as ladies 
in need of protection, however, was specific to the incidents of intimate-partner violence, but the 
application of womanhood in cases of intimate-partner violence suggests the country’s attempt 
(as contradictory as it may have been) at defining masculinity, femininity, and restraint. 23 
By the 1870s, courts, like in the Huntley case at the beginning of this introduction, 
regularly prosecuted men with assault and battery for abusing their wives. They also allowed the 
testimony of wives as evidence against a husband and recognized the consequences of mental as 
well as physical abuse.24 In a precedent-setting case, Fulgham v. the State of Alabama, the chief 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     22  Wheeling Register May 4, 1881; Savannah Tribune December 12, 1876; Macon Weekly 
Telegraph September 12, 1876; New Orleans Times August 8, 1874; Morning Republican 
August 23, 1873; Macon Weekly Telegraph April 30, 1872; Times Picayune October 31, 1871. 
 
     23 In situations of sexual assault, especially when the accused assailant was white, African 
American women had little to no recourse for crimes against their person. Often, women of color 
were blamed for the rapes since white social expectations considered them hypersexual and 
incapable of saying “no” to sex. Deborah Gray White examines this Mammy v. Jezebel myth of 
black women in Ar'n't I a Woman?: Female Slaves in the Plantation South, (New York: Norton, 
1985), and Crystal Nicole Feimster analyzes the lack of protection for African American women 
against sexual assault in the New South in Southern Horrors, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2009).   Darlene Clark Hine also explores rape of African American women 
and what she calls the “culture of dissemblance” in “Rape and the Inner Lives of Black Women 
in the Middle West.” Signs, Vol. 14, No. 4, (Summer, 1989), 912-920. 
 
     24 State v. Huntley 91 N.C. 617 (1884). The majority of opinion denied prior precedent in 
Hussey and argued the wife could in fact testify against her husband. Huntley also argued that 
Justices of the Peace had no jurisdiction for intimate-partner violence since such assault and 
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justice “charged that the proposition that a husband could moderately chastise his wife was a 
relic of barbarism.”25 Other courts quickly followed Fulgham by abolishing legal protection of 
the antebellum male privilege of chastisement.26 Wife beating was no longer compatible with 
American conceptions of civilization, masculinity, or femininity, and courts nationwide started 
punishing abusive husbands under the misdemeanor of assault and battery.27 This was a marked 
change from the antebellum period in which family violence was viewed as private matter and a 
man’s “right” to chastise his wife went virtually unchecked. 
Admittedly, intimate-partner violence then like now often went unprosecuted. While I 
argue that social and legal reform empowered women to demand freedom from violence, I also 
strive to convey the complexity of intimate-partner violence during the period, including when 
women did not show agency. Sometimes women dropped charges or refused to testify when the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
battery was not trivial. The judges used mental suffering as evidence of the severity of wife 
beating. 
	  	  
     25 Fulgham v. the State  46 Ala. 143 (1871). Although there is a major case before Fulgham- 
State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (1868)- I start with Fulgham since Rhodes still recognized the 
primacy of the family and state intervention only in severe cases of spousal assault.  Fulgham 
goes further than the North Carolina Supreme Court case to argue that wife beating was not 
acceptable.  For more information on the Rhodes case, see Laura Edwards, “Women and 
Domestic Violence in Nineteenth-Century Carolina” in Michael A. Bellesiles, Lethal 
Imagination: Violence and Brutality in American History, (New York: New York University 
Press, 1999): 114-136. 
 
     26 For example of similar cases that followed Fulgham, see Knight v. Knight 31 Iowa 451 
(1871); Commonwealth v. McAfee 108 Mass. 458 (1871); and Shackett v. Shackett 49 Vt. 195 
(1876). 
	  	  
     27 Although Fulgham involves an African-American couple, the repudiation of the male 
privilege of chastisement extended to every race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class. For 
information on white elites being charged with wife beating see Carolyn B. Ramsey, “A Diva 
Defends Herself: Gender and Domestic Violence in an Early Twentieth-Century Headline Trial,” 
55 St. Louis University Law Journal 1347 (2011) 1; University of Colorado Law Legal Studies 





state pressed charges against their husbands. A few cases, for various reasons, had the words 
nolle prosequi written on their covers, denoting that the accused would not be prosecuted 
further.28 Still, husbands could face legal and social consequences for spousal abuse. The court 
records testify to that, and more importantly, the extra-legal violence by the community showed 
that society did not whole-heartedly condone this gendered violence.  
By the 1890s, reform for intimate-partner violence lost ground in the South largely 
because race dominated social concerns in the region. Without northern oversight or concern 
about the South’s racial relations, southern states devised loopholes to impose segregation, 
disenfranchise black men, and deny African Americans civil rights. This shift in relations had 
implications for intimate-partner violence, as shown in the Harris case at the beginning of this 
introduction. Politicians and society viewed wife beating as the black community’s problem, and 
intimate-partner violence became racialized. Newspapers described an African-American man 
who abused his wife as a “bad nigger” and “a blood thirsty negro.”29 Successful prosecutions 
were made more often against black men during this period, and punishing intimate-partner 
violence became a method of white elite control over African-Americans.30  
By the beginning of the early twentieth century, views on intimate-partner violence also 
changed in the North. People started to feel intimate-partner violence was not really a problem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    28 A few examples are: State v. Stagno Salvador, May 12, 1893, CRDC 2041; State v. Jeffery 
Hill, 30 Sept. 1885, CRDC 7593; State v. James Gillen, 8 Sept. 1882, CRDC 2911. New Orleans 
City Archives. 
 
     29 Charlotte Observer August 25, 1896; Wheeling Register November 26, 1893. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  30	  Historian Elizabeth Pleck, for instance, found “Between 1889 and 1894, fifty-eight out of 
sixty men arrested for wifebeating in Charleston, South Carolina were black.” See Elizabeth 





and that the suffragette and “New Woman” provoked her husband to be violent by attempting to 
be the man’s equal. In 1914, Boston scientist Dr. William T. Sedgwick articulated this mindset to 
the public through newspapers when he argued a man would commit violence against women if 
women persisted in public and political life.31 Essentially, Sedgewick warned women that male 
violence (physical and sexual) was the consequence of feminism. Abolishing conservative 
gender expectations and the separate spheres ideal gave men the inclination if not the right to 
abuse women, Sedgewick implied. This 1914 statement by a respected medical professional 
contrasts sharply with views on violence against women in the 1870s and 1880s. By the 1910s 
and 1920s, intervention in intimate-partner violence lessened as gender expectations 
reestablished men’s right to assert control over his wife, even through the use of physical force. 
Similar to the Copper case at the beginning of this introduction, northern courts and 
agencies like the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCC) also lost interest in 
punishing abusers. Instead, their new objective upheld family stability. In 1910, Justice William 
Day wrote the majority opinion in the U.S. Supreme Court case, Thompson v. Thompson, and 
declared that a wife could not sue her husband for damages from assault and battery because it 
would “open the doors of the courts to accusations of all sorts of one spouse against the other” 
and questioned whether the  “exercise of such jurisdiction would be promotive of the public 
welfare and domestic harmony.”32 Quickly, privacy of family trumped prosecution of intimate-
partner violence. Within the next decade, police officers and criminal courts stopped pressing 
charges against husbands for intimate-partner violence. Psychologists and social workers took 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     31 George MacAdam, “Feminist Revolutionary Principle is Biological Bosh,” New York 
Times, 18 January 1914, sec. 5, p. 2; as quoted in Bederman, 161.  
 




control, upholding views of female accountability and victim blaming.33 By the 1930s, Freudian 
psychoanalysis in the United States stressed internal conflict, and the battered wife was told the 
abuse was her fault. This provided a means of social control of women through imposing 
conservative gender expectations. Any progress in addressing the problem of intimate-partner 
violence was virtually erased. 
 
Methodology 
This dissertation examines the changing public policies for intimate-partner violence 
against women in heterosexual relationships through the lens of shifting gender roles in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Legal intervention at first may seem like a top down 
method of control, but such a perspective overlooks critical social factors, particularly the 
changes in gender expectations. The majority of the women’s testimony attests to a distinct 
transformation in people’s attitudes. The courts did not create the shift in treatment of intimate-
partner violence but rather enforced a new social norm by punishing abusive partners. Historians 
and legal scholars have debated the legal system as either a primary mover of social change or a 
responder to social pressure, and while most agree a blend of the two are evident, a general 
consensus on the more dominant influence does not exist.34 Intimate-partner violence during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     33 Pleck, 125-144.  
 
     34 Historian Michael J. Klarman’s From Jim Crow to Civil Rights argues law, particularly 
concerning the Brown v. Board of Education case, was and is largely influenced by social values. 
Klarman also discusses how judges rule (personal values or based on the letter of the law) and 
argues while a blend of both, judges rely on personal beliefs when the law is “less clear” (5).  
See Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle 
for Racial Equality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Legal scholar Thomas Kearns 
agrees social views are the impetus for change in the legal system. He states, “Law, in the 
instrumentalist account, mirrors society. Changes in law tend to follow social changes, and often 
intend to do no more than make those changes permanent.” See Thomas Kearns, Beyond the 
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late 1800s shows a blend of both as well. Judges could and did punish those who broke the law, 
and by policing those who still clung to antebellum notions of manhood and the “right” of 
chastisement, case law set new precedents that mimicked a larger shift in society. Politicians did 
not, in the majority of states, pass laws criminalizing intimate-partner violence. Rather, judges 
began reinterpreting assault and battery statutes on the books and started finding abusive 
husbands guilty of assault and battery when they beat their female partners. The fact that the 
change took place in case law subtly, informally, and unevenly throughout the country indicates 
judges responded to changes in social expectations. Then, the judges used the positions to teach 
men the new restriction on male power. The redefinition of gender expectations drove the new 
interpretation of assault and battery to repudiate the antiquated privilege of physical “correction.”  
Post-Civil War masculinity, femininity, and case law, then, are all integral to 
understanding intimate-partner violence and female agency in the United States. Newspapers, 
manuscript collections, and court cases form the backbone of the research. Newspapers give 
insight to social attitudes. No less than three hundred twenty-eight articles were used in this 
dissertation, including newspapers ranging from New Orleans’ The Times Picayune to the 
Chicago Daily Tribune. Manuscript collections, such as the Micajah Wilkinson Papers and 
James Knapp Papers, contained journals and private correspondence that supported statements 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship and Everyday Life, in Law and Everyday Life 21 (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993). Historian Richard Polenberg seems to argue 
differently on the influence of courts. He intimates that the courts affect the larger society and 
impose changes and views. See Richard Polenberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the 
Supreme Court, and Free Speech, (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1987). Legal scholar Reva 
Siegel uses a “preservation through transformation” argument stating judges tended to allow for 
social change somewhat but uphold the older hierarchy by readapting the ruling along another set 
of lines in order to have the same end result as prior to social pressure to change. See Reva B. 
Siegel, “‘The Rule of Love’: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,” Faculty Scholarship 




made in the newspapers, further enabling the reconstruction of a public attitude on intimate-
partner violence for this dissertation. 
 Court cases provide a look at the legal response during the period. Rather than cherry 
pick various cases from throughout the country, this dissertation relies largely on local recorder 
court records from Orleans Parish. I examined 1,228 assault and battery cases from Orleans 
Parish during the 1865 to 1910 period and found 202 that dealt specifically with some form of 
intimate-partner violence. Recorder courts provide important insight to the day-to-day responses 
from the lower courts, and give a better glimpse of the typical ruling in intimate-partner violence 
than federal Supreme Court cases. These local cases, along with some landmark state or federal 
court cases are a substantial component of this dissertation.  
A study of the densest population settlement in Louisiana lends itself to a richer and more 
manageable analysis of the shift in social awareness and public policy. Moreover, since major 
works in the field by Linda Gordon and Elizabeth Pleck focus on northern cases, particularly 
Massachusetts, a southern state such as Louisiana provides a needed point of comparison. In the 
late nineteenth century, Louisiana was neither as aggressive in punishing wife beating as 
Massachusetts and Georgia were, nor was it as lax in its policies as states such as Arkansas.35 As 
a result, Louisiana represents more of the median of the states and a glimpse into case law for the 
period. Moreover, it clearly illustrates the southern shift in policy during the 1890s that is not 
visible through northern court cases alone. Within the state of Louisiana, the population was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     35 See Laura Edwards’s chapter in Lethal Imagination. North Carolina and Georgia quickly 
targeted “wife beating.”  For instance, in the State v. Rhodes (1868), North Carolina ruled against 
anything more than “moderate correction” of a spouse, and by the 1890s, North Carolina had a 
Constitutional amendment disfranchising “wife beaters.” As early as Georgia passed a law 
punishing “wife beaters” with a misdemeanor. Arkansas, on the other hand, had no express legal 





clustered in the port city of New Orleans and its surrounding vicinity. In 1870, Orleans Parish 
was home to twenty-seven percent of Louisiana’s population.36 Even by 1900, twenty-one 
percent of the state’s population resided within Orleans Parish making it more than five times the 
size of the next largest parish, St. Landry.37 Examining Orleans Parish, then, provides a good 
portion of the court cases in Louisiana. Orleans Parish and the City of New Orleans also have 
maintained the best archives for Louisiana court cases in the period. As such, legal reform 
discussions in this dissertation will rely heavily on the records of these locales for the legal 
reform aspect of this study.    
To illustrate the North’s rolling back of reform in intimate-partner violence, I use various 
works discussing the views in psychology and social work. The Massachusetts and Louisiana 
Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children provide critical insight into the changing 
goals in organizations. Case studies of social workers in Chicago also are used to demonstrate 
the influence of experts in family courts as well as the new primary objective of family stability. 
Most of the cases used are found in Dr. Ernest Mowrer and Harriet R. Mowrer’s published 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     36 This statistic was created by using the 1870 US. Census 
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1870.html.   I divided the population numbers 
for Orleans Parish  (197,418) by the total population of the state of Louisiana (726,915) and 
multiplied by 100.   
 
     37 The same technique as described in footnote seven was used to compile this statistic as 
well.  Population numbers derived from the 1900 U.S. Census.   At this time, St. Landry included 





Such a multifaceted issue like intimate-partner violence warrants a comprehensive 
approach. Consequently, this dissertation builds upon and draws from multiple forms of 
scholarship both inside and outside the field of history. Historical works provide a critical 
foundation, especially since this dissertation spans four decades. In the postbellum period, the 
United States was still reeling from the Civil War. In Shook Over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, 
Vietnam, and the Civil War, Eric T. Dean, Jr., examines how returning soldiers attempted to 
readjust to civilian life but struggled from their war experiences. Their struggles offer insight 
into the shift in masculinity. Also, women on the home front took on new roles and questioned 
antebellum roles. Drew Gilpin Faust discusses the southern home front in Mothers of Invention: 
Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War while J. Matthew Gallman focuses 
on the North in The North Fights the Civil War: The Home Front.38 Both find antebellum 
manhood and womanhood could not remain intact. As LeAnn Whites argues in Gender Matters: 
Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Making of the New South, men and women experienced a 
shift in gender and sought to make sense of their changing roles.39  
Politically, Americans faced more changes. The reach of the federal government 
extended well beyond the borders of the states to force recognition of individual rights. Radical 
Republicans in Congress had gained control and were passing legislation to make the South, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     38 See Drew G. Faust, Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the 
American Civil War, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996) and J.M. Gallman, 
The North Fights the Civil War: The Home Front, (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1994). 
 
     39 See Leann Whites, Gender Matters: Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Making of the New 




Congressman Thaddeus Stephens said, “republican in spirit.”40 Passage of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments sought to guarantee African-American men rights that the southern states 
sought to deny, but Henry Adams noticed, “the Fifteenth Amendment was ‘more remarkable for 
what it does not than what it does contain.’”41 Eric Foner in Reconstruction: America’s 
Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 thoroughly covers this tumultuous period and argues that the 
reforms in Reconstruction were incomplete. He remarks on the many problems and inadequacies 
of the period, including some women’s issues. For example, women’s rights advocates Susan B. 
Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton noticed the deficiencies in the amendments, specifically its 
lack of enfranchising women. In response, the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA) 
and American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) were formed. While the main focus for the 
NWSA and AWSA centered on extending the franchise to women, many other issues fell under 
their domain, and their leaders and members spoke in favor of several concerns of women, 
including intimate-partner violence.   
 By the late 1870s, Reconstruction was in decline, and industrialization seemed, to the 
majority of the white population, to be the larger threat. Anxiety over the consequences of 
industrialization plagued many Americans. Railroads expanded, connecting small towns to larger 
cities, and increasing numbers of individuals fled to the city for opportunity. Women gained 
economic opportunities to work outside the home and participate in leisure activities, which had 
previously been considered male pursuits. This increased autonomy in women fueled shifting 
gender expectations, and citizens feared these changes would be detrimental to society and to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     40 Thaddeus Stephens, “Speech to U.S. House of Representative,” January 3, 1867. 
  
     41 Henry Adams, “The Session,” North American Review, 108 (April 1869), 613; as quoted in 
Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, (New York: Harper 




family. Jackson Lears in Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920 posits 
that people at this time possessed “a widespread yearning for regeneration- for rebirth that was 
variously spiritual, moral, and physical.”42 From this desire for rebirth, social movements 
multiplied. Many felt the family was in crisis, and reform groups took these issues to the 
government. After all, as Gaines Foster notices in Moral Reconstruction, “If the federal 
government could abolish the sin of slavery, they [Christian Americans] claimed, it could also 
outlaw other forms of immorality.”43 Reformers consequently sought help from the government 
to stamp out problems, instill morality, and protect families. This included family dynamics, 
especially women’s relationships to men. As I argue in this dissertation, reformers fought for 
women’s right to be free from violence. 
Scholarship on families also provides important support for this dissertation. Stephen 
Mintz and Susan Kellogg in Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of American Family Life 
and Michael Grossberg in Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century 
America deftly trace the changes in family in American history. Mintz and Kellogg argue that 
despite family having existed as a private entity since the New Republic Era, the Civil War 
changed people’s views on the relationship between the family and the state. Instead of outside 
the bounds of the law, families by the late 1800s fell within the domain of public welfare, and 
consequently, neighbors and courts felt obligated to intervene when abuse or neglect occurred. 
Coinciding with this shift, Grossberg notices that between 1870 and 1890 Americans viewed 
marriages as more than a simple contract as romantic love grew to dominate social views on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     42 Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920, (New 
York: HarperCollins, 2009): 1.  
 
     43 Gaines Foster, Moral Reconstruction: Christian Lobbyists and the Federal Legislation of 




marriage.44 Although some reformers sought to tighten divorce laws between 1870 and 1920, the 
changing views of marriage altered expectation and influenced divorce, which increased fifteen 
times over the period.45 In part, intimate-partner violence drove more liberal interpretation of 
divorce laws. Women’s rights advocates, such as Lucy Stone, Amelia Bloomer, and Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton, petitioned state legislators to modify marital laws and enable abused women and 
women with alcoholic husbands to divorce their spouses. They did not have much success in 
changing the actual legislation on marriage, but judges shared some of these views by the end of 
the twentieth century. As Elaine Tyler May proves in Great Expectations: Marriage and Divorce 
in Post-Victorian America, judges typically granted divorces to wives for their husbands’ cruelty, 
desertion, “unreasonable” sexual demands, and drunkenness.46 As social awareness grew about 
the problem and courts criminalized violence against women, judges granted more divorces to 
help legally married women escape from abusive spouses. Wife battering and sexual abuse 
within marriage were not as tolerated anymore.  
Acknowledging social anxiety and a perceived crisis in family, most works that discuss 
intimate-partner violence do so within the lens of family violence. Elizabeth Pleck in Domestic 
Tyranny and Linda Gordon in Heroes of Their Own Lives both focus on understanding shifts in 
the family and its implications for public policy on family violence. This approach is necessary 
to understand the changing family dynamics during the period. However, this dissertation seeks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     44 Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and Family in Nineteenth-Century 
America, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985): 84-102.  
 
    45 Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg, Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of American 
Family Life, (New York: The Free Press, 1988): 109.  
 
     46 Elaine Tyler May, Great Expectations: Marriage and Divorce in Post-Victorian America, 




to concentrate on intimate-partner violence through the lens of shifting gender expectations. It 
also seeks to inject the South into the narrative, which is absent in Pleck and Gordon’s works. 
Intimate-partner violence differed from other forms of family violence and from region to region. 
Although the North and the South followed the same trajectory in criminalizing intimate-partner 
violence in the 1870s and 1880s, definite differences existed, particularly on the reasons for the 
decline of addressing intimate-partner violence. Race was also somewhat fluid in the South 
during the postbellum years, as C. Vann Woodward argues in The Strange Career of Jim Crow. 
The oppressive racial order that emerged in the 1890s was neither predetermined nor inevitable. 
During the 1870s and 1880s, then, race mattered less than the seemingly larger issue of gender 
expectations, as seen by the threat of rape by black men, and change resulted in which abusive 
men faced social and legal condemnation. The rise of what became known as the Jim Crow era 
in the 1890s, however, brought an end to concern for women’s right to be free from violence, 
and instead made race the central social and legal issue again for southerners. Including the 
South corrects the narrative to address the issue distinctive differences of the region as well as 
the pressing issue of race. After all, as Edward Ayers argues, the New South in the postbellum 
period did not simply follow northern economic, political, and social patterns or “lose its of the 
region’s distinctiveness within the nation.”47 Examining gender rather than the family as well as 
each region rather than the North as emblematic of the nation enables a clearer understanding of 
intimate-partner violence during the period.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     47 Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002): x. Ayers and other historians point to the failure of Populism in 
1896 as the main catalyst for the Jim Crow Era. His argument, like Woodward’s, shows 
redefinition of relationships between blacks and whites in the South during the 1870s and 1880s. 
This exceptionally fluid moment permitted gender expectations to be addressed, albeit briefly, 





Feminist theory, gender studies, criminology, victimology, anthropology, and sociology 
all offer important theoretical foundations. Primarily, however, this dissertation utilizes 
postmodernist theories that stress the subjective creation of gender and the unequal distribution 
of power. Many feminist scholars and women’s historians have discussed gender as a social 
construction. Joan Wallach Scott’s 1986 article titled, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical 
Analysis” profoundly impacted the historical profession and still serves as the basis for many 
other scholars in the field, as well as for my understanding of the uses of gender analysis.48 Like 
many postmodernists, Scott recognizes gender as distinctive from biological sex, and she refutes 
the male/female dichotomy. Men are not automatically masculine any more than women are 
predestined to be feminine. Masculinity and femininity are behavioral performances influenced 
by expectations in society since, as feminist author Judith Butler states, there is no “right” 
gender.49  
Moreover, Scott, like many postmodernist historians, recognizes gender as a social and 
ideological process that has changed over time. To understand gender expectations, then, social 
values and customs of the period must be scrutinized. Definitions of masculinity and femininity 
are not constants but rather shift according to time, location, socioeconomic status, religious 
faith, race, and ethnicity. Scott, however, adds that gender serves as a useful lens through which 
to analyze history since “gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power.”50 The 
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Historical Review, 91, no. 5 (December 1986): 1053–1075.  
 
     49 Judith Butler, “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” in The Judith Butler Reader, 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2003): 119-137. 
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dynamics of power and capturing the voice of disempowered groups are central to history, in 
general, and intimate-partner violence, in particular.51 After all, intimate-partner violence, as 
Lenore Walker has shown, is based on issues of power and control.52 The connections between 
sexism, power, and battering are not inevitable, but, as this dissertation will show, the links are 
clearly present from 1865 to 1920 and, more importantly, crucial to past understandings and the 
prevalence of intimate-partner violence. 
For purposes of this dissertation, discussion of embodiment is purposefully neglected. 
Some domestic violence policy advocates point to the physical size of men and women as a 
cause in abuse. In these theories, men are viewed as naturally larger and women as naturally 
smaller.53 Since size in male bodies, as Susan Bordo argues, is associated with aggressiveness 
and power, some domestic violence theorists posit masculinity prizes domination and power over 
physically smaller beings, such as women and children.54 The link appears a prevalent cause to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     51 Jesse Lemisch is the historian from the New Left period who coined the phrase and 
influenced the profession with his “history from the bottom up” theory.  See Jack Tar in the 
Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America, (Manchester, NH: Irvington 
Publishers, 1968).  
 
     52 Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman, (New York: Harper & Row, 1979): xi.  
 
     53 A few who believe size influences the choice/likelihood to batter are as follows: Kevin A. 
Fall, Shareen Howard, and June E. Ford, Alternatives to Domestic Violence: A Homework 
Manual for Battering Intervention Groups, (Philadelphia, Pa: Accelerated Development, 1999); 
L.K. Hamberger and Mary B. Phelan, Domestic Violence Screening and Intervention in Medical 
and Mental Healthcare Settings, (New York, NY: Springer, 2004); and Râachael Wyckoff and 
Sally Simpson, "The Effects of Self-Protective Behaviors on Injury for African American 
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  54 Susan Bordo, The Male Body: A New Look at Men in Public and in Private, (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999). New masculinity at the turn of the twentieth century did hold a 
chiseled, athletic, physically aggressive male as an ideal, but the shift in gender expectations that 
causes intimate-partner violence reform begins decades before the new man that Gail Bederman 
and others describe. For more on the new masculinity and physical prowess at the turn of the 
twentieth century, see Gail Bederman,	  Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender 
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even to modern day medical professionals. 55 Physical strength logically enables successful 
physical domination over another person, but most times physical abuse is accompanied with 
emotional abuse as well, which makes the victim more easily beaten regardless of physical size.  
Some recent scholars argue size is not in fact a contributor to violence but rather is a harmful 
overgeneralization (and borderline biological determinist argument) that glosses over the 
pervasiveness of intimate-partner violence and obscures the real issue—that of power.56 Given 
the debated aspect of size and that physicality of the abusers did not enter into the court records’ 
testimony, embodiment will not be a component of the analysis of intimate-partner violence 
during the late 1800s.57 
 Sociologists have also written a wealth of material on gender-based violence. Sociologist 
and Criminal Justice Professor Susan Miller is an expert on the topic, particularly abuse in the 
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     55 Jarmila Mildorf, Storying Domestic Violence: Constructions and Stereotypes of Abuse in 
the Discourse of General Practitioners, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007). Mildorf 
analyzes medical doctors charts and statements on couples in intimate-partner violence and finds 
overwhelmingly, the doctors express disbelief when the victim is larger than the abuser. Size is 
prevalent in people’s belief in factors contributing to intimate-partner violence. Especially in 
male victims of heterosexual intimate-partner violence and any victim in same-sex intimate-
partner violence, size is not accepted by many theorists as a factor at all. A few who believe size 
is not an indicator in the choice to batter, see Jarmila Mildorf, Storying Domestic Violence; 
Robbin S. Ogle and Susan Jacobs, Battered Women Who Kill: A New Framework, (Westport, 
Conn: Praeger, 2002); and James M. Clark, Behind the Fence: Examining Domestic Violence 
Attitudes and Behaviors between Military and Civilian Wives, (Ph.D., Capella University), 2007.	  
      
     56 Ibid.; Laura L. O'Toole and Jessica R. Schiffman, Gender Violence: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, (New York: New York University Press, 1997). 
  
     57 Southern newspapers in the 1890s did start to use size in their racialized descriptors of 
African American abusers, however. In this case, physicality mattered in proving black men as 
primitive and uncivilized thereby undeserving of political and civil rights. Still, for the initial 
shift in gender expectations and abuse, size did not appear as stated factor although power did.	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home. Her works Victim as Offender: The Paradox of Women’s Violence in Relationships and 
The Victimization of Women: Law, Policies, and Politics provide another component to this 
dissertation’s theoretical framework.  In part, Miller’s writings helped to shape this dissertation’s 
terminology. Intimate-partner violence is used to explain violence against women in some sort of 
relationship⎯ whether it be a marriage, an engagement, courtship, or cohabitation. The phrases 
“family violence” and “domestic violence,” are not the most appropriate term for the scope of 
this dissertation. These phrases are commonly used as an umbrella term to incorporate incest, 
molestation, patricide, matricide, femicide, infanticide, child abuse, child cruelty, child neglect, 
and intimate-partner violence. Since this project seeks to understand certain dynamics in 
intimate-partner violence, family violence would not be specific enough. Moreover, family 
violence is, as Miller convincingly argues, a “more sanitized euphemistic term,” which avoids 
placing blame.58 In a family-centered approach for identifying and correcting intimate-partner 
violence, the violence precipitating the need for treatment is not given a high priority since 
professionals seek to maintain the marriage, and instead, these professionals search for the other 
difficulties within the couple’s relationship.59 Taking a family-focused method, then, underscores 
the importance of power dynamics and spreads the blame to the victim as well as the batterer. 
Even the term “spousal abuse” and the contemporary “wife beating” are limited for the purpose 
of this dissertation since the violence examined does not exist only within the confines of 
marriage. “Wife beating” or “spousal abuse,” like “family violence” and “domestic violence,” 
are not inclusive enough and are infrequently used in this dissertation.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     58 Susan Miller, The Victimization of Women: Law, Policies, and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011): 12.  
 




Similarly, the word “batterer” is used to refer to the person responsible for the majority of 
violence within the relationship. Those who use violence in self-defense are not, within the 
confines of this dissertation, considered batterers. All forms of violence must be evaluated on 
their severity, and context is critical when examining intimate-partner violence. Therefore, 
women who the penal system might call “mutually violent” are not given the same status as 
batterer for physical assaults in the act of self-defense.60  
Although recent decades have empowered victims of intimate-partner violence by using 
the signage “survivor,” “victim” is better suited for this project. Not all the women discussed in 
this dissertation survived, and those who used the court systems and Progressive organizations 
for help called themselves victims. This is not to diminish the strength of anyone who has lived 
through intimate-partner violence nor is this to paint women as weak. Rather, “victim” serves to 
designate, as most dictionaries define, the individual harmed as a result of violence against their 
person. 
 Miller’s works provide more than help with terminology. Both Miller and journalist Ann 
Lloyd examine the problem of violent women. While Lloyd’s Doubly Deviant, Doubly Damned: 
Society’s Treatment of Violent Women focuses on women who use violence both as self-defense 
and as a means of retribution or control, her book is useful when viewed in conjunction with 
Miller’s Victims as Offenders. Lloyd and Miller examine the seemingly contradictory statuses 
women can hold as victim and offender. Both see how women who use violence are stigmatized 
more so than men who use violence.61 Biological determinist theories hold that women are, by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     60 Susan Miller, Victims as Offenders: The Paradox of Women’s Violence in Relationships, 
(New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 2005): ix-xii. 
 
     61 Miller, Victims as Offender: 3; Ann Lloyd, Doubly Deviant, Doubly Damned: Society’s 
Treatment of Violent Women, (London: Penguin Books, 1995): xviii. 
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consequence of their physical sex, feminine and therefore nurturing and the opposite of violent. 
Violence is, within the framework of biological determinism, a trait of men. Consequently, 
women are perceived as the “other.”62 Rather than being seen as only violent, violent women are 
viewed as “abnormal, unnatural evil monsters, witchlike and cunning, deadlier than the male.”63 
Moreover, Lloyd and Miller recognize that the use of violence generally differs between the 
sexes, which makes victim blaming all the more problematic. Men and women resort to violence 
for different reasons. Men use violence to instill fear while women use it primarily for self-
defense or in frustration.64 While some women (roughly five to ten percent according to most 
studies and one percent of this dissertation’s sample size) could be defined as batterers and use 
violence as a mechanism of control, the vast majority of women do not.65 This fact delegitimizes 
much of the victim blaming and viewing couples as “mutually combatant.” This dissertation 
seeks to identify the reasoning behind that rise in perceiving women as having responsibility for 
being battered. 
To examine the dynamics of gender and reform, this work focuses on violence against 
women. The choice is deliberate but not meant to be dismissive of male victims or to privilege 
heterosexual relationships. Since intimate-partner violence was defined as “wife battering” at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     62 Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex is well known for her work in discussing the 
polarized creation of ego and otherness.  By designating something or someone as an “other,” an 
individual, particularly an individual shaped by Western androcentric expectations, consigns that 
“other” to a lower status.  For women, then, being labeled as an “other” facilitates inequities 
between the sexes in gender expectations as well as in daily practice. 
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turn of the twentieth century and comprised the majority of intimate-partner violence cases, 
female victims will be the focus of this dissertation. In a search of articles from 1865 to 1910 
within the American Historical Newspapers database, only eight out of two hundred seventy-four 
articles and few criminal court cases I found mention “husband beating,” in which the husband 
was the victim.  While the idea that real men cannot be beaten by women may be gender bias, 
current statistics uphold the estimate of women comprising the majority of intimate-partner 
violence victims at 75-85%.66  Men can be and are victims of intimate-partner violence, but the 
dynamics in male victim/female batterer are too different from female victim/male batterer, 
especially at the turn of the twentieth century, and therefore are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.   
Likewise, same-sex intimate-partner violence has drawn more attention in recent years 
and does warrant attention, but again, while power and control are crucial, the dynamics vary 
somewhat from heterosexual intimate-partner violence during the period. Moreover, finding 
information on same-sex intimate-partner violence at the turn of the twentieth century is 
challenging given how homosexuality had become pathologized and increasingly stigmatized at 
the time.67 None of the court cases I examined addressed assault and battery between two men or 
two women living together openly or discreetly in a same-sex relationship. Turn-of-the-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     66 See Center for Disease Control, “2012 Intimate Partner Violence Factsheet,” 
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twentieth-century studies on gay and lesbian relationships have been explored in notable works, 
such as Lisa Duggan in Sapphic Slashers: Sex, Violence, and American Modernity and George 
Chauncey in Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Makings of the Gay Male World, 
1890-1940. Sapphic Slashers deals with intimate-partner homicide, but relatively little 
scholarship exists on non-lethal forms of intimate-partner violence between members of the same 
sex during the late nineteenth century, likely because of limited sources. While such issues are 
important, this dissertation focuses on violence against women, and the dynamic of same-sex 
intimate-partner violence is beyond the scope of this project. 
 Another component to the theoretical framework for this dissertation involves literature 
on reform. Social reform in United States history has generally undergone repeating cycles of the 
following steps: “moral suasion, coercion [usually through use of the state], backlash, and 
complacency.”68 Starting with the Temperance Movement and Social Purity Movement in the 
1870s, as Gaines Foster notes in Moral Reconstruction, groups attempted to change social 
problems through pointing out moral problems in society but met with little success until they 
relied, like other Progressives, on legislation to affect a difference. Using the state to affect 
change, however, required changes on other levels⎯including views on the government’s 
influence, the relationship between individual and society, the role of family, and gender 
expectations. The often-quoted anthropologist Clifford Geertz is useful since he argued that 
ideology can be analyzed as “a cultural system.”69  Changing gender expectations of the time 
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show people renegotiating relationships between men and women and rethinking their views of 
the male privilege of chastisement. Society also drove reform as well as the decline of reform. 
Rather than small steps towards eradicating the problem of intimate-partner violence, reform for 
women’s right to be free from violence rolled back, like a wave, by the turn of the twentieth 
century. This cycle illustrates a nonlinear progression to addressing intimate-partner violence. 
This cultural and cyclical view of change is central to the framework of this dissertation. 
 
Organization 
 Organized along the lines of bottom up change, this dissertation is structured to examine 
each level of intervention. Chapter one establishes the changing gender expectations and 
behaviors, resulting from people’s experiences during the Civil War and the process of 
industrialization. Women gained some economic rights and participated more in the public 
“sphere;” more importantly, women demanded some level of reciprocity in their relationships 
with men. Chapter two analyzes the change in the individuals, notably women, who internalized 
the right to be free from violence. Chapter three shows how larger groups in society viewed 
intimate-partner violence and how family and neighbors intervened. This chapter relies heavily 
upon newspapers and their discussion of gender and intimate-partner violence as well as 
testimony in Orleans Parish court cases to uncover the level of social awareness. Chapter four 
looks at institutions, such as the SPCC and WCTU, to see how these groups lobbied for the state 
to get involved in the social problem of intimate-partner violence. Chapter five takes Orleans 
Parish criminal court records from Louisiana and illustrates a shift in the courts’ legal response 
to intimate-partner violence.  Most states did not have any new law specific to intimate-partner 
violence; however, courts fleshed out new legal responses to wife beating. Chapters six and 
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seven reveal the major differences between the North and the South in addressing intimate-
partner violence⎯ the end of the movement. Chapter six shows how the South racialized 
intimate-partner violence during the 1890s to act as another method of racial control. Chapter 
seven examines the decline of the movement against intimate-partner violence in the North 
through relegating public policy towards experts, who prioritized family stability. In both the 
North and the South, the movement to eradicate intimate-partner violence fully ended by the 
1920s. 
Analyzing intimate-partner violence enables an in-depth look at the social and legal ties 
in addressing spousal abuse in the United States from 1865 to 1920.  In the wake of changing 
gender expectations, courts reinterpreted the law to allow for female agency as well as state and 
social intervention in helping abused women. New understandings of manhood and womanhood 
promised to protect ladies from uncivilized, brutish men, and these new expectations 
encompassed white women, African-American women, poor women, and wealthy women. 
Women could and did seek legal redress for abuse during the late nineteenth century. This 
dissertation will add to the rich scholarship on gender, social reform, legal reform, and women’s 
rights, but this dissertation aims at making needed connections between changing gender roles 
and intimate-partner violence.  How these connections began have massive implications for 
public policy, even now. Understanding this period helps to uncover how gender expectations 
and racial ideologies can facilitate and hinder responses to intimate-partner violence, and these 
social links to public policy are crucial to devising effective solutions to the complex issue of 







TRANSFORMING GENDER EXPECTATIONS 
DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 
 
Oh great God! what means this carnage, 
Why this fratricidal strife, 
Brethren made in your own image 
Seeking for each other’s life? ⎯ “My God! What Is All This For?” (1861)70 
 
At the battle of Manassas, a dying Union soldier cried out, “My God! What is all this 
for?”71 His attempt to find meaning in his last breath resonated with many Americans who heard 
reports of the first major land battle and read the long lists of the dead. The soldier’s exclamation 
quickly became part of a song that gained popularity during the Civil War on both sides. The 
song’s lyrics spoke of men “duped” into fighting and unable to die the “Good Death” of a 
soldier⎯unquestioning, accepting of his fate, and honored to die for his country.72 “My God! 
What Is All This For?” encapsulated the frustrations of a population bewildered by the 
unprecedented number of casualties, trying to find meaning in a land filled with family members 
in mourning.73 The Civil War⎯what historian Charles Royster aptly called “the destructive 
war”⎯ challenged the entire nation and what they thought they knew. 74 It left Americans 
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http://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/songsheets_bsvg100466/  (Accessed 10/26/2013). 
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32 
scrambling to reconstruct their country as well as their beliefs, and it created a pivotal moment in 
which gender expectations became increasingly fluid.75 
 
The Civil War and Manhood 
Antebellum views of manhood glorified men’s service as soldiers. Fighting for God, 
country, and home, these military men fulfilled their ultimate role as protectors. Newspapers and 
condolence letters spoke of men who died proudly accepting their life as vital for the cause and 
believing they would be reunited in Heaven with God and lost loved ones.76 Men internalized 
this message with nearly half of all white men of fighting age serving in the war in the North and 
three-fourths of white men of fighting age serving in the war in the South.77 As early as 1861, 
however, the patriotic fervor that induced many men to enlist in the military in both the 
Confederacy and Union had already started to wane, especially as reports came back about 
men’s experiences on the battlefield. If dying in the war was not a “Good Death,” then what was 
the meaning of the war? And, more importantly, how manly were these men? 
 Before the Civil War, the South’s dominant view of manliness celebrated a more 
aggressive view of manhood, while the North emphasized restraint. Southern society often 
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celebrated white male activities, such as hunting, drinking, fighting, and swearing.78 Still, 
religion, particularly evangelical denominations like Methodist and Baptist, remained integral to 
life, and served to temper southern male aggressiveness. Only with the abolition of slavery in 
1865 did tensions between southern manhood and faith lessen some.79 Slavery, many northerners 
contended, was a sin that included barbarity and vice, such as beating enslaved men and women. 
White southern men renegotiated gender expectations without the glaring hypocrisy of slavery. 
On the other hand, northern white manhood emphasized self-control, faith, and domestic virtue. 
Northern men obviously engaged in drink and vice, but they prided themselves on not being as 
dissipated and unrestrained as their southern brothers.80 These competing interregional and 
intraregional images of manliness coexisted uneasily during the antebellum period. The Civil 
War, however, exacerbated these tensions. 
 In 1864, Union General William Tecumseh Sherman wrote, “War is cruelty, and you 
cannot refine it; and those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and 
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maledictions a people can pour out.”81 He described war in the starkest of terms: “War is 
cruelty.”82 Even before Sherman’s transition to hard war with the destruction of civilian property 
and emancipation of slaves, soldiers recognized war indeed was hell.83 Deaths alone could testify 
to such a statement. Roughly 620,000 men died in the Civil War, a number that surpasses 
American deaths in all other wars combined. Some historians, such as J. David Hacker, estimate 
that deaths actually reached as high as 750,000.84 Regardless of the precise number, soldiers 
witnessed an unprecedented slaughter.  
 The reactions to such a large numbers of casualties caused some to betray their ideals of 
manliness and the “Good Death.” Losing close brothers, whether those of blood relation or those 
formed through a shared war experience, men sometimes wondered about the meaning of the 
war, like the soldier who uttered, “My God! What is all this for?”85 Some wrote home about the 
depressing realities of war. Confederate soldier Samuel Watkins Rush wrote 
 My pen is unable to describe the scene of carnage and death that ensued in the next two  
hours. Column after column of Federal soldiers were crowded upon that line… 
Yet still the Yankees came….The sun beaming down on our uncovered heads, the 
thermometer being one hundred and ten degrees in the shade, and a solid line of blazing 
fire right from the muzzles of the Yankee guns being poured right into our very faces, 
singeing our hair and clothes, the hot blood of our dead and wounded spurting on us, the 
blinding smoke and stifling atmosphere filling our eyes and mouths, and the awful 
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concussion causing the blood to gush out of our noses and ears, and above all, the roar of 
battle, made it a perfect pandemonium. Afterward I heard a soldier express himself by 
saying that he thought, "Hell had broke loose in Georgia, sure enough."86 
 
Rush graphically expressed a fraction of what soldiers suffered. The low supplies, rampant 
diseases, primitive hospitals, and incompetent surgeons all were part of the military experience.87 
The men in Rush’s company could only describe the war as hell, not as a worthwhile endeavor in 
which they took part.  
Some could not buy into the “Good Death.” To them, the preservation of the Union or 
establishment of the Confederate States of America was not worth the hundreds of thousands of 
deaths, and these men’s experiences led men to question the larger issue of humanity. A number 
of soldiers, fueled with the desire for avenging their friends’ deaths, sought to kill as many as 
their enemies as possible. In This Republic of Suffering, Drew Gilpin Faust argues that men in 
the war had begun to “delight in killing.”88 Some became “quite another being,” possessed with 
“almost maniac wildness” as they fought and viewed the fields of dead.89 Even when not fighting 
on the battlefield, soldiers acted at times without restraint. Occupation brought out the worst in 
other men as reports of stealing and sexual assault reached higher levels of command. As men 
fought, raped women, stole supplies, and butchered their enemies, what had become of the 
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humanity of the soldiers?90 How much were these soldiers really men⎯ particularly northern 
men who celebrated restraint and self-control⎯ if they harmed women and “delighted in 
killing”?91 
 Between 1861 and 1865, service as a soldier had been seen as a mark of manhood, but 
after the war, Americans started to shun veterans who did not escape unscathed. Amputations 
were performed “around the clock” in military hospitals, and body parts piled up outside the 
entrances to be seen by weary soldiers and army nurses.92 Men commonly underwent 
amputations of limbs to save their lives from the threat of gangrene infection, but in a time when 
medical men lacked knowledge of germs and infrequently washed their hands, such surgeries 
were dangerous. One Union soldier, upon losing a leg to an amputation shrugged it off saying, “a 
leg off is nothing.”93 He attempted to hold onto the restraint of northern manhood and acceptance 
of his fate as a good soldier, but when removed from a camp hospital, he encountered the prying 
eyes of civilians. Newspapers reported the arrivals of trains with injured soldiers, and people 
came “to watch the spectacle of soldiers being unloaded and carried onto stretchers.”94 Whether 
out of morbid curiosity or honor for those who served in the war, people gawked and stared at 
the amputees. At home, these men attempted to acclimate to domestic life with their injuries. 
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Many, however, could not make a successful transition. In a pamphlet for veterans, The Empty 
Sleeve, one soldier commented on the poverty his family faced as the result of losing an arm in 
the war: 
‘Tis of an humble soldier who bore throughout the wars, 
 The flag of freedom’s conflict, and bears to-day the scars;   
And of his wife and children, all famishing and poor, 
 Because the crippled parent can never labor more.95 
 
Those without an extensive support network found it difficult to continue as breadwinners and 
protectors for their families. Even if seen as physical scars of manliness and sacrifice, 
amputations caused internal conflict, and many disabled veterans faced a postwar life that 
challenged their conception of manhood.  
 Some men came home not with physical injuries but with debilitating emotional scars. 
The pressures of the war and threat of death left an imprint with which not all men could come to 
terms. The fear of snipers and the loud shelling made many men panic. One soldier wrote, “One 
second you are filled with anxiety; the next with fear; one second you want to, and the next 
second you don’t.”96 Sometimes the pressure led men to act “with demoniacal fury and shouting 
and laughing hysterically.”97 When they returned home, the war was not always left behind. A 
number of men continued to struggle with the memories and anxiety. Dr. Silas Weir Mitchell 
studied the phenomena and labeled it “shell shock” during the later part of the nineteenth 
century.98 Mitchell mentioned that “soldiers who had ridden boldly with Sheridan or fought 
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gallantly with Grant become…as irritable and hysterically emotional as the veriest girl.”99 The 
war, Mitchell argued to the medical community, tested even the healthiest of males, and self-
control or the lack of it did not explain the serious mental injury some men sustained.  
Fearful of what an epidemic of shell-shocked men could mean for the war and manhood, 
mental hospitals throughout the country created reports during the war, arguing that “the 
aggregate population of citizens and soldiers has probably not furnished during the war a larger 
number of insane than would have occurred independently of the war.”100 But, as historian Eric 
T. Dean, Jr., discovered, at least two hundred ninety-one men suffered from mental disorders 
caused by their war experiences.101 Some had to be institutionalized, such as Lt. Allen Wiley 
who suffered from insomnia, lapses where he relived the war, panic, anxiety, and rage. After 
beating his wife several times, Wiley’s wife filed for divorce and left him. He was finally 
institutionalized in Indianapolis in 1870.102 Men were supposed to be able to have enough self-
control and strength to endure the hardships of the war, but clearly some could not. Were these 
men who suffered from the anguish of war not sufficiently masculine? Was the North and 
South’s idea of manliness somehow flawed if veterans returned unable to function within 
peacetime? 
 The Civil War impacted a whole generation of men. The majority of young, white 
men⎯a critical part of the racialized ideal of manliness⎯served in the war, and their struggles in 
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the postbellum period created a crisis in manhood. Northerners questioned whether restraint, 
duty, and self-control really should be something to which men should aspire. Southerners 
wondered if aggressiveness, physicality, honor, and duty really defined the ideal man. As men 
tried to make sense of what it meant to be a man in the postwar years, they were not alone. 
Women too threw off the rigid expectations of antebellum womanhood in large part due to their 
Civil War experiences. 
 
The Civil War and Womanhood  
Whether on the home front in the war torn areas of the South or in the industrialized 
urban centers of the North, women’s experiences not only taught but also necessitated a shift in 
gender relations. With many men gone and serving in the war, women often had to take on what 
had previously been considered male duties. Women also faced hardships with which1 they 
alone had to deal. Confronted with such situations, women quickly learned they could not wholly 
confine themselves to the domestic sphere without repercussions. This awareness led to more 
fluid gender expectations in the postbellum period. 
In both the North and the South, women encountered severe hardship during the Civil 
War. Many participated directly in the war effort as spies and soldiers. A still larger group of 
women served as nurses in the military. Approximately 13,000 women in the Union and 
Confederacy worked as military nurses, while still thousands more were volunteers.103 As nurses, 
they witnessed some of the grotesque realities of the war. Emily Bliss Thatcher Souder 
commented in a letter: “The amputation-table is plainly in view from our tents. I never trust 
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myself to look toward it.”104 Female nurses witnessed the bloody scenes of field hospitals and the 
agony men faced. Souder commented, “dying [is] all around us and there is no time to say more 
than a friendly word.”105 The heavy demands after a battle stopped women from even offering 
solace to the dying and those who recently had undergone surgery. As Souder recognized, the 
war resulted in an unprecedented number of deaths, and not all women stoically endured the 
graphic scenes of death, disease, and misery.  
Some nurses tried to comfort themselves with the idea that these men at least died a 
“Good Death,” quietly accepting their fate as soldiers in a righteous war. Union nurse Mary 
Phinney wrote, “I don't remember one who ever expressed repentance; many wished to live, but 
all seemed to die without fear of the future.”106 But by the end of the war, even she changed her 
description of the deaths of these soldiers. Phinney wrote during the Battle of Appomattox Court 
House,  
It was no time to illuminate the hospital, especially this one, which in case of fire has 
only one narrow stairway, and has, in the third story, over a hundred patients; but…it 
must be done. Just as the lights were in full blaze, one poor fellow went to heaven; he 
looked up so scared and then lay back dead.107 
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The “Good Death” had given way to fear and anxiety, even as Confederate General Robert E. 
Lee surrendered. What was the purpose of the war, what protection did men afford if they did not 
fulfill the gendered requirement to resign themselves to their death? 
While the battlefield and camp hospitals left their imprint on women, others keenly felt 
the cost of war on the home front. After all, Lincoln himself recognized the war was “essentially 
a people’s contest.”108 Women mobilized the wartime patriotism through benevolent societies, 
fundraising, tableaux vivants, and other displays of pride in the Union or Confederacy. Civilians 
keenly felt the impact of the fighting. They dealt with shortages in supplies and food, inflation, 
displacement, disease, poverty, and violence, such as rape and theft in the occupied South.109 
This surely taught the lesson that men could not be relied upon to protect women all of the time.  
In both regions, women took part in the infamous draft riots and bread riots in Richmond and 
New York. In doing so, they engaged in aggressive public action, voicing an opinion they could 
not express through the franchise.  
In the South, the hardships of the war were more intense. With a smaller population 
compared to the North, a higher percentage of southern men fought in the war, and consequently, 
a greater number of southern families were affected by absent husbands, brothers, and fathers. 
The war’s impact on southern women, who lived closer to the theatre of war because most of the 
fighting took place in the South, was graver than it was to northern women. These women of the 
South had to take on different tasks as well. Rather than going to work in munitions factories, 
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many southern white women, like Mary Pugh of Louisiana and Hattie Motley of Alabama, took 
over management of the household or plantation. These women engaged in economic practices 
as “deputy husbands,” acting in the place of their spouses. These women also typically employed 
more violence when disciplining slaves.110 The obvious participation in the public sphere 
constituted a temporary but necessary wartime measure, but use of physical discipline⎯a male 
privilege⎯bordered on a violation of gender expectations. Partaking in what was considered a 
male pursuit shook conservative views of masculinity and femininity in the South.  
As Civil War experiences created a space where gender roles were challenged, some 
women began to assert themselves more than previously. Women in New Orleans acted out in 
the well-known Battle of the Handkerchiefs by flouting Union regulations that stipulated one 
could not display Confederate patriotism.  Waiving their handkerchiefs at a ship carrying 
Confederate prisoners of war, these ladies “were surly, and the guards at the head of the gangway 
heard many a caustic aside expressive of contempt for Yankees and devotion to the 
Confederates.”111 Women also disrespected Union soldiers in occupied New Orleans under the 
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infamous reign of General Benjamin “Beast” Butler.112 They acted politically and publicly by 
openly defying Union rules. Some women verbally insulted Union soldiers while other women 
dumped chamber pots out the window on the occupying troops. Even Butler treated southern 
women as political actors by holding them accountable for such actions. In fact, Butler’s 
infamous Women’s Order declared rude females to be treated as prostitutes. Clearly, 
women⎯even women of status and wealth⎯did not strictly adhere to traditional ladylike 
behavior in the Civil War. The war broke down rigid gender barriers. When discussing the 
southern home front during the war, some, such as Louisianaian Sarah Morgan, went so far as to 
proclaim, “There are no women here.  We are all men.”113 War required many women to take on 
“masculine” roles, placing the antebellum notion of womanhood in serious jeopardy. Many 
continued to seek the ultimate goal of marriage, with some finding husbands among soldiers 
camped nearby.114 Despite some attempts to cling to domesticity and ideal womanhood, the fact 
cannot be dismissed that one effect of the Civil War was for women to act independently and not 
“celebrate helplessness.”115 Women emerged more aware of the drawbacks of antebellum gender 
expectations and sometimes more critical of the institution of marriage. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     112 Alecia Long takes on the myth of General Butler’s infamous Order Number 28 in 
Occupied Women.  She argues that the order (also known as the Woman’s Order) did not stop 
women from disrespecting Union soldiers in occupied Louisiana.  See “(Mis) Remembering 
General Order No. 28: Benjamin Butler, the Woman Order, and Historical Memory in Occupied 
Women: 17-32.  
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After the War 
The Civil War created what historian LeeAnn Whites aptly calls “a crisis in gender 
relations.”116 Following the war, women faced more challenges that hindered a return to rigid 
gender expectations. The Civil War took its toll in human lives with over 750,000 deaths and 
impacted an entire generation. Women then found a lack of available men to marry, and as a 
result, many were potentially without the ability to uphold the white upper class ideal of 
womanhood. In a letter to her grandmother in November of 1878, nineteen-year-old Thelia Bush 
from Louisiana wrote, “that old maid you spoke of marrying was old indeed but it is some 
encouragement to all the rest of us girls.  It will make us think there is a chance for us whether 
there is or not.”117  
Marriage remained important since it afforded women some advantages. Without 
marriage, “Old maids” were considered “abominable,” and they found in their declining years 
that they were “desolate and alone while the married woman…[was] moved by the love and ties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     116 LeeAnn Whites, Gender Matters: Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Making of the New 
South, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 16.  Some historians, such as Gail Bederman, 
emphasize careful consideration of phrasing these moment when gender constructs shift.  
Bederman argues that to imply a crisis in gender means that “manhood is a transhistorical 
category or fixed essence that has its good moments as well as its bad, rather than an ideological 
construct which is constantly being remade.” I agree with Bederman that gender is a process and 
not fixed. People were anxious about gender.  Their fears, however, express more than anxiety 
given the changes in the status of African Americans and in the views of Southern womanhood. 
See Gail Bederman, Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the 
United States, 1880-1917, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995): 11. 
 
     117 Thelia Bush to Ms. Wilkinson, November 25, 1878, Collinsburg, Louisiana, Micajah 
Wilkinson Papers, Manuscript Collection 707, Hill Memorial Library, Louisiana State 
University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 70803. In the letters from Bush to Wilkinson, Bush states 
the average age of marriage in rural Louisiana was approximately fourteen until after the war 
when the lack of men impacted women’s ability to marry. A year later, Bush at the young age of 
twenty stated, “if I don’t get off pretty soon I will have to take an old bachelor.” The pressure to 




of the family circle.”118 Family offered women protection against loneliness, lack of social status 
and respect, and economic destitution. Between unmarried young women and war widows, the 
rate of women without husbands increased. Rising numbers of single and widowed women 
proved women’s reliance upon men was not always possible, leading to a changing status of 
women in the postbellum years. 
African-American women began to define their freedom after the war and created further 
challenges to rigid gender roles. In both the North and the South, African Americans were denied 
full social and legal equality, but in the South, African Americans faced the most intense 
transition from slavery to free labor. White widows on plantations complained about having to 
continue running their lands, particularly when confronted with the end of slavery and new 
opportunities for black men and women. As Darlene Clark Hine and Kathleen Thompson argue, 
“black Americans had three goals⎯to find their family members and reestablish families; to 
make a living; and to live, as far as possible, lives that did not resemble slavery.”119 Some 
attempted to follow northern advice, especially as given by the Freedman’s Bureau, to adopt 
values of “true womanhood” and confine black women to the private, domestic sphere.120 As 
groups of African American men and women rushed to have their marriages legally recognized 
after the war, many martial contracts upheld this implementation of white gender values for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     118 Thelia Bush to Ms. Wilkinson, December 12, 1880, Collinsburg, Louisiana, Micajah 
Wilkinson Papers, Manuscript Collection 707, Hill Memorial Library, Louisiana State 
University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 70803; O.M. Grisham to Sallie, June 19, 1904, Winnfield, 
Louisiana, Grisham-Kellogg-Faust Papers, Manuscript Collection 5048, Hill Memorial Library, 
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 70803.  
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black women. These legal contracts gave African American women the “rights and protections” 
of a wife but also required submission to the husband.121  
Still, even when black men and women adopted white gender expectations, they did not 
relinquish their goals. Many historians, such as Nancy Bercaw and Laura Edwards, have shown 
how black women both accepted and rejected these new white gender values to hold onto some 
autonomy. Even when black women worked for white households, they did not lose sight of their 
primary aims. Many white women complained that they could not keep servants. Anna McCall 
Watson wrote in her diary about this problem on Cross Keys plantation in Louisiana. Along with 
the weather, illness, and visitors, Watson would write about each time the cook or laundry “girl” 
left without notice and how she had to “do the laundry again” or had “breakfast to get” by 
herself.122 The high turnover rate showed that African Americans utilized this new freedom to 
move, locate family, and find better employment. With the death of slavery, racial upheaval 
destabilized gender roles, particularly the white middle class ideals. 
For women, the transformation in gender expectations was particularly dramatic, but men 
faced a shift as well and were forced to redefine masculinity.123  A male dominated society rested 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     121 Ibid., 32. Recent scholarship has challenged the long held view that the majority of 
African Americans sought to legalize their marriages, fearing white encroachment in their lives. 
See Andrew Slap and Michael T. Smith, This Distracted and Anarchical People: New Answers 
for Old Questions About the Civil War-Era North, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013).  
 
     122 Cross Keys Plantation records, Manuscripts Collection 918, Manuscripts Department, 
Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana 70118. Anna McCall Watson’s diary covers the 
years 1868 to 1876. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  123 As LeeAnn Whites point outs, some historians, such as Elizabeth Fox-Genovese in her 
work Within the Plantation Household: Black and White Women in the Old South (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1988), have argued that gender does not mean as much as 
class and race since not all women could exert the “rights” and status of womanhood. Even 
Linda Kerber argues “race trumped gender” for African American women in the post-war South. 
I seek to show, that while class and race do matter, prosecution for intimate-partner violence cut 
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on privilege and required power over women and people of color. The Civil War disturbed all 
this.  The emancipation of over four million slaves knocked out one pillar of southern 
masculinity, and the shifts in women’s attitudes weakened another part of the foundation in both 
the North and the South.  
Regionalism after the war exacerbated this anxiety. As Nina Silber discusses in Divided 
Houses: Gender and the Civil War, southern masculinity and southern womanhood came under 
full attack as northerners sought to show how the southern way of life was inferior and even 
backwards.124 The capture of former Confederate President Jefferson Davis illustrates the intense 
criticism southern men faced. Davis supposedly wore female attire, including dress and bonnet, 
in his attempt to avoid arrest. Northern newspapers and journals, such as Harper’s Weekly, 
picked up on the story and added illustrations that mocked Davis for his cowardly behavior, but 
these journalists went further than just Davis. The drawing in Harper’s Weekly included the 
letters “C.S.” on the hatbox Davis carried and intimated that the entire South and former 
Confederate States were feminine as well.125 Loss of the war, by itself, impugned southern 
manhood. How could martial valor or southern honor exist if the Confederacy was defeated? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
across all lines.  While some limits did exist, courts punished the crime, and all women could 
seek legal redress for abusive partners. As LeeAnn Whites states, clearly “gender matters.” See 
Gender Matters: 3. Also see Linda Kerber, No Constitutional Rights to Be Ladies: Women and 
the Obligations of Citizenship, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998): 67. Gail Bederman uses the 
term “manliness” to discuss the social construct of behavioral expectations and expectations for 
men prior to the 1890s. While the term masculinity emerges in the new aggressive male at the 
turn of the twentieth century, I choose to employ the term “masculinity” to Southern men, even 
prior to 1890 since Southern manhood did incorporate aspects of aggression and strength. For 
more information on Southern masculinity immediately after the Civil War see Ted Ownby, 
Subduing Satan: Religion, Recreation, and Manhood in the Rural South, 1865-1920, (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). 
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Gaines Foster states that the infamous capture of Davis in women’s clothing “certainly suggested 
that on some level people perceived surrender as a form of emasculation.”126 The North 
constantly reminded the South of its loss, particularly with the start of Radical Reconstruction 
and the 1867 Military Reconstruction Act. Occupation humiliated many white southerners, 
particularly men who could not resume the political roles they held previously. By denying many 
white southern men the right to vote or hold office, northerners challenged southern men’s 
masculinity. In rebuilding itself, the South faced the need to claim respect somehow. This 
required, in part, redefining white southern manhood and womanhood. The redefined gender 
roles enabled legal reform for women, such as in criminalizing intimate-partner violence. 
Despite its regional distinctiveness, southern masculinity was predicated on northern 
respect. Part of the reconciliation and re-entry into the Union required the reduction of animosity 
between the sections and the northern admission of worth and honor of the South’s efforts, even 
if it lost its gamble to secede. Examining northern travelers in the postbellum South, Gaines 
Foster finds that often southerners were defensive and quick to “put the Yankee in his or her 
place,” but “if the traveler met the southerner properly, in other words if he or she thereby 
acknowledged southern honor, the southerner reciprocated with a kind welcome and considerate 
behavior.”127 This, Foster argues, shows that indeed southerners “valued northern respect.”128 In 
an attempt to “prove” themselves, southerners increasingly focused on being civilized.129  
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the New South, 1865 to 1913, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987): 26. 
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     129 Gail Bederman analyzes the invocation of “civilization” to “construct what it meant to be a 
man” (24), but her focus is on the turn of the twentieth century, particularly the 1880	  to 1917. 
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To be civilized meant the South should shrug off the label of “backwards” and 
“brutal”⎯phrases that the North had used to define southern society and its reliance on slavery 
during the antebellum period. The South could re-establish its honor, its pride, and consequently, 
its masculinity by proving itself “civilized.” The term became a buzzword in southern 
newspapers, as did its opposite⎯ “brutal.” The South contended that its superiority lay in its 
combination of old and new.130 It held onto chivalry, neighborliness, and honor while it 
modernized by accepting the ideals of civilized society. The South’s industrial advancement, for 
instance, helped to make the region more “civilized.” Henry Grady, editor of Atlanta’s 
Constitution, gave a speech in 1886 to the New England Society of New York in which he spoke 
of the South as embracing industrialization in farming and transportation. Grady also praised the 
South for holding onto some of its older regional expectations. Edward Ayers describes Grady’s 
speech as “a rationale that allowed the South to have it both ways, to be proudly southern and yet 
partake in the new industrial bounty.”131 The tension of the old and new remained as the South 
sought to prove itself civilized. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
While a remarkable book, her scope does not extend to the period discussed here or the region, 
but her discussion of masculinity and civilization was an asset in viewing southern masculinity 
immediately after the Civil War. See Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural 
History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917, (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1995). 
 
     130 Historians, such as Charles Shindo and Lynn Dumenil, examine the 1920s and the tension 
over modern change. They showed how Americans simultaneously clung to the past and yet 
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South after the Civil War.  See Charles J. Shindo, 1927 and the Rise of Modern America, 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010) and Lynn Dumenil, The Modern Temper: 
American Culture and Society in the 1920s, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). 
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In order to obtain civilized status, however, the South also had to condemn behaviors of 
southerners that did not live up to the ideal. Before the 1890s, these terms were applied to those 
of any race or ethnicity since southerners did not condone uncivilized behavior. Men who abused 
their wives, for instance, were slurred as “brutes,” “monstrous fiends,” “inhumane,” and 
“unmanly.”132  
For many women, antebellum womanhood could not be resurrected intact, especially 
female submission. A former Catholic nun, Desiree Martin, wrote about southern women’s 
expectations of men. She said, “Men must be helpful and attentive to women. A society where 
no one would exercise restraint, where there would be no respect for one another would soon 
provide no enjoyment, and turn men into savages.”133 In her journal, which was to become a 
book of advice for her nieces and nephews, Martin expressed the expected benefit for a female’s 
subordination⎯chivalry and protection.134 If men did not place women on a pedestal and protect 
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(New Orleans, La: Imprimerie Cosmopolite, 1877); translation Claude Remillard and Denise R. 
Charchere, (Manchester, MO: Independent Publishing Corporation, 2004): 167. Restraint was a 
component of masculinity in the United States during the nineteenth century. The Victorian Age 
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manners in the nineteenth century see John F. Klasson, Rudeness & Civility: Manners in 
Nineteenth-Century Urban America, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990). .  Also, I use the term 
“Victorian” to refer to gender expectations of the nineteenth century.  See Paul Robinson, The 
Modernization of Sex: Havelock Ellis, Alfred Kinsey, William Masters, and Virginia Johnson, 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1976): 2.  Moreover, I want to stress the term “ideal” here and 
throughout the dissertation.  Carl Degler in “What Ought to Be and What Was: Women’s 
Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century,” American Historical Review 79 (1974): 1467-90 and 
Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz in Rereading Sex, (Knopf: New York, 2002) have been instrumental 
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However, the enforcement of Victorian ideals by those in power (courts, legislatures, etc.) is key 




them, Martin claimed it would “turn men into savages.”135 Here she tied masculinity with its 
protectiveness and “restraint” to being civilized. When men did not help to keep a woman in 
comfort, society suffered and men became “savage.” Martin (perhaps unintentionally) helped 
prove the South with its new gender roles as respectable and civilized.  
Martin’s writings illustrate more than this, however. She spoke of respect and seemed to 
suggest a sense of reciprocity between men and women. Men had to respect women by showing 
esteem in their behavior, such as being attentive and protective. Even while submissive, women 
insisted on respect. Manhood was dependent on men’s attitude and behavior towards women. 
Lack of restraint towards women and dereliction of duty to women meant that the man failed to 
live up to the new gender expectations.  
These new expectations for men were evident in marriage vows. Adelbert Ames, a 
Radical Republican who served as Governor and U.S. Senator of Mississippi from 1868 to 1874, 
wrote to his fiancée, Blanche Butler, in 1870 about their upcoming wedding. In it, Ames 
discussed whether a wife should obey her husband. 
You say you are not going to promise to "obey." Well, Love, that does not frighten me. 
Do you think people love, honor and obey because they promise to do so at the altar? Do 
all who so promise keep their word? If one did not love and honor, how could one get 
married? -- and be honor-able? If there be "love" and "honor" what need of the "obey" -- 
with them there would be no need of it as promised at the marriage ceremony, no "obey" 
at any time. When a wife ceases to find her love strong enough to be a motive power, no 
promise will control her to the good and happiness of her husband. Suppose you give 
"obey" its full force. Obedience without love, obedience to the will of any master, soon 
will become unbearable -- and unless a man be very little he would find such orders and 
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nephews but particularly her nieces. The book curiously places emphases on manners and 
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such obedience the saddest moments of his life. No, Blanche, I do not ask that you 
promise to obey me -- I only ask that you love me -- love me and all that can tend to 
make our home happy will flow from that -- honor, for we could not love unless we 
honored each other.136 
 
Blanche Butler in a previous letter had refused to say she would obey her husband. Her refusal 
shows an assertion of the new womanhood emerging during the period. In response, Ames 
responds linking obeying to a master-servant relationship. This is not surprising given his 
political leanings as a Radical Republican. With the end of slavery, some linked other 
relationships to the dynamics of slavery. Given that the enslavement of African Americans had 
largely been accepted, particularly in the North, as an evil vanquished, similar relationships that 
denied autonomy of a person fell under scrutiny, such as husbands’ dominance over their wives. 
Ames stated obedience was replaced by love and honor since men, he implied, should not base 
their marriages on expression of power and expectations of wifely obedience. Instead, mutual 
affection and respect served as the basis of his relationship with his soon-to-be wife. New 
expectations of manhood and womanhood meant intimate relationships between men and women 
were reciprocal rather than patriarchal as they had been before the Civil War.  
Advertisements illustrated this emerging new manhood. In a promise to cure colic, Dr. 
M.A. Simmons Liver Medicine’s ads depicted a tired father holding a crying infant.  In the 
background, the mother slept undisturbed and a crocheted piece on the wall contained the saying, 
“Home Sweet Home.” Underneath, the advertisement described its product saying, “Many 
midnight hours find a multitude of tired fathers walking the floor with screaming babies who are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     136  Aldebert Ames to Blanche Butler, June 28, 1870, Washington D.C., Chronicles from the 
Nineteenth Century: Family Letters of Blanche Butler and Adelbert Ames Married July 21st, 
1870, vol. 1, (Ames, Blanche Butler, comp., Clinton, MA: Privately published, 1957): 719. 
Interestingly, Blanche Butler was daughter of former General Benjamin Butler. After Regulators 
took over the election in 1874, Ames resigned his position as Mississippi State Senator, and the 




in agony with colic….It is enough to tempt the father in the household similar to the one 
illustrated above to turn in the Home Sweet Home inscription.”137 Placed within a memorandum 
book sold largely to men, the ad portrayed the father as an involved parent, taking on what had 
previously been claimed as a task of the mother. The mother, on the other hand, seemingly 
deserved rest and a break from the demands of raising children. Although not likely a practice 
taken on by all men, the advertisement touched on some emerging views of fatherhood during 
the late 1800s whether lived experience or aspirational. (If the advertisement did not reflect 
society or its ideal in some manner, then the company would have been terribly ineffective in its 
selling tactics.) Since Dr. M.A. Simmons Liver Medicine remained a popular tonic until at least 
1901, the message at least hit a broad audience.138 
Despite expectations for changes in men, not all women were believed to deserve such 
respect from men. Desiree Martin described a northern woman on a train going through Ohio, 
and this female passenger was, she declared, “a pseudo-sophisticated lady,” “one of those 
Always First type ladies, who seemed to believe the ship, the train, and the world were created 
exclusively for their own particular convenience.”139 A self-interested woman lived against the 
feminine ideal of selflessness. By nurturing and helping others, a woman supposedly fulfilled her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  137 Memorandum Book , vol. 50, Daniel Trotter Papers, Manuscript Collection 990, Hill 
Memorial Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 70803.  
 
     138 Dr. M.A. Simmons Song, Fortune, Dream, and Cook Book, (St. Louis: Dr. M.A. Simmons 
Medicine Company, 1901). The company started in Mississippi in 1840 and continued to grow 
particularly in the 1870s and 1880s. The tonic appeared popular in the South and had other 
companies who tried to copy it. See The Southwest Reporter, vol. 23, (St. Paul: West Publishing 
Company, 1894): 171-172. I cannot find record of the company after 1901 (although that is not 
to say it did not exist after that year), but Dr. M.A. Simmons Medicine Company had to have 
closed no later than 1906 with the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act. 
 
     139 Desiree Martin, Evening Visits with a Sister or the Destiny of a Strand of Moss, (New 




duty, and this woman Martin described defied the expected norm. As a result, she forfeited the 
respect of men and the status of a “true” lady. Desiree Martin articulated this idea when she 
reminded her nieces,  
However, if gentlemen are bound to be considerate and courteous toward women, 
remember too, my dear nieces, this is no excuse to take advantage of that kindness and 
courtesy….it is only ostentatious and temperamental women who behave on the trip as 
the lady about whom we just spoke.140  
 
Men and women did not automatically deserve certain treatment by the very nature of their sex. 
Instead, women were expected to show deference to men provided men acted respectfully 
towards women. A sort of reciprocity existed between the sexes that enforced adherence to 
gender expectations, which is important to note.  
Despite the overall stress placed upon female submissiveness, Desiree Martin, perhaps 
influenced by her experience during the war and the military occupation of Louisiana, conveyed 
another hint of female autonomy when she later asserted, “[r]espect is a barrier that protects big 
and small equally, and which makes it possible to look at each other face to face; and I repeat to 
you, the woman who respects herself always has, by an inalienable right, dignity and respect.”141 
Her use of the phrase “inalienable right” resonates with the American values of natural law⎯ the 
concept that as human beings, individuals are born with rights and not given these rights by any 
government⎯ as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the United States 
Constitution. A woman is entitled to “dignity and respect” if she feels herself worthy, not if a 
man decides she is worthy. This implies more than the Victorian adoration of the “angel in the 
house.”142 Women held value independent of men, which was a new component of womanhood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     140 Ibid., 158.  
 




and different from the antebellum feminine ideal. The new view might require women to be 
dependent upon men, but it also required more from men than previously.  
The Civil War provoked a transformation in gender relations and forced the redefinition 
of masculinity and femininity. In some ways, antebellum notions of gender remained intact. The 
country clung to past notions to create stability amidst intense change, but still no one could 
completely resurrect the past. Too much had changed. Slavery ended, wiping out a crucial 
foundation of social organization in the South. The war forced women to face the drawbacks of 
relying completely on men. In the North, wartime experiences and reform movements also 
forced a change in gender expectations. Overwhelmingly, women looked to the state to mediate 
the new gender relationship. The war and its aftermath galvanized women, creating a heightened 
awareness of the inequality between the sexes. Throughout the country, whether conservative or 
liberal, many women recognized the problem of complete female dependence.  
Women knew some burdens they would have to bear alone, and so even as northern and 
southern society rebuilt itself on the foundations of a gendered hierarchy, it could not recreate 
antebellum manhood and womanhood. This dynamic allowed for a new womanhood that 
simultaneously subordinated women and provided avenues, albeit small and complicated, for the 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




ABUSED WOMEN AND THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM VIOLENCE 
 
I asked my wife where my dinner was, and she [asked] where I had been all day long. I 
said, “Give me my dinner”… I kicked the chair in the street…. My wife said, “You shit, 
strike me if you dare.” ⎯ Sylvester Conlon, 1884143 
 
 In September of 1884, Sarah Conlon demanded to know where her husband Sylvester had 
been all day, and when he threatened to become violent, she refused to back down. She 
challenged him saying, “Strike me if you dare.”144 When he did, a neighbor overheard Sarah 
promise “she would fix him for that,” and she did.145 Sylvester Conlon spent time in jail and lost 
his family, as Sarah vowed never to return to his household with their child. The fluid gender 
expectations after the Civil War created an opportunity for women to renegotiate relationships 
with men. In particular, the postbellum years prompted female agency in combatting the problem 
of intimate-partner violence. While not all women were as bold as Sarah Conlon, women 
internalized the right to be free from violence, and many demanded it. 
 Linda Gordon in Heroes of Their Own Lives argues “many women clients did not seem to 
believe they had a ‘right’ to freedom from violence” even if they morally condemned abuse and 
fought against it.146 Most women did not verbally articulate a “right” to not be abused, but their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     143 State v. Sylvester Conlon CRDC 5573 (1884). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  
     144 Ibid.  
	  
     145 Ibid.  
 
     146 Linda Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence, 
Boston, 1880-1960, (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1988): 256.  Gordon’s section on intimate-
partner violence focuses on the North and mainly uses child protection agencies rather than the 
courts. This would account for the difference in women’s mentality. New definitions of 
womanhood in the South, as I have argued, required protection and gave a sense of agency. 
Moreover, women’s tactics differed in order to receive help from the courts and from the SPCC. 
The SPCC’s main goal was to help abused children. Women had to show the father’s abuse 
towards the mother also impacted the child. The SPCC could only offer limited help to the 
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actions insinuated such a mentality. The very act of pressing charges suggested that they 
believed the abuse was wrong and that violence was an unacceptable behavioral choice. Betty 
Williams in 1881 stated in her testimony, “He hit me on Saturday night…and this is the reason I 
had him arrested.”147 Betty’s statement seems so simple. Arguably, she wanted protection, but in 
going to the recorder’s court and pressing charges, Betty Williams asserted her belief that 
husbands cannot abuse their wives. She did not drop the charges, and so her husband George 
stayed in jail for twenty-four hours for his attack. Although George might not have changed his 
ways, Betty’s actions suggest that women possessed the right to be free from violence.  
 
Power 
Ultimately, intimate-partner violence rested on the issues of power and dominance, which 
is why renegotiation of gender roles emboldened women to attack the male privilege of 
chastisement. As Elizabeth Janeway perceptively states, although it is not the only method, “sex 
is the most intensely stressed physiological fact that has been used to distance a group from 
power by ranking its members low.”148 Abuse aimed at asserting or maintaining dominance of 
those in power, which in the late nineteenth century were, in general, men. Since legally and 
socially the male sex held positions of power in relationships with women, even men of color 
and poorer socioeconomic status who had relatively little power in society could exert authority 
in their own home.149 Many Orleans Parish cases in the postbellum era possess blatant male 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
abused wife, which did not include punishment of the batterer. Consequently, women’s approach 
to the SPCC in the North and courts in the South would not be the same. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  147 State v. George Williams (1881) CRDC# 1304.  
	  
	  	  	    148 Elizabeth Janeway, Powers of the Weak, (New York: Knopf Press, 1980): 9.  
     149 Some more recent studies suggest while power resides as the central issue in intimate-
partner violence, abusers who feel disempowered in other areas will be more likely to 
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displays of power. In 1885, John Heir told his wife Elise not to go outside, but she went to tend 
to her garden anyway. He responded by beating her. In her testimony, Elise stated, 
He said you go nowhere or I will kill you…. He come and cursed me for all the dirty 
names…. He held me by the throat…and then he slapped me in the face…[and] in the 
mouth with his hand, and then he pushed me down and come out with a stick of wood 
and hit me again in the side… and he kicked me too.150 
 
She testified that he had a hard day at work and was contentious upon his return home. John 
provided no reason why he did not want her to work in the garden, but when she disobeyed him, 
he flew into a rage and viciously beat her. Perhaps he felt he had the right to chastise his wife 
with physical punishment, or perhaps he sought a compensatory form of power at home because 
of his problems at work. Regardless, John Heir’s actions suggest that he sought to feel dominant 
through abusing his wife. 
 In another instance in 1887, Annie Hannewinckle charged Gust, her husband, of twenty 
years with assault and battery. The incident started over a debate about money while they were 
sitting on the front porch with their three children. He called Annie a “damn so and so,” to which 
she responded he should be ashamed of calling her a name and he had “no reason to be growling 
like that.”151 Gust threatened her by yelling, “I’ll show you what I am growling about,” and then 
put his threat into action by hitting her.152 Annie openly questioned Gust’s financial business as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
compensate by engaging in physical or emotionally abusive behaviors. This might have 
influenced men of color or poorer socioeconomic classes in the late nineteenth century 
(especially considering the lack of legal and social equality as compared to wealthy white men), 
but ultimately, the violence rested on power over the female partner. See Julia C. Babcock, 
Jennifer Waltz, Neil S. Jacobson, and John M. Gottman, “Power and Violence: The Relation 
Between Communication Patterns, Power Discrepancies, and Domestic Violence,” Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology 1993, Vol. 61, No. 1, 40-50. 
 
     150 State v. John Heir (1885) CRDC# 7410.  
      




well as his language in front of their children. In doing so, she threatened his role as head of the 
household, his ability to provide for the family, and his decision-making. Gust retaliated first by 
verbally insulting his wife and then by physically abusing her. The entire incident took place in 
the presence of the children, asserting his male dominance and driving the lesson home that he 
was in charge.  
In a similar situation, Lizzie Hill confronted her husband Jeffery, which led to his 
reassertion of power through violence. Lizzie accused Jeffery of carrying on an affair with 
another woman, and she demanded he end it. Jeffery defiantly told her he would “have” that 
woman and Lizzie could do nothing to prevent it.153 In the altercation, Jeffery demanded to know 
where his clothes were so he could go spend the night with his mistress. As Lizzie showed him, 
he hit and then choked her. Somehow during the attack, she escaped. Jeffery’s adultery may have 
been many things, but it strongly suggested that he held power in his ability to cheat on his legal 
wife, even if it made her miserable. He did not recognize marriage as a union intended to make 
both partners happy. His pleasure superseded her needs, and his dominance mattered more than 
her emotional and physical well-being.  
Power drove violence against women in the postbellum years. In the Hill, Hannewinckle, 
and Heir cases, men used force either to maintain or to reassert their position of dominance over 
their wives. Anxiety over men’s loss of power over women and women’s more public roles 
dominated the period, and some lashed out in a desperate attempt to hold onto what had 
previously been a male privilege. Still, the fluidity in male and female expectations permitted 
some changes in the roles of men and women. Even if not a complete gender revolution, many 
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     153 State v. Jeffery Hill (1885) CRDC#7593. 
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women spoke out against their abusive partners and presented their families, the community, and 
the legal system changed notions of power that had to be renegotiated. 
 
Table 2.1 Plaintiffs in Intimate-Partner Violence Cases in Orleans Parish, 1865-1900154 
Plaintiff Number of IPV Cases Percentage of IPV Cases 
Abused Women 186 92% 
District Attorney 13 6.5% 
Community/Family Member 3 1.5% 
 
 As shown in Table 2.1, the overwhelming majority (92%) of plaintiffs were abused women who 
brought their violent partners to court. This statistic supports the concept that women internalized 
the events of the Civil War and the need to renegotiate their rights within their relationships with 
men. As a result, the male right of chastisement lost favor as women asserted their right to be 
free from violence. From courtship to cohabitation to legal marriage, women demanded this right 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     154 A total of 10,181 cases exist on assault and battery in Orleans Parish from 1870 to 1900. 
The statistics in the table are formed from a random sampling of 1,228 assault and battery cases. 
Out of those 1,228, the ones that involved intimate-partner violence (courtship violence, abuse 
against a common law wife, and wife beating) totaled 202. The numbers in Table 2.1 reflect 




As gender expectations were being redefined, courtship rituals shifted. In the antebellum 
period, southerners initially relied on family and community organizations, particularly churches, 
to help assist in the path to matrimony. With the guardian’s consent, men would call on intended 
partners, and under the watchful eyes of a chaperone or parent, the couple would get to know 
each other. The man typically bestowed compliments and small gifts upon his intended until he 
declared his feelings. After which, the man and the woman’s guardian arranged the marriage.  
After the Civil War, courtship changed. One of the most noticeable differences could be 
seen in the role of love in romantic relationships. As historian Karen Lystra argues, intimate 
relationships in the postbellum era centered on the notion of love, and emotion mattered.155 
Women increasingly wanted men to prove their love, and many engineered challenges for men to 
solve as testimony to their affection.156 Romantic love, then, took precedence over other issues 
that dominated women’s reasons to marry in American history prior to the late 1800s. Wealth, 
companionship, social status, and the family’s consent still mattered to many women but now to 
a lesser degree than love. Women expected reciprocity in the form of mutual affection. 
The influence of new gender expectations further altered courtship rituals by permitting 
women to assert themselves in a variety of ways. For example, some women in the rural South 
resurrected an old Irish tradition that allowed women to propose marriage on leap years, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     155 Karen Lystra, Searching the Heart: Women and Men, and Romantic Love in Nineteenth-
Century America, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). For a similar discussion of 
sentiments in courtship, see Ellen Rothman, Hands and Hearts: A History of Courtship in 
America, (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 
  




some took advantage of it.157 Twenty-year-old Thelia Bush from Louisiana noted in a letter, 
“there will be a great many more weddings before this year is out for you know this is leap year 
and the young ladies will have a fair chance to go to see the young men.”158 According to Bush, 
women not only proposed to men on leap year but also looked forward to it. Generally, brief 
breaks from a traditional hierarchy of gender or class serve as a safety valve to release anxiety 
over power.159 The leap year tradition in the postbellum South performed the same ends. With 
masculine authority in abeyance, women could assert themselves in a controlled manner through 
the leap year proposals. 
Courtship, however, changed more drastically in the city. With increasing numbers of 
women working, mechanized transportation, and recreational facilities, courtship no longer took 
place on the front porch, particularly for working and poorer socioeconomic classes. In Cheap 
Amusements, Kathy Peiss skillfully demonstrates this shift and argues that dance halls, 
amusement parks, and theaters altered courting rituals for young urbanites. Many Americans 
during the antebellum period had taken pride in local autonomy. Communities determined their 
own policies and value system with little involvement from the rest of the country, but as Robert 
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Wiebe states, these “island communities” witnessed a gradual loss of influence and power.160 
Parents no longer controlled their children’s movement or curbed their desire for “mixed-sex 
fun.”161 Although Peiss’s work focuses on turn-of-the-twentieth-century New York, the same 
behavior can be seen in working-class women (of any race) in the South as well. 
In 1882, New Orleanian Peter Johnson expressed frustration over the change. He saw his 
daughter with a man and ran to stop them from continuing their outing. Johnson testified, “I went 
up to the place where they were and caught them in the act. She broke and run…. I told him he 
need not run that all I wanted was my daughter.”162 The parental worry over the loss of control 
was also depicted in children’s stories. “Who Would A-Wooing Go” told a southern tale about a 
frog who would not listen to his mother’s advice on who to marry. Instead of finding another 
frog, he pursues a mouse. The story ends with a cat eating his friend the rat, a kitten eating his 
intended the mouse, and a duck eating him. Quite obviously, the moral of the story was for 
children to listen to their parents about courting.163 The change in courtship rituals created 
anxieties over parental authority, but in an urban setting, families waged a losing battle and could 
not maintain the control they once had. Young women, particularly in urban settings, took to 
deciding their spouses based on romantic love and without their families’ consent.  
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Women entered into the public sphere more and more, increasing contact with the 
opposite sex. Without the watchful eyes of parents, these women entered into intense emotional 
bonds where the couple adopted a “shared identity.”164 This required vulnerability and included a 
power dynamic. Many, such as Lizzie Jones at the start of this chapter, went out with groups of 
female friends to listen to musical performances and met up with men. They rode the streetcars 
and enjoyed the nightlife. But this desire for leisure time and “mixed-sex fun” placed women in a 
sometimes vulnerable position. As Peiss discusses, women often made less than men and relied 
on their male companions to “treat” them to an evening of fun. Men paid for dinner, drinks, 
dance tickets, or whatever outing planned, and they expected a return. As a result, “treating” 
often required some level of sexual compensation.165 Women were then left with a “sexual 
debt.”166 Coupled together, a “shared identity” and pressure for sexual favors created a situation 
where women’s autonomy could be threatened and their partners could become violent to 
maintain a sense of control. Some boyfriends ignored new definitions of manhood and felt 
entitled to “chastise” or “control” their female partners.  
Disagreements and intimate-partner violence occasionally resulted from these “sexual 
debts.” In the summer of 1887, Eliza McRea had been seeing Willie Hennessey but had refrained 
from becoming sexual with him. One evening, he followed her as she came out of her house. 
McRea testified, “he said ‘where are you going?’ I told him I was going to my aunt’s. He came 
up to me and asked if I was going to sleep with him. I said no. [Then] he hauled off and punched 
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me in the eye.”167 Hennessey felt entitled to some sexual remuneration and a certain level of 
control over McRea. McRea, however, reasserted herself, denying him complete power in the 
relationship. Instead of having sex with Hennessey as so-called payment for the outing or 
passively accepting the beating, McRea refused Hennessey on both accounts. She, moreover, 
believed she was entitled to legal protection even if she had been “treated” by Hennessey, and 
McRea illustrated new gender expectations by displaying a level of autonomy and pressing 
charges on her abuser.168  
Intimate-partner violence during courtship often erupted when the woman disagreed with 
her boyfriend. Sometimes the disagreement could be as simple as not wanting to go out on the 
town that evening. When John Green called on his girlfriend, Rosetta Williams, she told him that 
she did not feel up to leaving her house. Green responded by grabbing her arm and hitting her. 
He seemingly could not tolerate a “no” from the woman he was courting, which demonstrates 
Green’s sense of power and privilege. Williams, however, illustrated new gender expectations. 
Her refusal to go out that evening suggests a right to act as she would like without being told 
what to do by her boyfriend. Williams’s actions also indicate a right to be free from violence by 
having Green arrested for his abusive actions.169 New courtship rituals did not maintain 
antebellum notions of male power and privilege, including the “privilege” of chastisement. 
Sometimes intimate-partner violence in courtship was less in “the heat of the moment” 
and more of a premeditated act to exert power, but even in systemically abusive courtships, 
women demanded the right to be free from violence. In 1887, George Samuels followed his 
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girlfriend Emma Conrad through the streets harassing her on several occasions. After one intense 
verbal altercation, Conrad stopped by New Orleans’s fourth police precinct and asked an officer 
for protection. She said, “You would see me home. I am in trouble.”170 When pushed for more 
information, Conrad told the police officers that her former boyfriend Samuels was following her 
again and had threatened to beat her. A Sergeant Klotter agreed to walk her home, and once they 
reached her house, Samuels arrived on the scene with a friend and yelled at Conrad. The officer 
sent Samuels home and advised Conrad that the best thing she could do was go to bed. Despite 
his assurances, Sergeant Klotter noticed she was still very frightened. Conrad’s fear was well 
founded. She testified Samuels returned two hours later with his friend, came into her home, 
snatched her from her bed, and beat her till she was unconscious.171  
Samuels shadowed Conrad’s movements all afternoon on May 20, 1886, intimidating and 
harassing her. His actions were a premeditated act of violence intended to break Conrad 
emotionally and physically. Samuels told her, “You got the best of me [by breaking up first],” 
and the loss of control sent him on a frenzied quest to regain the upper hand between the two of 
them. His attempt to exert dominance did not stop at the beating. During the testimony, 
Samuels’s lawyer cross-examined Conrad and tried to clear his client of any responsibility by 
asking, “Are you not subject to epileptic fits?”172 Conrad flippantly responded, “Only when I get 
hit.”173 Despite months of emotional and physical abuse, Conrad believed she had the right to be 
courted free from violence. She expected the police to protect her from a potential act of violence 
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from a man she had been seeing by declaring, “You would see me home.”174 When Samuels 
denied responsibility for his actions, she still held him accountable by pressing charges and 
remaining consistent about his guilt in her testimony. The changes in gender expectations 
courtship rituals, and as Conrad showed through the court case, men could not wield unchecked 
violence against women. 
As in Samuels case, some men refused to accept women’s decision to end a relationship 
and lose power. The case of Emma Starks further illustrates this clash between old and new 
views of gender expectations. On November 10, 1881, Starks enjoyed an evening out with a 
female friend. They met up with the men they were seeing at the time, and the two couples 
gambled and danced at the Keno Room.175 After a few hours, they left, and Starks spotted her ex, 
Andrew Williams. She knew being in the company of other men would create an issue with 
Williams, and so the couples split. Starks and her female friend walked more quickly towards 
their homes until Williams ran up to them, punched Starks, and then tried to stab her. She 
pressed charges, which resulted in him spending four days in jail.  
Throughout all of it, Starks displayed a distinct sense of self. She spent evenings out on 
the town, passed time in the company of different men, and filed suit against her attacker. In her 
testimony, she stated, “I used to have him,” indicating a sense of ownership of her past lover.176 
Her case attests to the amount of power she held in the relationship as well as the desire to be 
free of his continued and unwanted abuse. Single women like Starks became more autonomous 
in the postbellum period, participating in leisure activities and the work force. As they did so, 
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many took pride in their emerging sense of self, and as women exerted this new autonomy, they 
upheld the right to be free from violence in courtship. 
Engaged women asserted the same right to be free from abuse as women being courted. 
In a similar situation to Emma Conrad, Ada Wheeler attempted to break off her relationship with 
her fiancé, Morris Hamilton. She had been lying down on the porch when Hamilton approached 
the house. He asked Wheeler to come inside, but she refused. He barked back, “No, come inside. 
I don’t want to tell my business to everybody.”177 Still, she would not accede to his wishes, and 
in the presence of neighbors, Wheeler said, “Here Morris, there is your ring. I don’t love you no 
more and I don’t want to carry it [the engagement] out anymore.”178 He asked her if she truly 
meant it. After confirming she did not love him, he pulled out a pocket knife, attacked her, and 
cut her hand.  
Throughout it all, Hamilton could not accept that his fiancée would leave him, at least not 
of her own will. He held strong feelings for Wheeler even outside of marriage, illustrating the 
intensity of engagements during the late 1800s. When he lost his shared identity with his fiancée, 
he turned to violence, endangering the life of the woman he supposedly loved after hearing her 
emphatic claim that she stopped loving him. Wheeler, on the other hand, illustrated new gender 
expectations by upholding romantic love as the primary reason for marriage. When she no longer 
loved him, she ended the engagement. Wheeler also displayed the new gender expectations by 
acting with autonomy. She refused Hamilton’s wishes to keep the argument private. She refused 
for power to be consolidated in the hands of men. When attacked, Wheeler pressed charges, and 
despite Hamilton’s claim that someone forced her to do it, Wheeler insisted she alone filed the 
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complaint and wished to prosecute. In their actions, Hamilton and Wheeler exhibited new power 
dynamics that accompanied emerging gender expectations.  
 Overall, but in urban areas especially, courtship rituals changed in ways that gave women 
more independence in their intimate relationships with men. Women more frequently chose 
boyfriends and fiancés that reciprocated romantic feelings of love. Power, more importantly, 
could not be held solely by men. Women expected a say in a relationship free from abuse. When 
their partners violated these expectations, women often chose to end the relationship and demand 
punishment for these men who transgressed the new gender roles. 
  
Common Law Marriage 
In the antebellum era, some states began to recognize marriages in which individuals 
privately exchanged vows or cohabitated openly as husband and wife. These common law 
marriages often took place in more rural areas in the nineteenth century when records were kept 
sporadically and among the poorer socioeconomic classes, who lacked the monetary means to 
contract a marriage. Since the legal system wanted to make marriage more accessible to the 
entire American population, courts generally followed the “maxim semper prasesumitur pro 
matrimonio (the assumption is always in favor of matrimony).”179 But by the 1870s, common 
law marriages came under attack. 
 Purity reformers and evangelicals pushed to regulate marriage even more than it had 
been.180 Proponents of stricter marriage requirements felt acknowledging common law marriage 
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encouraged moral depravity by condoning couples living together and engaging in sex outside of 
marriage. Not surprisingly, they believed the government in general and legislation in particular 
should be used in creating change. The state, they argued, could and should intervene, even in 
what was previously considered private affairs. Contemporary sociologist George Eliot Howard 
argued, “you can make people better by law…. A good marriage law is prevention⎯social 
prophylaxis.”181 Some argued explicitly that denying the legality of common law marriage would 
be enough. Others supported stricter requirements for marriage celebrations, including who 
could officiate and how many guests had to be present. The movement for marital reform gained 
a broad backing with religious conservatives and women’s rights advocates, such as Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton. Stanton believed stricter marital requirements would prevent unions without a 
woman’s consent or full understanding, and coupled with more liberal divorce laws, these 
changes would keep women from being trapped in a bad marriage. The Purity Movement did not 
agree with Stanton’s logic, but they worked together for marital change. Whether for women’s 
interests or moral uplift, many Americans supported reforming the legal system’s view of 
marriage. 
 Detractors argued increased regulation of nuptial celebrations would disproportionately 
influence poorer socioeconomic classes and people of color. Without funds to purchase the 
marriage license or pay the officiant, couples would continue to live together without the rights 
and privileges associated with the legal institution of marriage. This, they argued, would be to 
the detriment of society. Most of their complaints stemmed not from a desire for equality⎯ but 
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rather from fiscal conservatism. Property and children were at the top of the list of concerns. 
Children born in these unions would be illegitimate and deprived of the mandatory support of the 
father, and successions and property would also be denied to the widows and heirs. Financial 
responsibility of these children would then fall to the community or state. Society, anti-marital 
reformers argued, would suffer.  
People of color would also be impacted by the proposed changes. Although some African 
Americans rushed to have their marriages legalized and protected after the war, numerous others 
feared white expectations would be imposed in their marriages if made legal, specifically the 
ability to end these relationships. Those who were wary of negative consequences kept their 
relationships outside of legal sanctions in what historian Nancy Bercaw calls “taking up and 
sweethearting.”182 Sometimes the relationship involved simply a sexual or financial arrangement, 
but “taking up” or “sweethearting” could lead to a private vow between the couple, which was 
viewed in the African-American community as a form of marriage. But, this also meant courts 
would not recognize their variation of marriage. Marital reform had the potential to 
disproportionately affect those less wealthy, those living in rural areas, and people of color. 
Despite serious disapproval, many states enacted stricter legislation on what constituted a legal 
marriage thereby outlawing common law marriages.183 
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 Some states, such as Louisiana, rarely recognized common law marriages even before the 
marital reform movement. As early as its territorial days, Louisiana passed legislation 
acknowledging marriage as a civil contract that was made when the parties were “willing to 
contract, able to contact, and did contract pursuant to the forms and solemnities prescribed by 
law.”184 The civil code article remained vague in what detailed the ceremony, but consent was 
crucial. If either party was forced by violence, if the woman was raped and not yet “restored to 
the enjoyment of liberty,” or if either party misrepresented themselves, then the marriage would 
be rendered invalid.185 Ceremonies, however, could not be performed by just anyone. Articles 
102 and 103 specify only justices of the peace, parish judges, “minister of any gospel, or priest of 
any religious sect” could perform the ceremony provided they abided by the law, including a 
“special license issued by a parish judge.”186 For marriage to be legitimate in Louisiana, the state 
required consent, licensure, and an approved official to perform the ceremony. By 1877, the state 
legislature of Louisiana added another article in the civil code requiring at least three witnesses 
(all must be over the age of twenty-one).187 Although Louisiana recognized common law 
marriages legal in other states, Louisiana common law marriages rarely held up in civil court.188 
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However, even if judges did not formally recognize common law marriages, people continued to 
live as man and wife without a legal seal of approval. The practice remained entrenched despite 
attempts to dissuade or eradicate it. 
 The changes in common law marriage and changes in gender expectations created an 
unstable power dynamic in common law marriages. Common law husbands could not maintain 
their authority as women asserted themselves. In 1888, Mary Antoine sought to prosecute her 
common law husband William Anderson for abuse. She stated they had been living together for 
nine years as husband and wife and had two children. One night, he came in her room while she 
was sleeping and choked her. Unlike some women, Antoine had the resources to leave with her 
two children, and she fled the home soon after the incident.189 Antoine considered the physical 
violence reason enough to break a nine-year common law marriage, taking advantage of an 
opportunity legally married women did not possess. Since they never legally solemnized the 
relationship, she could leave without seeking the court’s intervention. But as often happens with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     188 Since common law marriages came under attack during the postbellum era and since some 
states, such as Louisiana, refused to recognize them, intimate-partner violence in common law 
marriages falls under the non-marital intimate-partner violence category. The court case cited for 
Louisiana’s legal recognition of other states’ common law marriages was Taylor v. Swett 3 La. 
33 (1831). Also, I use the term “common law marriage” to refer to the committed relationship of 
two individuals living together regardless of race instead of “concubinage.” Although 
concubinage was when a couple lived together “in a committed relationship without benefit of 
marriage,” common law marriage appears better a term for this discussion (10). Often the couple 
in the court records would refer to each other as husband and wife with the added phrase 
“although not legally married.” To them, they felt married and did not use any other phrase to 
refer to their arrangement. Sometimes, the couple would eventually seek legal sanction of their 
marriage. Additionally, other states did and still do recognize common law marriage. 
Consequently, I have chosen to stay with the phrase “common law marriage” rather than 
“concubinage” or even “cohabitation.” For more information on concubinage in New Orleans, 
particularly the form called plaçage which involved an interracial relationship, see Alecia Long, 
The Great Southern Babylon: Sex, Race, and Respectability in New Orleans, 1865-1920, (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  




intimate-partner violence, leaving proved the most dangerous part of the entire relationship.190 
Married or not, Anderson spun out of control, not able to deal with his loss of power over 
Antoine. On the evening of January 19, she testified that he found her at her friend’s house and 
jumped into the room with a cotton hook in his hand. I ran and tried to get away from 
him. I got into the bed, he came after me, began to beat me with the cotton hook, he kept 
beating me until he hurt his hand with the cotton hook he then took the broomstick beat 
me with that then took me up bodily and threw [me] out of the door and as I started to get 
up, he kicked me….191 
 
Anderson seemingly could not accept the end of his common law marriage and the repudiation 
of his “right” to control his common law wife, and so he found her and beat her again. She 
successfully escaped and sent a child to contact her aunt, who called for the police. Anderson did 
not internalize the new masculinity but rather upheld an antiquated view of manhood. To him, 
legal sanction of his marriage did not matter. Antoine was “his” and as such, subject to his 
authority and methods of “discipline.” Antoine, however, acted under the new views of 
womanhood in the postbellum period. She expected a certain level of protection and reciprocity. 
When he violated her gender expectations of him by abusing her, she left. Although the exact 
catalyst that touched off the violence is unknown, the abuse clearly serves as an example of 
intimate-partner violence based on a dynamic of competing gendered forms of power.  
In a similar case, Elizabeth (Lizzie) Andrews pressed charges against her common law 
husband of five years, Major Anderson. He accused Andrews of having a relationship with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     190 There are no statistics on intimate-partner homicides during the postbellum period. 
Presently, seventy-five percent of intimate-partner homicides are committed as the victim 
attempts to leave the relationship.  See Hallie Bongar White and James G. White, “Testifying 
about Lethality Risk Factors,” Southwest Center for Law and Policy & Office on Violence 
Against Women, U.S. Department of Justice, 2005.  
 
     191 State v. William Anderson (1888) CRDC# 10255. Cotton hooks were found in many court 
cases involving assault and battery. Since they were common in areas dependent on cotton as a 
cash crop, these instruments were accessible and could inflict significant damage given their 
sharp end and heavy metal construction. 
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another man, Daniel Jordan, and despite her protests of innocence, Anderson did not believe 
her.192 He choked Andrews and pulled a knife on her, insisting he was going to kill her. Andrews 
testified that her common law husband had a history of violence and was extremely jealous. In 
her testimony before the Recorder Court, Lizzie Andrews stated, “The accused is a very jealous 
man and continually accuses me of being untrue and having criminal intercourse with other men. 
He has often ill treated me.”193 Anderson sought to control Andrews and ensure her fidelity 
through violence. The violation of new gender expectations, however, led Andrews to have her 
common law husband arrested. 
 The Major Anderson case illustrates how poorer socioeconomic groups internalized the 
new views of gender and how the courts ruled on abuse in common law marriages. None of those 
involved in the suit⎯the plaintiff, defendant, or witnesses⎯ could read, write, or sign their 
names. All made their mark in the court records with an “x.” Although illiteracy cannot be the 
sole predictor of socioeconomic class, the ability to read and write indicates a lack of a 
rudimentary education and suggests Andrews and Anderson did not belong to any middling or 
elite family.194 Her living situation is also evidence of economic hardship. Andrews and 
Anderson rented a room from Jane Green on Plum Street.195 Instead of a bedroom, they lived in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  192 State v. Major Anderson (1886) CRDC# 8059. 	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  193 Ibid. 
      
     194 Statistics on education in postbellum era show roughly half of 5 to 19 year olds were 
enrolled in school. “Rates for males and females were roughly similar throughout the period, but 
rates for blacks were much lower than for whites….Following the Civil War, enrollment rates for 
blacks rose rapidly from 10 percent in 1870 to 34 percent in 1880.” See Tom Snyder, ed., 120 
Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait, chapter one (Washington, D.C: U.S. Dept. 
of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, National Center for Education 
Statistics, 1993). 
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the kitchen and had been renting at that location for some time. Given her poorer socioeconomic 
status, Andrews could have reinterpreted gender expectations differently since those in power 
typically decide social expectations.196 In a way, she did. Marriage, to Andrews, did not have to 
be legally recognized with a formal ceremony and license and instead she accepted a common 
law marriage as suitable and as a valid form of marriage. She insisted they lived as husband and 
wife, which showed an emotional commitment more than simple cohabitation. But, in another 
way, Andrews showed similar views with other women during the period. She internalized the 
new womanhood, and she refused to permit her common law husband the male privilege of 
chastisement any longer. 
New gender expectations included a sense of reciprocity, particularly in working class 
relationships. Working-class common law wives expected assistance in the home. Some noted 
their financial assistance to the family income entitled them to help with domestic chores. Others 
believed the new gender expectations did not define women solely in terms of the home. Still, 
they expected their husbands to contribute in some way. Jane Robinson, for example, certainly 
required respect and assistance with the housework. In 1887, she filed assault and battery charges 
against her common law husband Sam Carney. Carney wanted to go to sleep, but Robinson 
insisted he take out the mattress and create a pallet for them to sleep in the living room. After all, 
she argued, he had not gone to work, so he had not done anything to make him tired. If he did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	      196 Most postmodernist theorists argue those in power help to formulate or uphold what 
constitutes “normal” and “not normal.” Those considered abnormal are denied access to power. 
Also, scholarship on disempowered groups has shown how minorities reinterpret and 
reappropriate these values. See Larry May and Jeff Brown, eds., Philosophy of Law: Classic and 
Contemporary Readings, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010): 133. See also Dianna 
Taylor and Karen Vintges, Feminism and the Final Foucault, (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2004): 222-223; Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (New 





help, she threatened he would have to sleep in the bedroom with the children. Carney responded 
by yelling, “I will be God damn if I do,” and then he began to curse and beat her.197  
As part of the working class, Robinson and Carney both found seasonal work to make 
ends meet. They could not afford a home with enough bedrooms but rather slept in the living 
room and had the children share a common bed. Despite their financial situation, Robinson had 
the right to be free from physical and emotional violence. She also expected Carney to fulfill his 
obligation as a man and as a partner by assisting with the domestic chores. When he violated this 
understanding by not helping and hitting her “two licks in the face,” Robinson had him arrested. 
She asserted a right to be free from violence and challenged his power by asserting her 
contribution to the household. 
The new gendered expectations infiltrated all socioeconomic levels and even 
relationships outside of marriage. Many women no longer supported the antebellum male 
privilege of chastisement. These women began to recognize their economic and domestic 
contributions to the household and believed that power needed to be renegotiated in these 
relationships. In courtship and common law marriages, women held more legal rights since they 
were not civilly dead and subsumed under their husband’s identity as in the law of coverture.198 
This could have translated into internalizing a level of autonomy from their male partners, but 
during this period, even legally married women demanded the right to be free from violence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     197 State v. Sam Carney (1887) CRDC# 9873. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  198	  Coverture defined women as civilly dead as her identity was subsumed under her 
husband’s. This had been the legal identification of women since colonial America. For more 
information on coverture in the United States, see Hendrik Hartog, Man and Wife in America: A 
History, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000); Linda K. Kerber, No 
Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship, (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1998); and Sally Kitch, The Specter of Sex: Gendered Foundations of Racial 






Once married, the new gender dynamic did not taper off. Even men recognized a 
different interaction between husband and wife. John McKowen from Louisiana wrote to his 
sister Sallie Henry about his widowed mother’s recent marriage and remarked,  
I hope that Mama is happy in her new home and is learning to boss her husband as every 
good wife, who resolutely intends to be happy in her own home, should, and I hope that 
her husband takes kindly to the bossing as every happy husband must do if he really 
wants to be happy in his married life.199 
 
He based the ideal marriage around the concept of happiness for both the husband and wife, not 
the husband alone. Moreover, McKowen linked happiness in marriage not to the complete 
submission of the wife but rather on a degree of female assertiveness. The wife held the position 
of “boss” in the home under new gender and marital expectations, and the husband should 
“kindly” yield to his wife’s command of the household. If a wife became unhappy, she could 
seek a divorce. In fact, after the Civil War, unhappily married women increasingly sought 
divorce. Historian Carl Degler found that two-thirds of divorces in the late 1860s were granted to 
women and argues this shift in divorce signaled in part “another sign of women’s drive for 
greater autonomy within their marriage.”200 In fact, among Orleans Parish court cases for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     199 John McKowen to Sallie Henry, December 20, 1895, Wilson, Louisiana, McKowen-
Lilley-Stirling Family Papers, Manuscript Collection 4356, Hill Memorial Library, Louisiana 
State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803. 
	  	  	  
     200 Carl N. Degler, At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the Revolution to the 
Present, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980): 168. Elaine Tyler May also notices a shift 
in divorce in the second half of the nineteenth century in her case study of Los Angeles. May 
states, “the late nineteenth century witnessed a slight straining against the limits of Victorianism” 
as “altered sex roles” reshaped marital expectations and the court’s response. See Elaine Tyler 
May, Great Expectations: Marriage and Divorce in Post-Victorian America, (Chicago: The 




intimate-partner violence from 1870 to 1900, legal marriages accounted for 61% of the cases 
while extramarital intimate-partner violence comprised only 39% of the sample size.201 Clearly, 
postbellum marriages did not resurrect an intact patriarchy and sought to renegotiate 
relationships with their husbands. 
The role of wife after the Civil War shifted to include visibility and participation in the 
public sphere. Using maternalist rhetoric, women argued their moral “nature” would be of 
benefit to the larger society, and consequently, the emerging gender expectations were not 
completely different to those of the antebellum period. In particular, the glorification of white 
women as domestic and moral remained. Both regions engaged in memorial activities including 
the creation of cemeteries, the relocation and burial of soldiers, the building of monuments, 
participation in decoration days, and the establishment of Memorial Day.202 In Memorial and 
Decoration Day speeches, men praised women not only for honoring the dead but also for their 
emotional and moral “nature.” In 1873, Confederate Colonel Thomas Hardeman applauded these 
women’s actions, saying 
These noble women come, when spring flowers bloom, to plant the memorial shrub and  
shed their tears of love over the humble mounds that tell where our heroes sleep. For this  
I give them honour and praise today.203 
 
Hardeman praised southern women in this particular speech for their sacrifice in the Civil War 
and for their continued love for the wounded and fallen soldiers. He noted that these women 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     201 From the sample, 123 (61%) cases I examined were of marital intimate-partner violence.	  	  
	  
	  	     202 For more on Decoration Days see David Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in 
American Memory, (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001) and 
Gaines Foster’s Ghosts of the Confederacy.  
 
     203 John R. Ficklen Papers, Mss. 144, 209, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley 
Collections, LSU Libraries, Baton Rouge, La.  
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were “the perfection of beauty and glory of the land” for their emotional fidelity to their men.204 
This is key to the new gender expectations. Women could hold an exalted status through 
devotion to men but not independently of them. These southern women’s reassurance of men’s 
sacrifice and loss eased the grief of defeat and strengthened a weakened sense of manhood by 
emphasizing the sacrifice of southern men for the protection of southern women.  
In spite of the conservative tone of women’s roles in memorial days, these women acted 
as they had not done in the past⎯as public advocates. They stepped outside of the home and 
publicly honored fallen men, even Confederate soldiers. Instead of being viewed as treasonous, 
women were viewed as nonthreatening and helped paved the way for such Confederate tributes 
to be acceptable. Nurturing and moral remained in the new womanhood, but the division of 
distinct spheres gave way to a more public female whose viewpoints and actions could have an 
impact. Although couched in maternalist terms, they altered the relationship between men and 
women, even as they held onto older characteristics of womanhood. 
Wives, especially those in upper socioeconomic classes, were encouraged to join 
benevolent societies and become leaders of the community. One Louisiana woman advised a 
female relative to do as much since “this is an absolute cure for blues, is a strong anchor and fine 
encouragement for your husband, and in short makes you a good and valuable citizen rather than 
a hippo-condriac [sic] and drone and impediment to society.”205 Heading charities and other 
helpful organizations, then, made women useful and an asset to her husband and to the larger 
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  O.M. Grisham to Sallie, June 19, 1904, Winnfield, Louisiana, Grisham-Kellogg-Faust 
Papers, Manuscript Collection 5048, Hill Memorial Library, Louisiana State University, Baton 




society. Confining oneself to the home completely was not advisable, and in the newer, more 
public role, women exerted more influence. 
 Women also became more visible in the public by participating in what historian Kathy 
Peiss calls “cheap amusements.”206 For instance, women gathered in public squares to talk or 
listen to music, as Lizzie Muldaner did in New Orleans.207 They sometimes went with their male 
partners, but women also participated in leisure activities with female acquaintances or sisters. 
With the economic recessions of the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, women increasingly entered into 
the public sphere. Although most white women remained outside the workforce, more and more 
women had to earn an income, particularly women of color.208 The Census of 1900 estimated 
more than twenty percent of women worked and declared that “although far from customary” 
working women were “by no means unusual.”209 In 1887, for example, Anna Marks testified that 
her husband was unable to support them and she had to work part time to earn money to buy 
shoes for their baby.210 Necessity compelled her to find extra income for the household. 
Although Marks and Muldaner ventured outside the home for different reasons, their presence in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     206 Kathy Peiss, Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century 
New York, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986). Peiss examines working women in a 
northern urban setting, but her argument can be extended to the South, albeit urban areas like 
New Orleans. 
  
     207 State v. Mat Lumbardo (1887) CRDC# 9901. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  208 For more information on the history of women and the workforce, see Alice Kessler-
Harris, Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982). 
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the public sphere illustrates the increasing visibility of women in what previously had been 
considered male activities. 
 Many wives agreed that their husbands had no right to abuse them. Their repudiation of 
the male privilege of chastisement took various forms. Some women showed a sense of agency 
by verbally standing up to their abusive husbands. Mrs. Bax pressed charges on her husband, and 
in her testimony, she stated the argument was over her treating him “coolly.”211 When her 
husband cross-examined her and asked if she would improve her attitude, she refused because, 
she reasoned, “he wasn’t treating me properly and I wasn’t going to do any better.”212 Like 
former nun Desiree Martin, Mrs. Bax seemed to expect a sort of reciprocity in male-female 
relationships.213 When her husband did not seek to make her happy, Mrs. Bax declared she did 
not have to behave submissively. Instead, she argued with him and defended her supposedly cold 
treatment of him. She implied that only when he acted as a loving and protective husband would 
she in turn conform to the role of a loving and submissive wife. Even if some husbands like Mr. 
Bax wanted obedience, society could not resurrect the expectation of complete female 
subordination in the postbellum period. The conditions of the Civil War made women recognize 
the consequences of upholding the antebellum feminine ideal, and new views of womanhood 
required a different type of marriage based more on respect and a give-and-take mentality. 
 Other women physically confronted their abusive spouses, believing the men’s violation 
of new gender expectations warranted a like response. Virginia Wilson testified, “he rushed in 
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and gave me a shove me, and I shoved him back.”214 Wilson expressed the belief that he was 
subject to the same treatment as he shows her. Another woman, Mary Shields, stated that after 
her husband struck her, she hit him with a spoon she had in her hand.215 When he made a 
movement towards her after, she “struck him in the mouth.”216 Shields’s actions appear self-
defensive because she fought back rather than remain passive.217 In a case involving an African-
American couple, the wife, Anne Dagan (alias Anne Williams), similarly fought back. When the 
court asked her why she beat her husband, Anne said, “I tell you sir, he got just what he 
deserved. I ain’t no dog, and I ain’t going to be thrashed in that way.”218 She explicitly stated that 
her husband had no right to strike her, believing she possessed the right to be free from marital 
violence, and she took a stand to stop it. Despite what some historians claim, these women did 
not seek to “perform” as a lady to gain sympathy and successful prosecution from the court.219 
Physically violent behavior could be classified as unfeminine in most other situations, but in 
intimate-partner violence, women could and did strike back without being judged. After all, the 
husbands first violated redefined gender expectations by being abusive to their wives. Shields, 
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Wilson, and Williams, like other women, openly refuted any male privilege of chastisement and 
did not hide their defensive behavior from the court. 
Of all the 202 cases of intimate-partner violence examined, only three women expressed 
the belief in the privacy of the family or the husband’s right to chastisement. This accounts for 
approximately one and a half percent of the cases of intimate-partner violence⎯an astounding 
minority.220 In 1882, police dragged James Gillen to a Recorder’s Court to answer for abusing 
his wife. Mrs. Gillen never sought to press charges but rather the watchman in the neighborhood 
arrested James. When asked to testify on the incident, Mrs. Gillen stated, “I didn’t wish to 
prosecute him… He wanted his way, and I wanted mine. It was my fault as much as his.”221  
When the judge asked where she received her black eye, Mrs. Gillen responded, “It was done in 
the family.  I didn’t wish to go against my husband.”222 Despite the police having witnessed the 
abuse, Mrs. Gillen insisted she held accountability. She avoided a detailed description of the 
events and gave vague responses upholding the concept of the privacy of the family. She insisted 
she did not want charges pressed since it was a family affair, even if she felt she had a right to 
hold different views from her husband on certain issues. Although women such as Mrs. Gillen 
internalized some sense of guilt or privacy of family, clearly most women no longer accepted a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     220 Only 3 (1.5%) of cases involved women expressing a belief that the husband had some sort 
of right to beat her. Since I examined 33 nolle prosequi cases, 2 cases or 6% (one of the cases in 
which the women who internalized guilty still resulted in conviction) of the cases women 
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argument of women’s overall agency due to new conceptions of womanhood. 
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complete patriarchy, including total female submissiveness. Gender ideals had changed too much 
to resurrect such antiquated views.  
 Overwhelmingly, women internalized the change in gender expectations. Ninety-eight 
and a half percent of the women in the 202 cases examined from Orleans Parish during the 
period of 1870 to 1900 asserted that their male partners did not have the right to raise a hand 
against them. Their testimony illustrates a large shift on the individual level about how women 
viewed intimate-partner violence, and women constituting the majority of the plaintiffs further 
supports a different attitude about what had previously been a male privilege. Through refusing 
to submit to physical and emotional violence, women renegotiated every type of romantic 
relationship with their male partners and affected social attitudes. Their repudiation of a man’s 
right to chastise his wife affected other members of society, the community, and the public at 
large. Fluid gender expectations, then, allowed for social reform on the issue of intimate-partner 






















THE FAMILY, COMMUNITY, AND INTIMATE-PARTNER VIOLENCE 
 
He [the accused] made a big excitement. The little girl called me.  I went in as quick as I 
could.  He had [his wife] on the bed and was choking her. When I came in he said, “I will 
kill you.” I told my husband to go and call the policeman. He did not come quick enough, 
and I went myself and got two policemen. ⎯ Hannah Anderson, 1887223 
 
At ten o’clock in the evening on July 26, 1887, Hannah Anderson awoke in her New 
Orleans apartment to the cries from a nine-year-old girl begging for someone to help her mother. 
Hannah quickly followed. She arrived on the scene to find a man choking his wife and 
threatening anyone who dared stop him. Instead of turning a blind eye to uphold the privacy of 
family, Hannah hurried to intervene, calling to her husband for help.224 Hannah’s actions and 
demand for the police to do something suggest a rising level of awareness of intimate-partner 
violence and society’s moral obligation to stop it. 
During this period the public stepped in to protect many different women, not just those 
in keeping with the antebellum conception of a lady. The Wilson case in 1887 illustrates that 
point. Virginia and James Wilson separated multiple times during their sixteen-year marriage, 
and James reportedly told Virginia to become “a decent woman.”225 James never specifically 
testified as to what Virginia did to make her an “indecent” wife, but when she refused his sexual 
advances that night, James insinuated Virginia engaged in extramarital affairs. He came over that 
summer night intent on reconciling the marriage and seeing if they could live in the same house 
again. Virginia turned him away and acted defiantly. She kept blowing out the matches he lit to 
smoke, and when he shoved her, she shoved back. James possessively clung to his dominance 
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and perceived power over her life, by threatening, “I will kill you so you won’t be of any service 
to me or anybody else.”226  
Far from demure and submissive, the abused woman, Virginia Wilson, did not exemplify 
the typical “proper” woman. She left her husband several times, fought back, refused his wishes, 
and found a job to singlehandedly provide for herself and her daughter. Although Virginia, like 
other abused women, violated the antebellum notion of “true womanhood,” this did not exclude 
them from societal protections. Hannah and the police intervened, throwing aside the concept of 
family privacy and male privilege, which suggests the public agreed not only on a broader view 
of what was acceptable of a woman but also on new limitations to men’s behavior. 
The Wilson case of New Orleans, Louisiana involved at least three levels of intervention: 
family, community, and the law. The nine-year-old daughter sought help from Hannah 
Anderson, Hannah found watchmen, and the police and court used criminal statutes of assault 
and battery to enforce Virginia Wilson’s right to be free from abuse. These multiple forms of 
intervention demonstrate a high level of public awareness about intimate-partner violence that 
infiltrated every aspect of society. Greater awareness generated a level of visibility to a social 
problem prompting action. A high level of public awareness changed the dominant message from 
accepting the male privilege of chastisement to ending intimate-partner violence, making silence 
no longer acceptable. When this happened, people then condemned the perpetrator and sought to 
protect a woman’s right to be free from violence. Intimate-partner violence came out of the 
shadows in the 1870s and 1880s as people discussed the problem, raised awareness, and held the 
abuser accountable. Although laws in the majority of states did not change, judges responded by 
interpreting old assault and battery statutes to hold the batterer legally accountable. Rather than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




solely a top down, the shift also began with people taking a stance against intimate-partner 
violence on an individual then communal then state level.227  
 
Family 
At the core of this change lay a shift in the family power dynamic that allowed for 
increased family intervention in intimate-partner violence. Gender anxieties from the Civil War 
undermined male authority, and women’s experiences taught the need for a level of autonomy. 
Continuation of a male-led gender hierarchy came with stipulations. In both the North and South, 
women demanded a more reciprocal relationship between the sexes. Some insisted on equal 
rights while others wanted legal protection. Whether radical or conservative in their goals, 
women sought to alter the power dynamics, particularly in marriage. When men became abusive, 
they violated the new understanding in heterosexual relationships governed by gender 
expectations in the postbellum decades. Consequently, violent men forfeited their other family 
members’ respect and deference. Like in the Wilson case where the nine-year-old daughter went 
in search of help, family members, including siblings and children frequently witnessed intimate-
partner violence. Often they became the first level of intervention. Those who interceded on their 
mother’s, sister’s, or daughter’s behalf tended to do so without any remorse for breaking 
supposed deference to the male head of the house. In return for submission of one’s wife and 
children, men had to be protective and refrain from violently chastising he other family 
members. Violating this new understanding meant an abusive man could not command respect or 
power.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     227 Sharon Block, Rape and Sexual Power in Early America, (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006). Block also argues about rape, a form of gender based violence, is 
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To uphold these new gender expectations, families sought to make the abuser stop, with 
some resorting to defensive acts of physical violence themselves. On September 27, 1883, 
Theresa Busch cooked a breakfast for her family when her husband, Herman, asked her to go 
somewhere with him. When she said no, he became angry and demanded the money she had in 
her pocket, but she kept refusing. Unable to accept defiance from his wife, Herman tried to 
enforce submission. Theresa testified,  
When I refused he caught a hold of me by he collar saying he would choke me….Threw 
me down… While in that position, Mary Senyetter, my daughter took a stick and beat 
him to make him let me go.  He then jumped up got a hold of a piece of iron that we use 
as a poker and struck me in the face cutting my face.228 
 
Theresa and Herman’s daughter, Mary, already married and moved out of the house, still 
intervened to stop her father from beating her mother. Instead of calling for help or yelling at her 
father, Mary grabbed an object and tried to force him to leave her mother alone. In doing so, 
Mary acted, reciprocating with the same behavior her father used with her mother. Both women 
were not submissive and obedient. Theresa defied Herman. Mary beat him. These women’s 
actions seemingly threatened a traditional gender hierarchy, but by abusing his wife, Herman 
violated the new gender expectations. As a result, women behaved less submissively and 
intervened in intimate-partner violence. 
 Male family members intervened as well. New definitions of masculinity required men to 
be protective of women, including protecting a woman from her own male partner. Husbands 
possessed a significant amount of legal and social power over their wives. When he became 
abusive, a husband or male partner violated the new terms of gender. This weakened his claim to 
privacy and dominance in his household, and intervention became necessary. William Joyce 
transgressed these expectations when he abused his wife, Mary, and child, Katie. Mary left the 
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Joyce home refusing to live with an abusive husband any more and sought assistance from her 
brother, James. William sought after his wife and daughter and eventually found them staying at 
James’s house. On November 20, 1885, William demanded his family return to him. He called to 
Katie telling her to come to him, but she began to cry and hid behind her mother. Mary told her 
husband to leave and that she would not force their daughter to go with him. William responded 
by yelling obscenities and grabbing Katie by the arm. Mary testified,  
I says, “You are looking for another term in the workhouse.”  He abused me and James  
says, ”You can’t abuse her in this house,” and ordered him out.  He [William] raised his 
hand to strike me.  I told James to go out and get a policeman. As he was going out, 
William tripped him and beat him, and I went out to his assistance.229   
 
The house belonged to James. It was his property. As such, James insinuated William did not 
possess any rights while there but rather was subject to the authority of the owner. Moreover, 
William’s abuse violated the new limits to manhood, so he had no right to force Mary and Katie 
to return with him. While James acted to protect Mary, she was not a passive victim. She told 
James to find an officer and seek legal help. She also went to assist her brother when he was 
tripped by William.230 Together, brother and sister worked to end the violence, knowing a man’s 
right did not extend to beating a woman, even if the woman was his wife. 
While some sons learned abuse from their fathers and perpetuated the cycle of violence, 
others turned against their abusive dads. For example, sons of the abused woman could and did 
file charges of assault and battery against their violent father. In the Lee family, the father, Ben, 
had a history of abusing his wife, Adelina.231 Their child, Scott, filed suit against his father for 
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     231 State v. Ben Lee (1884) CRDC# 5151; State v. Ben Lee (1884) CRDC# 5421. Testimony in 
both cases stated he had abused her on several previous occasions.  
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one of the attacks, hoping to protect his mother and end the violence. He succeeded despite the 
fact that he had not been present the night of the abuse to serve as a witness.232 If not a witness or 
victim, then what right did Scott have to file criminal charges? His actions suggest his 
knowledge of the abusive past and his position as a family member granted him the right to hold 
his father accountable. The court summarily recognized Scott’s petition to press charges and 
found the father guilty. This suggests a son could replace the father as leader of the family and be 
the one who upholds the ideals of manhood in the late 1800s. The father/husband lost his 
position of authority because of his violence.  
Often young sons used a weapon as an equalizer, marking the level of determination 
family members had in ending intimate-partner violence. On July 30, 1884, a New Orleans 
newspaper, The Daily Picayune, printed a story entitled, “Misdeeds and Mishaps: Domestic 
Discords.”233 The article described an incident in the Hener family that “ended in a court 
scrape.”234 The father created a “disturbance” by “beating his wife unmercifully.”235 The son 
tried to stop his father by hitting him with a blunt object. The police arrested both the father and 
son, although they let them go when the bonds were met. The son, whose age and first name 
remained unprinted, did not stand by and allow his father the privilege of chastisement. Rather, 
he physically denied the respect or deference typically due to the head of the family. The 
protective act came at a cost. Charged with assault and battery, the son paid a fine and spent 
some time in jail. Even in the face of such consequences, the son still intervened. Family 
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members could (and some did) silently witness spousal abuse, but when they intervened, they 
made deliberate choices that showed disapproval of intimate-partner violence and the abusive 
men, whose violence transgressed their expectations of male behavior.  
While the Hener case did not result in a fatality, sometimes a family member died in the 
attempt to stop the abuse. In July 1891, Elias Phips of rural Boone, Louisiana, saw his father 
come home drunk and beat his mother.236 Unable to stand by, fourteen-year-old Elias grabbed a 
musket and shot his father. At the time of publication, the newspaper believed the abusive 
husband would die, and young Elias sat in jail awaiting the court’s judgment. The exact reason 
Elias used a gun can never quite be known. Perhaps, he felt he could not stop his father without a 
weapon or perhaps he became enraged at his father for repeatedly being so violent to the family. 
Whatever the exact reason, Elias Phips’s actions do show that male power had limitations. The 
father forfeited his position of authority when he mercilessly beat his wife. This murder, while an 
extreme and illegal response, also showed a lack of respect for the father and a protectiveness of 
the mother.  
Family members also often risked their own safety when they tried to stop the abusive 
partner, which demonstrated their level of commitment to a loved one and to the right to be free 
from violence. In 1887, an African-American woman, Mary Bassinger, took her children and left 
her abusive husband, Will. Mary surrounded herself with female relatives and rejoined them in 
her mother’s home. As historians, such as Laura F. Edwards, have shown, these family links held 
immense value in the nineteenth century, especially for African Americans.237  
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Will called for Mary to come talk to him at the gate, but she refused saying she wanted 
nothing to do with him. Will yelled, “If you don’t come it will be worse for you.”238 Despite the 
separation, he felt he was entitled to a level of compliance and submission from his wife, and in 
an effort to maintain his dominance, he threatened her with violence. Will, however, 
compromised his rights by becoming abusive, and Mary’s defiant behavior portrayed many 
women’s view of marriage as reciprocal. At the very least, the wife possessed the right to live a 
peaceful life without the presence of abuse.  
After the verbal threat, Mary’s mother came home and told Will to leave or she would go 
to court and make a complaint. Mary’s mother also refused to listen to the demands of an abusive 
man. Undeterred, Will jumped the fence, yelling at the mother claiming she “harbored Mary for 
other men.”239 Mary’s mother refused to address his jealous accusation but still tried to block his 
path firmly declaring, “You are not going in there after her.”240 Will ran around her and into the 
room where Mary hid with the children. He dragged Mary out of the house, beat her with a stick, 
and then bit her hand. A neighbor alerted Mary’s sister Cora, who was living nearby, that Mary 
was being attacked, and Cora quickly arrived remarking, “That nigger got cheek enough to come 
into my mother’s yard and beat you!”241 Infuriated, Will attacked Cora with a knife, stabbing her 
in the back twice, and then went after Mary again. He pulled his wife onto the front steps, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
have argued, African-American households differed from the white ideal before the Civil War 
and were more matriarchial.  
	  
     238 State v. Will Bassinger (1887) CRDC# 9764.  
	  
     239 Ibid.  
	  
     240 Ibid.  
      
     241 Ibid.  
	  
94 
cut her twice on the face and once on the leg. Some of the wounds were as long as three and a 
half inches.   
Mary’s mother and sister’s intervention went beyond a token overture. These women 
viewed the mother’s home as a place of safety, even perhaps a bastion of female power. The 
household of women protected and empowered Mary so that when her husband came demanding 
their children, he was met with staunch resistance. As Cora testified, they did not believe Will, 
despite being Mary’s husband, had any right or would dare to step foot on the property much less 
harm anyone in their family. Cora left her home to help her sister. She also degraded Will by 
calling him “nigger,” and she physically challenged him, facing the danger of being stabbed. 
Cora, like her mother and Mary, felt Will had no power or right to harm anyone in the home, 
even if one of the women was his wife. Will’s behavior cost him his children, his wife, respect of 
his in-laws, and his authority over his family. Mary’s female relations stood against Will, but 
their intervention came at a price. They placed themselves in physical danger to protect Mary 
and deny Will what he believed to be his right of chastisement. The female family members 
collectively stood against the abusive husband. Their actions testify to the lengths these women 
were willing to go in order to stop the violence.  
 
Community 
Family intervention was not removed from the larger society. Neighbors and community 
members also acted to stop intimate-partner violence, reflecting a larger social change. When 
enough people altered their notion of gender in the postbellum period, the collective conscious 
shifted to expect limits on male power, including the denial of the male privilege of 
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chastisement. By the 1870s, society had come to condemn intimate-partner violence, and 
members of the local community felt the need and the right to step in and stop the abuse.  
Community members involved themselves in intimate-partner violence sporadically 
throughout American history. In the colonial era, small communities generally concerned 
themselves when individuals disrupted the harmony of the settlement.242 When they did, councils 
banished the offender or demanded public repentance, and groups humiliated the abuser with 
skimmington rides, parading the transgressor through the town as people made noise and yelled. 
Mary Beth Norton argues that colonial Americans accepted “moderate physical correction” of 
wives, and when that did not work, “it reflected negatively on him and raised the possibility 
others might intervene, not only to protect the wife from harm but also to instruct him in the 
responsibilities of household leadership.”243 In spite of recorded community intervention, the 
colonial family remained a private entity, particularly members of the family such as a wife 
whose identity was subsumed under the husband’s identity and control.244  
Before the Civil War, society occasionally intervened when a man assaulted his partner, 
but male dominance still ranked higher in priorities than addressing intimate-partner violence. 
Facing intense scrutiny from anti-slavery advocates, southern justifications of slavery included 
paternal benevolence, which argued slave owners took care of and showed kindness to those 
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dependent upon them. In charge of potentially a wife, children, servants, and slaves, a man’s 
dominance meant he had to take care of them and not simply maintain the hierarchy through 
discipline. Restraint and even kindness then entered the dynamic, at least in theory.245 How could 
a man control “unruly” members of his family, be aggressive, and simultaneously show 
restraint? Society and men struggled with how to integrate the conflicting mandates.246 When 
neighbors did involve themselves, they commonly argued the couple disturbed the peace and 
sometimes arrested both the husband and wife.247 Ultimately, the community wanted to restore 
balance and uphold a male hierarchy prior to the Civil War. 
Reasons for community intervention shifted by the 1870s and 1880s. The most obvious 
reason to intervene occurred when the abuse took place in a public area. Public spaces grew in 
the postbellum period as cities increased in size and municipal planners sought to regulate the 
burgeoning city landscape. As discussed in an article by contemporary sociologist and economist 
E.R.L. Gould, people required “adequate out-door breathing spaces” and “wholesome facilities 
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books like Uncle Tom’s Cabin. See Lacy K. Ford, Deliver Us from Evil: The Slavery Question 
in the Old South, (Oxford [England: Oxford University Press, 2009) and Edlie L. Wong, Neither 
Fugitive nor Free: Atlantic Slavery, Freedom Suits, and the Legal Culture of Travel, (New York: 
New York University Press, 2009). 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  246 I use the term “somewhat” since the South generally disapproved of intimate homicide, but 
generally, spousal abuse was accepted.  Although, two southern states did pass laws against wife 
abuse prior to the Civil War (Tennessee in 1850 and Georgia in 1857), other southern states, 
such as North Carolina, upheld the right of chastisement (State v. Jesse Black 1 Winston 266). 
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for recreation.”248 New York City’s Central Park serves as an example of the new city planning 
and creation of public spaces, but cities in other regions set areas aside for people to interact and 
“breathe.”249 The city of New Orleans acquired the land for City Park in 1850 but left the land 
unimproved until 1886. It also purchased land for current day Audubon Park in 1871. By 1879, 
the local government named the area the “New City Park,” and it served as the site to the 1884 
World’s Fair (the Cotton Centennial Exposition).250  After 1886, the city undertook major 
improvements to the land in order to make it a more decorative and attractive park. To Gould and 
others, including Frederick Olmstead, “Undoubtedly the most important requisite is small open 
spaces, well distributed over a city, but numerously located in populous districts.”251 In some 
neighborhoods, small pieces of land in the middle of streets and near canals sat empty and served 
as small “parks” where adults and children congregated. Regardless of the setup, public spaces 
served the entire public and required social policing given the purposes they served and the 
visibility of what occurred there. 
In a neighborhood in Algiers (an area annexed into the city of New Orleans by 1870), 
William Teal argued with his wife Elizabeth. She left the house, walking along a nearby canal. In 
full view of several neighbors, William hit Elizabeth and knocked her down into the canal. One 
woman, Mrs. Putnam, sought to help Elizabeth but was rebuffed when William yelled, “Do not, 
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woman, you [come] over here to my house any more.”252 Other female neighbors went to 
Elizabeth despite William’s threats. Ellen Butler and Mrs. Leddey testified they “heard a woman 
scream….her face bleeding. She was wiping the blood from her face with a towel. I asked Mrs. 
Teal to my house and we would put dry clothes on her; she went with me to the house and we 
changed her clothes.”253 Corporal Morgan, a police officer who lived nearby, was sleeping at the 
time of the incident but woke up due to the screaming coming from the streets. Morgan testified 
he “saw a crowd of people,” took an affidavit from Elizabeth Teal, and arrested her husband for 
assault and battery. He could have affirmed family privacy and the power of men to physically 
chastise their wives by charging William with disturbing the peace. Instead, Corporal Morgan 
arrested William for assault and battery, recognizing the importance of the incident and the 
neighbors’ outrage over the spousal abuse. The public visibility of the violence necessitated the 
neighbor’s intervention, and several stepped up to do something about the abuse. In the 
testimony, each witnesses’ statement showed they felt the husband had no right to act as he did. 
By defying William Teal’s threats to leave his wife in the ditch, the neighbors’ actions spoke 
against the supposed right of chastisement as well as for the social responsibility for addressing 
intimate-partner violence. 
Crowds frequently formed when members of the community overheard a domestic 
dispute. While some gathered likely out of curiosity, others intervened or went for the local 
watchman. These actions illustrate large-scale societal disapproval and the responsibility to 
intervene. The long-held value of family privacy did not trump the right of a woman to be free 
from violence. In the post Civil War period, an abusive husband could not claim the right to 
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family privacy because he lost much of his power by violating newly defined gender 
expectations. Sometimes communities resorted to a form of vigilante violence against the 
abusive man to enforce expectations, but most interventions, even when numerous people were 
involved, sought to protect the female victim and hold the male perpetrator responsible.  
On a Sunday during the summer of 1886, Louisa Johnson prepared to attend church when 
her estranged husband Martin came to her home. As the landlady attempted to block the 
entrance, Louisa tried to escape down a back alley but was caught by Martin and beaten “near to 
death.”254 Concerned, the landlady came with a crowd of others loudly protesting what Martin 
had done. Part of the crowd then brought Louisa to a hospital while some alerted the police so 
they could make an arrest. In an attempt to avoid prosecution, Martin tried to claim Louisa’s 
injuries were from an accidental fall. Louisa and the witnesses denied any such possibility, and 
the court agreed with the plaintiff. As part of his sentence, Martin Johnson spent a total of six 
months in jail for assault and battery. The crowd’s involvement shows an attempt to regulate 
behavioral and gender expectations through legal means. They gathered after hearing of the 
abuse and refused to disperse. The crowd intervened by shaming Martin for using violence, by 
helping Louisa seek medical help, and by finding patrolmen. Rather than vengeance, the group 
of neighbors sought to hold the abusive partner accountable before the law. 
Sometimes groups intervening in abusive relationships did resort to violence, particularly 
if they lived in less populated areas where there was a shortage of police. Remote locations 
limited witnesses’ ability to seek justice through the legal system. In one case, a white man 
named Winn owned a small amount of land in the small town of Collinsburg, Louisiana. Most 
people in the area knew of his notoriously cruel treatment of his wife. Winn not only beat her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




severely on multiple occasions, but he also had an African-American mistress that he called his 
“Sunday wife.”255 People constantly talked about his behavior as “cruel” and Winn in need of 
“justice.”256 Finally, in August of 1877, a crowd decided to take justice into their own hands. 
They waited till he beat his legal wife again, and while he sat eating dinner with his wife 
bleeding on the floor of their home, someone shot him through the window. One white neighbor, 
Nancy Willard, declared the shooting “justice.”257 She went on to say, “I don’t suppose any 
boddy [sic] cares.  His every day Wife is a hard working woman and has got a crop of her own 
and workes [sic] it her self.”258 Winn’s killer was never found, in part due to the lack of concern 
by the townspeople.  
In beating his wife, Winn’s actions violated social expectations—expectations held in 
common with larger urban areas. The townspeople intervened believing they had a right to do so 
although their sense of justice included murdering the abuser. To them, murder seemed fitting 
because Winn lost the privileges and rights of manhood by abusing his spouse and arguably by 
engaging in an openly sexual relationship with a black woman. Still, the extralegal violence took 
place after another incident where Winn abused his wife, suggesting the shooter acted because 
s/he believed men did not have the right to beat their wives. Nancy Willard’s comments about 
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Winn suggest the community had a broad base of support for depriving Winn not only of any 
respect or manhood but also his very life. 
Crowds proved the broad base of public support for intervention by more than their sheer 
numbers; they also proved public support by their diverse backgrounds. Sometimes groups were 
comprised of different races. The heterogeneous mixture suggests a broad base of support for 
dealing with intimate-partner violence as well as a fairly high level of awareness the social 
problem it posed. The Gillen case illustrates one instance of cross-racial alliance. Mr. and Mrs. 
James Gillen⎯a white married couple⎯ had a “spat,” in which the husband punched his wife in 
the eye.259 Neighbors heard the screams of “Watch!” and “Murder!” and ran to intervene. One 
policeman estimated a total of three or four hundred people of different races stood outside the 
house, yelling at the abuser, while six individuals carried Mrs. Gillen to safety at the local 
grocery. Officer Furloug further testified, “She [Mrs. Gillen] was bloody and looked very bad, 
and I took her to the hospital.  She told me Mr. Gillen did it and she wanted it stopped.”260 The 
level of intervention here was astounding. The wife’s cries generated a large social response, a 
response that crossed racial lines. In this case, a general view of intimate-partner violence 
transcended race, allowing for groups to come together with a common purpose⎯to help the 
abused woman and punish the wife beater. James Gillen’s supposed right to chastise his wife 
brought the wrath of the entire neighborhood. New Orleans has a history of more racial tolerance 
than much of Louisiana and the South, but during the 1880s, race became an increasingly 
divisive issue.261 The enormous mixed race crowd testifies to southern society’s broad 
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disapproval of intimate-partner violence and its belief that spousal “rights” and family privacy 
did not protect abusers. 
Cross-racial alliances among women did form as a result of intimate-partner violence 
since gender-based violence affected all regardless of race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status. 
Just as southern society extended a limited definition of womanhood to African-American 
women who were victims of intimate-partner violence, white women and women of color 
collaborated and intervened to stop the violence. In a sense, a quasi-sisterhood emerged 
sometimes when dealing with an abusive partner. In 1886, a white woman named Mary Hines 
filed charges of assault and battery against her husband William. William had been yelling at the 
neighbors, and although sick, Mary told him to stop in fear they would be evicted for disturbing 
the peace. William then turned his anger on his family. Mary tried to leave, but when William 
began hitting their child Margaret, Mary stayed. He then began beating his wife. Mary Hines 
stated in her testimony, “He [William] beat me with a vase from the mantelpiece. He struck me, 
broke this rib with a rocking chair. He beat me everywhere, kicked me, thumped me, 
commenced to beat me with the chair… I was weltering in my blood.”262  Fearful for her life, 
Mary screamed for help, knowing their African American domestic servant, Mary Cash, was in 
the next room. Cash quickly intervened and begged for William to release his wife. Cash 
struggled with him, but William began biting her hand. Mary Hines testified, “She [Mary Cash] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     261 Alecia Long’s The Great Southern Babylon, for example, examines the shift from slightly 
more tolerance for “sex across the color line” in New Orleans immediately postwar to a more 
rigid definition of white and black by 1910. C. Vann Woodward in The Strange Career of Jim 
Crow also explores the role of race and its increasing importance during the postbellum era. By 
1882, race, although being redefined such as the loss of the category of octoroon, generally 
mattered in most aspect of life. The social view of intimate-partner violence, however, broke 
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held his hand. He chewed on this finger all the time for fully fifteen minutes. He had it in his 
mouth. She begged him not to take the finger.”263  Despite trying to help, Cash could not stop the 
abuse, and when William quit biting her hand, she grabbed the child and sought outside help.  
Key to the incident was Mary Cash. She served as an important witness in the court case 
and physically struggled against a white man in an attempt to stop him from beating his wife. As 
a woman of color, she risked her job, her well-being, and possible retaliation by white 
supremacists for raising a hand against her white employer William. Race mattered in the 
postwar South, but in this situation, these women prioritized gender over race. The quasi-
sisterhood, of course, had limitations. In everything else, Mary and William Hines required 
Cash’s submission, but Cash still helped Mary, even jeopardizing her own economic and 
physical health. Mary Cash’s intervention speaks volumes about the types of bonds, albeit 
tenuous, that could emerge in response to intimate-partner violence.  
Social awareness had unpredictable consequences. Once manhood no longer included the 
privilege of chastisement, people sought to stop the violence as they saw fit. Those who 
intervened did not always act according to the victim’s wishes in intimate-partner violence. 
Instead, neighbors, family, and the community tended to act according to the belief that the 
attacker should be legally punished even if the abused partner disagreed. This might seem to 
deprive women of their agency in prosecuting batterers, but in sixteen cases initiated from 
witnesses, two ended in nolle prosequi or dropped charges.264  Although the abused partner may 
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not have wanted her husband prosecuted, victims generally permitted the state to continue its 
prosecution without dropping charges. The fact that policemen, the district attorney, and 
neighbors could successfully file criminal charges illustrates a public awareness of intimate-
partner violence as a social problem, not simply an issue for the abused partners. For those 
trapped in the relentless cycle of abuse, southern society attempted to solve intimate-partner 
violence by mandatory arrest⎯a technique utilized in some states today.265 Although not as 
frequently used, witnesses and officials could intervene and prosecute on behalf of the victim, 
testifying to the dedication of society to eradicate intimate-partner violence.  
 
Exceptions 
While many recognized the importance of stopping the violence, some tended to cling to 
the past and notions of privacy and feared society’s erasure of privacy. To them, intervention 
appeared more like interference. They insisted this unwarranted interference violated the veil of 
privacy that protected family and marriages from demands of the larger public. Men more often 
than women advocated such a mentality as they clung to male privilege and power. The push to 
end intimate-partner violence and women’s demands for protection and reciprocity chipped away 
at a gender hierarchy that empowered men. Men who feared the loss of family privacy, in some 
situations, hesitated to intervene. The 1886 Traylor case illustrates some resistance to changes in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and newspapers show a high level of public intervention, but overwhelmingly, women were cited 
as the person filing suit for assault and battery.  
 
     265 Some feminists, legal scholars, and sociologists have examined the unintended negative 
consequences of mutual arrest or mandatory arrest laws. See Susan L. Miller, Victims As 
Offenders: The Paradox of Women's Violence in Relationships, (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers 
University Press, 2005) and Michelle L. Meloy and Susan L. Miller, The Victimization of 




gender and privacy. On a Wednesday summer night, John Traylor came home to his wife, Mary, 
and accused her of having a man by the name of Jonnie Miller in the house. She insisted no one 
was there and adamantly refused any hint of infidelity on her part, but John did not believe her. 
He began to hit his wife and threatened to kill her. At that point, Mary screamed, disturbing the 
neighbors. They rushed into the Traylor home and saw John choking and beating Mary. One of 
the neighbors, Willie Kelly testified, “I heard the woman screaming. He had her by the throat. 
The lady was down. He had her by the throat.  She couldn’t hardly hallar [sic]….My father said, 
‘Shoot him.’ I said, ‘No, it may be his wife.’ She got loose and ran back. She ran in the street.”266 
Although his father thought differently, Willie Kelly limited the level of intervention in case the 
abusive man was in fact the woman’s husband. Had there been evidence to suggest John was 
someone other than Mary’s husband, Kelly intimates, he would have shot him. To Kelly, the 
scene warranted use of a gun but only if the man was not her husband, and so Kelly and his 
father stood in the doorway with the gun lowered. Their presence surprised John Traylor, and he 
briefly loosened his grip around Mary’s throat. She took the opportunity to run into the street and 
find a patrolman for help. Willie Kelly may have feared legal consequences for entering into 
someone else’s home and shooting the abuser. The legal ramifications of such actions could have 
landed Kelly in jail. Still, his refusal to do anything in the Traylor case suggests a certain amount 
of deference to husbands and their privilege of chastisement.  
Some blatantly asserted a man’s right to chastise his wife beyond the prying eyes of 
society. These men upheld not only family privacy but also male privilege. In 1888, Peter Carter 
witnessed intimate-partner violence but refused to do anything. He testified in State v. Warren 
Powell  
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They got into a fuss in their room. I heard them. I did not interfere with them. He called  
[and] told me to come in. He said if I would not come in he would take me in. I tried to  
talk to him. He had a knife in his hand. I said, “For God’s sake don’t you use a knife!” He  
gave me his knife [and] hit her with his fist. She asked me not to let him beat her. He  
struck her two powerful licks with his fist.267 
 
Carter refused to assist Annie Powell even as she begged for him to intervene. To Carter, his 
intervention would have actually been interference. To interfere meant Carter would be acting 
without any right. From his viewpoint, stopping Warren Powell’s attack would be destructive, 
particularly to the family and male power. He would be meddling in the private affairs of a 
family and violating a husband’s entitlement. After all, Carter stated, another man had been in 
Annie Powell’s room, and she cheated on her husband. To Carter, Annie’s infidelity seemed to 
justify the husband’s violence and so he looked on as Warren beat Annie and she cried for help. 
Only when he was almost dragged into it did Carter, unwillingly, limit the level of abuse. His 
conscience finally registered concern when he saw the knife. Fearing for her life, Carter felt that 
was beyond the right of chastisement husbands possessed. Despite changes in gender 
expectations, social intervention, and male-female relationships, Carter upheld older notions of 
marital privacy and male privilege.  As in the Traylor case, some male witnesses refused to 
intervene and punish abusers. 
Some men clung to conservative definitions of family privacy and gender, even if the 
family included those not legally married. Social attitudes viewed family and marriage less 
rigidly than did the courts. If a couple cohabitated and presented themselves as partners, then 
community members recognized them, in everything but legal terms, married and a family. 
Society recognized that men in those situations possessed the same rights as that of other 
husbands, but some believed those rights included antiquated views of the male privilege of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




chastisement. Louis Mayfield stopped by his house and grabbed a cup of tea before heading out 
to the local bars. On his way out the door, Annie Mayfield, his common law wife of five years, 
yelled, “You better come back instead of going out and drink all your money,” but Louis left 
anyway and did not come back until eight that night.268 He staggered into the house and passed 
out on the living room floor for a solid hour. When he awoke, Louis demanded to know where 
his tobacco was. Annie hesitated, and Louis screamed, “Do it when I command you!” He 
grabbed an oak whip and told Annie to get on her knees. As she did so, he began to beat her. He 
told her to call him “master,” which Annie did all the while she begged him to stop.269 Finally, 
Louis did and shoved her out of the house with nothing on but a nightgown. Eventually, Annie 
found a way back in the home. At this point, Officer Louis Deris came upon the scene after 
hearing a neighbor’s screams of “Murder!” He saw the man dragging Annie out by her leg from 
under the bed, and he intervened by arresting Louis Mayfield and sending Annie Mayfield to the 
hospital. Mrs. Washington Johnson, the neighbor who alerted the police, testified,  
He was whipping the woman so long; he was whipping her until she could not speak.  I  
told my husband that he was going to kill her; my husband told me I had nothing to do  
with that. Then he beat her so long that my husband had to speak to him. Then he cursed  
him and told him to mind his own business. He said it was his wife and he could do what  
he wanted. Then he dragged her in the yard to show my husband he could beat her good  
at that time.  I got out and I halloared [sic] for the police.270   
 
According to Mrs. Johnson’s statement, both her husband and Louis Mayfield believed 
men had the right to do as they wish without intervention. Only when the beating went on and on 
did Mr. Johnson decide to speak to the abuser, but still, he refused to go any further once he was 
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told to “mind his own business.”271 To Mr. Johnson, privacy stood as a pillar of the rights of 
manhood. He may not have believed in going so far as to whip his wife, but he respected a veil 
of privacy to ensure a man’s right to act without communal or legal interference. Louis Mayfield 
violently defended his power and his right to beat his wife. He asserted his dominance over 
Annie by beating her, forcing her on her knees, and making her call him “master.” He believed 
his power included treating his wife, not as a human but as property. Louis Mayfield’s actions 
here clearly illustrate intimate-partner violence as an issue of power in a gendered hierarchy. To 
Louis, this gendered power extended beyond the legal definition of family to any relationship 
between a man and woman, and this belief resonated with Mr. Johnson. Louis sought to 
publically assert his manhood and the right of chastisement by abusing Annie in the front 
yard⎯in full view of all the neighbors. Not all men believed in such definitions of male privilege 
and privacy, but some definitely did. 
The real intervention in the Mayfield case came from Mrs. Johnson, the police, and the 
court. Mrs. Johnson defied her husband and Louis Mayfied by running for a patrolman. 
Whatever the prior notions of men’s power and dominance, the gender dynamic changed some 
after the Civil War. Men had to respect limitations to what was previously considered a male 
privilege, and like many women, the law agreed. To Mrs. Johnson, the abuse was wrong, and in 
the postbellum South, she took the responsibility to intervene in intimate-partner violence. The 
officer arrested Louis Mayfield and pressed charges, since Annie was incapacitated at the 
hospital. The Recorder’s Court charged Mayfield with assault with a dangerous weapon and 
intent to kill and placed him under a thousand-dollar bond. Finally, the judge who tried the case 
sentenced Mayfield to four months in jail after having already served two months. From multiple 
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perspectives, Louis Mayfield violated gender expectations and Annie’s right to be free from 
abuse. He assaulted her with a dangerous weapon, acted uncivilized, and was subject to 
punishment by the court. Regardless of Louis Mayfield’s or Washington Johnson’s antiquated 
views of masculinity, male privilege, and right to privacy, Mrs. Johnson and those who enforced 
and interpreted the law disagreed and worked to enforce this new view upon those who clung to 
the past. 
As the country grew, rural areas gave way to larger, more populated towns and cities. 
Communal intervention, while still important, became less effective as neighbors more often 
than not were strangers and cohesive social groups stretched thin in a larger urban sprawl. People 
needed a more effective means of regulation and enforcement. In the last few decades of the 
nineteenth century, the South underwent a “search for order” like the rest of the nation.272 The 
unregulated growth of corporations, labor issues, and Radical Republicans in politics pushed 
many Americans towards reform, even southerners who clung to tradition and the past. 
Increasing the power of the state offered an opportunity “to apply more effective social controls 
in the interest of an orderly and cohesive community.”273 In urban areas (or increasingly more 
urban areas), vigilante justice became less necessary as law enforcement regulated violations, 
particularly crimes of assault and battery.  
On each level, people sought to intervene when men abused their female partners. They 
beat, shot, and embarrassed abusers. They sought to provide escapes and protective measures for 
victims. From the family to the community, the public took a stance against intimate-partner 
violence, and through their actions, they pressured the state to act on the problem. After all, 
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bureaucratic, centralized measures were, historian Robert Wiebe argues, thought necessary to 
combat a host of societal issues efficiently and effectively. People looked to the government to 
























INSTITUTIONS AND INTIMATE-PARTNER VIOLENCE 
 
“Organize, agitate, educate, must be our war cry…”⎯ Susan B. Anthony, 1893274 
Writing for The Woman’s Tribune in 1893, Susan B. Anthony spoke of the need for 
women to unify and work for rights, specifically the right to vote. Anthony’s words, however, 
reflected in part the impact organizations, such as the American Equal Rights Association, the 
National Woman Suffrage Association, and the American Woman Suffrage Association, had. 
Many reform groups of the late 1800s sought legal recognition of rights and betterment of 
society. Organizations created a powerful body in which to lobby for change. Despite having 
primary goals in acquiring women the franchise or banning the sale of alcohol, these 
organizations often upheld another right⎯ the right of women to be free from abuse, and the 
collective pressure of these as well as other groups to end intimate-partner violence led to 
changes in the civil code. 
National organizations, such as the National Woman’s Suffrage Association (NWSA), 
Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCC), and the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union (WCTU), pressured state governments to address the problems of intimate-
partner violence. NWSA advocated for divorce reform. The WCTU linked alcohol to abuse. 
Alcohol made men brutes, as the theory went, and women needed protection from the evils of 
drink.275 Local Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, although created for the 
protection of children, offered abused women aid if indirectly. Collectively, these organizations 
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took social concerns about intimate-partner violence and wielded political influence to protect 
women’s right to be free from violence. 
 
Suffrage Organizations 
During Reconstruction, women’s rights advocates presented some of the first challenges 
to manhood and womanhood after the Civil War. Former abolitionists, such as those in the 
American Equal Rights Association, pushed for African-American rights, including citizenship 
and the franchise. Women joined the AERA and other organizations like the Women’s Loyal 
National League to gather support for petitions on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Abolitionist women felt this push for equality should include the right of women to vote, 
particularly in the proposal of the Fifteenth Amendment. In the campaign, however, “with arms 
folded, Greeley, Curtis, Tilton, Beecher, Higginson, Phillips, Garrison, Frederick Douglass, all 
calmly watched the struggle from afar, and when defeat came to both propositions, no consoling 
words were offered for woman's loss [of support for the right to vote].”276 Many women felt 
betrayed as abolitionist men they had worked with for years refused to advance legislation on the 
vote for women. In History of Woman Suffrage, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and 
Matilda Joslyn Gage described the moment as a time when “our best men stood silent.”277 This 
awoke in female abolitionists a need to create women-led organizations to gain rights for 
women. Stanton, Anthony, and Gage wrote,  
The fact of their silence deeply grieved us, but the philosophy of their indifference we 
thoroughly comprehended for the first time and saw as never before, that only from 
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woman's standpoint could the battle be successfully fought, and victory secured. Woman 
must lead the way to her own enfranchisement, and work out her own salvation [italics 
added].278  
 
This realization motivated women to become public actors and independent agents for their 
cause. Not only should women have a political voice but they would also have to do so by their 
own efforts.  
In her role in the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), Stanton 
pushed a host of political reforms aimed at granting women more rights. From property 
ownership to the vote, Stanton utilized the NWSA’s political connections to create legal changes, 
even if only in individual local areas. Like many women, Stanton recognized the drawbacks to 
being completely dependent upon men. In “The Solitude of Self,” Stanton articulated the issue 
laid bare by the Civil War that prompted new gender expectations: 
Whatever the theories may be of woman’s dependence on man, in the supreme moments 
of her life, he cannot bear her burdens. Alone she goes to the gates of death to give life to 
every man that is born into the world; no one can share her fears, no one can mitigate her 
pangs; and if her sorrow is greater than she can bear, alone she passes beyond the gates 
into the vast unknown.279 
 
Woman, she argued, had to act with some level of autonomy, which could not exist in a 
patriarchy.  
Knowing that at the heart of the conflict was the issue of power, Stanton called attention 
to the relationship between husband and wife. The dynamics of power had to be altered, she 
insisted, in order to fulfill true equality and freedom.280 Since no educational system informed 
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women how to choose wisely in potential husbands and fathers to their children, the state was 
“honor bound to open wide the door of escape.”281 Not all women’s rights advocates agreed. 
Some, such as Lucy Burns in the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA), thought such 
claims too radical and divisive for the suffrage movement.282 Burns argued marriage protected 
women, and liberal divorce laws would give husbands easier outs and make women vulnerable 
economically and socially. Although controversial, Stanton pointed to the contractual theory of 
marriage to prove divorce a legitimate option. She argued marriage was not a sacred institution 
but a civil contract in which the man was obliged to respect his partner, and violations of that 
respect, such as intimate-partner violence, placed him in breech of contract. In an 1871 speech, 
“On Divorce and Marriage,” Stanton argued that 
The wife's condition is perpetual minority, life-long subjection to authority, with no 
appeal, no hope on the indissoluble tie theory. The practical effect of this is to make 
tyrants of men and fools of women. There never was a human being yet on this footstool 
godlike enough to be trusted with the absolute control of any living thing. Men abuse 
each other….and of course they will abuse their wives, taught by law and gospel that they 
own them as property…It is sheer folly at this age of the world to waste ink or words on 
marriage as an indissoluble tie and on the husband's divinely ordained authority. 283 
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Women possessed the right, Stanton argued, to end a marriage, particularly one based on cruelty. 
To uphold the sanctity of marriage as permanent gave men total control over their wives.  
By the mid-1870s, Stanton stopped campaigning for more liberal divorce laws, and Lucy 
Stone began. Stone published The Woman’s Journal starting in 1879, which contained stories of 
abusive and tyrannical husbands to shock readers.284 Horrific murders, neglect, and abuse ideally 
motivated Americans to push for change. While divorce laws became slightly less strict, her 
proposal to allow battered women of Massachusetts to obtain legal separation, child support, and 
custody failed three times.285 Through their activism and by social pressure, northern and 
western state codes began reflecting these new ideas on divorce⎯Nebraska and Indiana being 
the most lenient of states.286 By the 1870s, most states recognized physical cruelty as a legitimate 
reason for divorce, but at least two⎯Illinois and Michigan⎯included mental cruelty (verbal 
abuse).287  The number of divorces between 1870 and 1920 increased fifteen times.288  
Initially, the Suffrage Movement entailed far more than the vote. It included reform in the 
area thought to define women the most⎯marriage. Going “deep down to the very foundations of 
society,” the push was nothing less than “a social revolution.”289 The push for the franchise for 
women in the mid to late nineteenth century illustrates the redefinition of womanhood, but it also 
shows how women’s rights advocates recognized the need for the state to intervene and fix social 
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problems. Awareness regarding social issues, such as intimate-partner violence, facilitated the 
formation of many reform organizations, and they in turn served as an impetus for legal reform. 
 
Temperance Organizations 
Other organizations also helped place pressure on the state to address the problem of 
intimate-partner violence. Although established in 1873 to deal with the problems associated 
with alcohol, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union took a stance against intimate-partner 
violence. Previously, antebellum temperance societies employed moral suasion to convince 
people about the evils of alcohol, and their effect could be seen as well in education. In 1863, a 
North Carolina publisher released a book titled The First Dixie Reader. In it, the textbook 
included a maxim, “Don’t Drink a Dram.” The students would learn to read by reciting: 
        1. Do you see old Mr. Smith? How sad he looks! His hat is torn and his clothes in rags. 
        2. When he was a boy his pa gave him drams to drink, and he soon got to love it. 
        3. When he came to be a man, he was a sot and got drunk, and beat his nice wife. 
        4. Poor wo-man! She soon got sick and died, and left two small babes. 
        5. Now the poor old man and his boys stay there, and drink and fight. Is it not sad?290 
 
Most early readers included sayings for moral instruction as well as teaching literacy. “Don’t 
Drink a Dram” sought to show the negative impact of alcohol including poverty, violence and 
the destruction of the family. As a text specifically intended for distribution in the South, The 
First Dixie Reader shows that temperance advocates left a mark.291 Interestingly, the excerpt 
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seems to suggest alcohol abuse as a disease rather than simply a vice.292 When founded in 1873, 
the WCTU followed antebellum temperance societies by stressing the ill effects of alcohol. 
By the late 1870s, however, the president of the WCTU broadened the organization’s 
scope to a “Do Everything” policy.293 The WCTU joined with other organizations on a host of 
other issues to gain support and affect change. They quickly became politically active with 
lobbyists, pressuring politicians. Until the late 1890s, the WCTU believed drinking caused abuse 
in the home and worked to establish a strong connection between alcohol and intimate-partner 
violence.294 Unlike Stanton, the WCTU did not view marriage as a union of equals, but instead, 
the man was the head of the household who possessed the responsibility to maintain 
respectability and treat his family kindly.295 Woman was, the WCTU explained, defined by the 
home and not outside of it. The WCTU, however, agreed that divorce should be a legal recourse 
for wives of intemperate husbands. The WCTU also stepped into the “public sphere” with 
women demanding change as Carrie Nation’s hatchet-wielding activities at saloons resulting in 
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sizeable media attention to their cause.296 Women led the movement in family violence and 
temperance through appealing to the public that women’s role in the home was threatened by 
alcohol and intimate-partner violence. Despite the conservative tone, the WCTU drew attention 
to the problem of wife abuse and looked, in part, to the courts for help curbing the social evil. 
Women renegotiated gender expectations, causing the legal system’s views of marriage 
to evolve with the changes. Pressure from the WCTU and other groups led to reforms in the civil 
code. In 1873, states began passing legislation permitting a wife to sue a bartender for serving 
her husband drinks if he later beat her. By 1900, twenty states had similar legislation.297 This, of 
course, only applied to legally married wives who had warned the bartender in advance. Still, 
while liquor could be linked to abuse, many doubted it caused the violence. In 1878, W.H. 
Daniels wrote The Temperance Reform and its Great Reformers. In it, he argued,  
the countries that manufacture and drink most wine use most distilled liquors, and have  
the largest percent of beastly, wife-beating, child-beating drunkenness. Husbands may 
tell their ragged and pleading wives that they can stop. They guess they know who drives. 
They can stop if they will.298 
 
“They can stop if they will.”299 The choice is theirs, Daniels stated, and abusive men could avoid 
such behavior. If they did not, then they could be held legally accountable.  
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Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
The Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children provided additional pressure on 
the state to address intimate-partner violence. Attention towards child cruelty and neglect gained 
ground in the 1870s. Concern for these innocents had national backing, and by 1874, the New 
York court case of Mary Ellen set a precedent and opened wide the gates for state intervention. 
Mary Ellen was born in 1864, and she lived with a caretaker since her parents felt they could not 
handle the day-to-day issues of raising their child. The arrangement lasted until Mary Ellen’s 
biological mother died and the father moved. The caretaker then took Mary Ellen to a charitable 
organization that found another home for her. The new family, however, consisted of Mary 
Ellen’s biological father, Thomas McCormack, and his second wife, also named Mary. When the 
biological father died, Mary McCormack married again, changing her name to Connolly. 
Neighbors later testified they regularly heard a child’s cries coming from the Connolly apartment 
but did not know what to do. One neighbor, Etta Wheeler, in an unprecedented maneuver, sought 
help from the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), which then 
removed Mary Ellen from the home. In the court case, the prosecution placed Mary Ellen on the 
stand, and she tearfully testified about the abuses she faced from her “Mamma,” Mrs. 
Connolly.300 She had been beaten with a leather strap, malnourished, poorly clothed, forced to 
sleep on the floor, and cut with scissors. She was not permitted in the house except at night nor 
permitted play with any other children. The official at the ASPCA who rescued Mary Ellen 
acknowledged he had no legal right to intervene and remove the child, but he claimed to have 
done so “in the name of humanity.”301 Impacted by the heart-wrenching testimony, the court 
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quickly found Mary Connolly guilty of “felonious assault and sentenced her to the maximum 
penalty, one year of hard labor in the penitentiary.”302 The same year, the New York Society for 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children formed. Throughout the country, other local governments 
created similar agencies that could seize a child from a home of abuse and neglect. The Mary 
Ellen case, then, galvanized support for state interference in families “in the name of 
humanity.”303  
In the late 1800s and the first decade of the 1900s, reports varied from illegitimacy, 
abuse, neglect, non-support, and intemperance, but physical cruelty gathered the most public 
attention in newspapers. Some cases told of fathers who beat their children so badly that their 
“eyes wabbled [sic].”304 Others told of how the men of the household abused both the wife and 
children. Initially, SPCCs attempted to stay out of marital conflict, focusing instead on the 
children. In one Massachusetts case, the social worker told of two young boys, aged six and ten, 
who had been reported to the organization for being sent to the store to buy alcohol for their 
parents. Upon investigation, the father was found to be an alcoholic, who beat and did not 
financially support his family. The SPCC described the home as having “no furniture. No food. 
House filthy.”305 The children were sent to an orphanage, and no help was provided to the wife.  
SPCCs, however, soon rationalized assistance to abused women by claiming men lost 
their privileged status through the excessive use of alcohol the and beating of women and 
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children.306 In this sense, conservative domestic ideology and views of alcoholism enabled the 
odd situation where women were given some agency and recourse despite living in a male-
dominated society. Since women were seen as the “natural” caretakers of children and in charge 
of the home, women frequently used the SPCCs for some measure of help in combating wife 
beating. While child abuse and neglect overwhelmingly constituted the majority of SPCC 
investigations, historian Linda Gordon found thirty-four percent of SPCC cases involved 
intimate-partner violence.307  
In a Massachusetts report, a social worker responded to complaints about an abusive 
father and husband. The couple had six children, ranging from four months to ten years old, and 
the man squandered their money on drink and beat every member of the household. The worker 
described the husband as “drunken and ugly” and advised for the SPCC to take action. 
Arrangements were made to have the wife and children placed with a relative in another state. 
Before the move, however, the father promised he would change, and the mother agreed to stay. 
The last line of the case states, “At last accounts doing well.”308 In this case, the SPCC 
intervened to stop an abusive man. The best course of action they decided was to remove the 
mother and children. In doing so, they took away a man’s dependents, acknowledging each child 
and the mother as individuals with the right to be free from violence. The decision to stay was 
the mother/wife’s alone rather than something pushed by the SPCC. Breaking up a family in the 
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1870s and 1880s was utilized as a method to protect women and children from abuse, which 
testifies to the lengths SPCCs eventually went to in order to address intimate-partner violence. 
 With SPCCs, however, women needed to demonstrate not only need but also good 
character. Women who proved themselves unfit by committing an immoral act were not given 
any form of assistance. In Massachusetts, a man attempted to beat his twelve-year-old 
stepdaughter. The mother intervened and was attacked for trying to stop her husband. The 
twelve-year old reported the incident to the SPCC, who came to investigate. The investigators 
found the stepfather to be a drunk, negligent, and a wife beater. In addition to the abuse, the 
house appeared in shambles, and their children slept in a communal bed that was soaked because 
of a broken water pipe. The SPCC resolved the case by removing the children and placing them 
in a home, not by offering assistance to the abuse to his spouse. When the organization talked to 
the mother, they judged her as not worthy of help. The mother, a white woman, claimed to be 
married to three husbands⎯all of them African American. The one comment about the 
marriages stood as the only description of the woman. While other factors, such as the children 
on a wet mattress, could explain the lack of help for the abused woman, the statement on bigamy 
and the racial distinction of the husbands likely factored into the decision as well. Whites 
throughout the country feared that “racial impurities” would result from the “unfit mating,” 
including so-called “mixing” of the races.309 In Massachusetts, the state legislature passed a law 
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in 1913 banning interracial marriage.310 By not upholding the white, middle-class ideal, the 
abused woman lost the SPCC’s support. Some women learned to pretend to live the life of a 
“good woman,” by hiding outside jobs or certain traits. Others did not. Not all women received 
assistance from the SPCC when their male partner beat them. Consequently, the SPCC’s help for 
abused women was limited and depended on how much the woman upheld white, middle-class 
values. 
Abused women throughout the country sought help from these organizations despite their 
limitations, but they often did so at the risk of losing their children. In one 1911 SPCC case, 
Robert L. frequently abused his common law wife and his children. He eventually tired of his 
partner and kicked her out of the house. Not being married in the eyes of the law, the abused 
woman had no rights to the property or alimony. She could not argue for custody of her children. 
With his common law wife gone, Robert continued his abusive ways and beat his children. After 
the mother complained to the SPCC, a worker came to visit the home. The children were placed 
in an orphanage and the father in jail, while the mother, “a sober woman and devoted to her 
children, calls to see them regularly.”311 Despite being abused by Robert, the mother received no 
assistance. She could only watch as first her common law husband and then the agency took her 
children away. With their focus on child cruelty and neglect, the SPCC’s assistance in the early 
1900s often included removal of the children, and women not living “morally” risked losing their 
children. Sometimes, these women made the tough decision to save their children from abusive 
homes, even if they would not benefit from the SPCC’s intervention. 
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Despite these limitations, the SPCC often landed the abuser in a court. In one case, the 
father abused the mother and child; he also drank and provided little financial support. When 
asked about the allegations, the mother, “a good woman,” refused to talk, “knowing that it would 
mean a beating from her husband if he found she said a word against him.”312 Instead of dealing 
with “the weak wife,” the SPCC went to the courts to confront the problem of intimate-partner 
violence as well as child abuse.313 The judge decided to place the abusive husband and father on 
probation. The SPCC intervened when a neighbor reported the violent man, even without the 
wife’s consent or assistance. Acting as an organization that promoted the public’s welfare, the 
SPCC took the abusive husband and father to court to face legal consequences for his actions, 
and although the judge’s sentence was rather lenient in this case, the SPCC acted as advocates to 
end violence in the home and demanded the legal system respond to the problem.  
The SPCC relentlessly pressed charges and became more successful in influencing the 
courts. In one case, SPCC workers investigated claims that a man was beating his wife and three-
year-old child. The mother told caseworkers that the father abused the child, covering him in 
bruises, and then used salt water and turpentine on the wounds. When she tried to stop him, he 
attacked her as well. Sometimes, to keep her from interfering, the husband locked his wife in a 
room for hours as he beat their child. The wife and child ended up needing medical care in the 
local hospital but upon release were placed with other family members.314 The court heard the 
case and sentenced the man to three years in prison. The level of violence was extreme enough to 
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warrant medical care, which undoubtedly led to the more serious punishment. Still, with the 
SPCC’s insistence, the legal system responded. 
While agencies enabled the state or community to intervene and rescue abused 
dependents, southern states during the 1870s and 1880s focused more on the wife than the child 
when the accused was brought to trial. Often, child abuse and intimate-partner violence went 
hand and hand, and violence towards both came up in the testimony. The courts, however, 
typically did not file any charges for child cruelty or abuse in the postbellum South, at least not 
until the 1890s with the formation of local southern SPCCs.315 This is demonstrated in the case 
against Sylvester Conlon. In 1884, Sylvester was laid off from the steamship The Hutchinson, 
and in his despair, he stopped by a tavern and drank for most the day. When he finally returned 
home, his wife, Sarah, questioned why he stayed out drinking their money rather than coming 
home for meals. Sylvester demanded his dinner to which, he claimed, Sarah replied, “Go to 
hell.”316 He then grabbed an oil can and struck her with it. As the argument heated up, Sylvester 
found and threw a chair, which hit their three-year-old daughter. Sarah grabbed the children and 
tried to leave. He pursued her eventually overtaking her and punching her as Sarah held the 
youngest in her arms. Mrs. Quinn, a neighbor, ran to them trying to stop the violence. When he 
told Mrs. Quinn to get out of his business, she turned to Sarah saying, “Why don’t you leave that 
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damned rat? Why do you live with him?”317 Sylvester ignored her and ordered Sarah and their 
kids into the house. Mrs. Quinn screamed, “No! Don’t go in. He will murder you the damned 
rat.”318 Eventually, Sarah escaped with the children and arrived bleeding at her sister’s house. 
The neighbor in this case tried to intervene on behalf of Sarah and her daughter, but the court 
was concerned with the problem of wife abuse. The district attorney refused to file any charges 
for child cruelty, and Sylvester Conlon only stood trial for assault and battery of Sarah Conlon.   
The Conlon case and others in the Orleans Parish criminal court during the 1870s and 
1880s demonstrate Louisiana’s focus on eradicating intimate-partner violence. In the North, the 
opposite trend emerged. The South typically lagged behind the North in changes largely given to 
its tendency to cling to tradition and the past. The prioritization of intimate-partner violence over 
child abuse, however, was not southern resistance to modernity. Being civilized and recognizing 
rights of individuals of the family⎯that mentality infiltrated most of the nation. But the country 
clearly sought to prosecute abusive partners, particularly male partners. It did not seek to hold 
child abusers to the same standards until the last decade of the nineteenth century. Why? Gender 
expectations were again being redefined during the postbellum period. Women recognized the 
need for more autonomy and renegotiated relationships with men that curtailed the male 
privilege of chastisement. Newly defined gender expectations dictated this new approach by the 
court system and would last until the 1890s in the South and early 1910s in the North. 
Overall, however, the greatest impact of the SPCC on intimate-partner violence could 
arguably be seen in the civil code. Sometimes civil courts tried cases brought up by the SPCCs 
and successfully provided sentences for abusive men, permitted legal separations for abused 
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women, and awarded custody to the mother. The Massachusetts SPCC, for instance, enabled a 
woman, who suffered abuse from her alcoholic husband, to obtain a legal separation. The mother 
took her children, and in an agreement with the courts, the father made weekly payments through 
the Society for his wife and children.319 The SPCC, in this case, facilitated the dissolution of a 
marriage through petitioning the civil court system in Massachusetts. Pressured by a notable 
organization like the SPCC, the court recognized the right of a woman to be free from abuse. 
 
Recognizing Women’s Personhood in the Civil Code 
 Prior to the Civil War, courts upheld patriarchal privilege. The separate spheres ideology 
that dominated in the antebellum period created a zone of privacy for the family, and judges 
emphatically defended the man’s prerogative to control his family away from the prying eyes of 
the state.320 In 1852, a collection of Louisiana Supreme Court decisions was published citing one 
judge’s ruling: 
Domestic broils are not to be settled in a court of justice.  If the conduct of the part 
complaining have been outrageous, the remedy must first be sought in a reformation of 
that conduct….if they do not [cease] the interference of the law may justly be invoked. 
But if the wife exasperate the husband and by ebullitions of temper provoke him to 
quarrel, she cannot complain.  Husbands are men, not angels.321 (emphasis added) 
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Women, the ruling stated, could only seek separate room and board from their abusive husbands 
(a legal separation) if the abuse constituted extremely violent, if she did not provoke him, and if 
the husband habitually beat her. The definition of “extreme” and “habitual,” of course, rested on 
the court’s interpretation, and courts typically ruled with decisions that reinforced male privilege. 
Moreover, a wife could not press criminal charges or seek a full divorce, only legal separation in 
the civil court system. After all, “husbands are men, not angels,” the Louisiana courts declared, 
and as such, men’s abusive acts were justifiable, at least to a certain degree. Overall, the 
conditions placed meant few women could seek help from the court.  
 As women became more active in the public sphere, people viewed the institution of 
marriage as more public. The effects of the Civil War weakened people’s willingness to uphold 
the veil of privacy from the antebellum era’s view of family. Predating the Progressive 
Movement by a decade or two, the courts started to view marriage as something within which the 
state’s had the right to intervene. The change in marriage overlaps with the shift in courts 
intervening in families and the rise in child abuse charges and child protection agencies, such as 
the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCC).322 This did not mean the family or 
the institution of marriage held less value as an enforcer of social expectations. Instead, it shows 
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a shift to viewing each union as a bond with public interest and women as people who retain 
individual rights, even in marriage.323 
 Civil courts began to chip away at coverture, where a woman’s legal identity became 
subsumed under her husband’s, and recognize some aspects of personhood in married women. 
Arguably, the most well-known indicator of women’s legal personhood could be seen in the 
married women’s property acts. Historians and legal scholars have long debated these acts in the 
1870s and 1880s that granted married women the right to own property. Different from the 
married women’s property acts of the 1820s and 1830s, these postbellum legislative acts did 
more than provide husbands with the means to hide assets through gifting them to their wives. 
The married women’s property acts of the 1870s and 1880s, as historian Carole Shammas 
argues, brought tangible change in which women benefitted from the ability to own property 
independently, even within marriage.324 But, perhaps less discussed than the property acts, 
divorce on grounds of abuse set another precedent of recognizing married women’s personhood. 
Organizations, such as NWSA, argued husbands broke the civil contract of marriage when they 
abused a woman. Other institutions, like the WCTU, connected alcohol to abuse and spread the 
message that no woman should suffer unnecessarily from such brutal acts of a husband. By 
lifting divorce restrictions, especially for cruelty, women gained constitutional recognition as 
individuals with rights, even if married. 
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By the 1870s, legal writers on marriage and the civil code began to change their views on 
divorce and intimate-partner violence. Contemporary legal and historical scholar James Schouler 
wrote A Treatise on the Law of Domestic Relations in 1870 suggesting a new dynamic between 
husband and wife, which had implications for the “chastisement privilege.”325 
In a ruder state of society, the husband frequently maintained his authority by force…But 
[in recent times] the wife has been regarded more as the companion of her husband; and 
the right of chastisement may be regarded as exceedingly questionable at the present day. 
The rule of love has superseded the rule of force.326 (emphasis added) 
 
Women renegotiated new gender expectations after the Civil War, creating a reciprocal marriage 
based on emotion rather than female submission. Legal scholars, such as James Schouler, 
recognized this change and remarked that the antebellum male right to chastise his wife was, in 
the least, “exceedingly questionable.”327 Women’s demands for protection and the pressure from 
reform organizations resulted in tangible, legal results. 
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Siegel is the foremost legal scholar on intimate-partner violence and the law, and she discusses 
the legal shifts in dealing with the problem. Also, historians generally recognize the 
companionate marriage as a change in the marital union after 1900, but a rise in emotional 
expectation (marrying for love) gained ground in the late 1800s, as evidenced with Schouler’s 
work. Peter Bardaglio also notices this “growing emphasis on affectionate love between husband 
and wife” in the late 1800s; see Peter W. Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household: Families, 
Sex, and the Law in Nineteenth-Century South, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1995): xiii. For more information on the emergence of companionate marriage see 
Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History: How Love Conquered Marriage, (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2006) and Rebecca L. Davis, “Not Marriage at All, but Simple Harlotry”: The 
Companionate Marriage Controversy, The Journal of American History, (March 2008): 1137-
1163.  
	  
     326 James Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of the Domestic Relations 59 (Boston: Little, 
Brown, & Co., 1870).  Aside from Blackstone’s Commentaries, James Schouler’s various works 
were among the most cited legal tracts of the time. A Treatise on the Law of the Domestic 
Relations was Schouler’s first publication on anything, and it was reprinted and circulated more 
widely in 1874, 1882, 1889, and 1895. 
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In civil courts, women increasingly sought and successfully gained divorces from abusive 
husbands. These courts offered a solution available to married women. With a total divorce, an 
abused woman could claim her freedom without being economically devastated. Courts 
generally awarded alimony and child support in divorce decrees. In the 1870s, the country began 
drastically revising divorce laws. By 1871, out of thirty-seven states, “thirty-four permitted 
divorce on grounds of habitual drunkenness.”328 Temperance arguably had a significant impact 
on legislation since the majority of states permitted divorce for alcohol and physical abuse. Still, 
cruelty alone accounted for thirteen percent of all divorces throughout the states from 1867-
1871.329 While not a majority, a sizeable number of judges throughout the country recognized 
abuse alone as reason enough to permit women a divorce. The change illustrates a shift in the 
civil courts⎯  a change that recognized wives as autonomous individuals, who had a right to be 
free from intimate-partner violence.  
Louisiana passed an act in 1877, strengthening a similar piece of legislation from 1870, 
that declared “married persons may reciprocally claim a divorce on account of excesses, habitual 
intemperance, cruel treatment.”330 No longer did wives need to have an additional reason besides 
cruelty to receive a divorce. They could file because of abuse alone. In 1884, the Supreme Court 
of Louisiana put the new law to use by granting an abused wife separation of room and board. In 
the case of Margaret Moclair v. James Leahy, Moclair sued her husband for separate room and 
board under the charges of cruelty. She claimed that on two separate occasions after their 
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marriage in 1881 Leahy broke furniture, “used foul language, and struck her.”331 He also failed 
to provide for her, depriving her of food and medicine when sick. Despite prior decisions in 
favor of the husband, the Supreme Court of Louisiana overturned the lower courts, and Moclair’s 
separation was granted with a provision that she could seek alimony and division of community 
assets in a separate case. The presiding judge, J. Poche, declared in the court’s opinion, “A 
woman subjected to such treatment is justifiable in taking refuge with her parents and is entitled 
to the intervention of the laws enacted for the protection of ill-treated and abused wives.”332 
Leahy failed to live up to his obligations under the new masculinity as a husband and man. He 
did not provide or protect his wife, and he acted brutally by verbally and physically abusing her. 
Consequently, the courts felt the woman had the right to be legally separated from her husband. 
 Within three years, Louisiana courts moved from granting separations to full divorces in 
cases of abuse. In the 1887 case Macado v. Bonet, the Supreme Court of Louisiana granted the 
wife a full divorce from her abusive husband.333 For years, Bonet verbally and physically abused 
Macado in the presence of their children, servants, and guests, and once he attempted to kill her 
by shooting at her with a pistol. Bonet claimed Macado had been abusive as well⎯ yelling, 
cursing, and breaking furniture. Typically, courts would not grant divorces when fault could be 
found with both spouses, and so the lower courts of Louisiana ruled in the husband’s favor.334 In 
the Supreme Court’s opinion, J. Poche overturned the lower courts saying,  
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     334 For more information on the issues victims face when they fight back, see Susan L. Miller, 
Victims as Offenders: The Paradox of Women’s Violence in Relationships, (New Brunswick: 
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To condemn a woman to live under the authority of a brutal husband whose excesses and 
cruelty render her life with him absolutely unbearable, simply because such conduct has 
driven her to desperation, culminating in endless quarrels with him, and in violent 
explosions, would be a denial of justice.335 
 
The wife, then, did not have to play the passive role to be treated as a lady and receive rights in 
the courts. Her husband’s brutality alone constituted grounds for divorce. Given the emerging 
views of manhood and womanhood, the shift in the civil court system appears less surprising. 
The husband’s failure to be “civilized” meant he had violated his obligation as a man and, given 
his public marital vows, as a husband. Moreover, the new womanhood meant women possessed 
a certain degree of agency when found to be a victim of intimate-partner violence.  
The Suffrage Movement, the Temperance Movement, and the Child Cruelty Movement 
created organizations that pressured the legal system to recognize women’s right to be free from 
violence. Whether through legal separation, child support, or divorce, state civil codes began to 
change in response to social and institutional demands to do something about intimate-partner 
violence. The impact was far from negligible as some states revisited divorce laws. But 
ultimately, these movements and these laws affected only legally married women. To really end 
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of Women: Law, Policies, and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford Universtiy Press, 2011). 
 





THE CRIMINALIZATION OF INTIMATE-PARTNER VIOLENCE 
 
The wife is not to be considered as the husband’s slave. And the privilege, ancient though 
it be, to beat her with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face, or kick her about 
the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our 
law…[I]n person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband 
can invoke for himself…Her sex does not degrade her below the rank of the highest in 
the commonwealth. ⎯  Judge J. Peters, 1871336 
 
The legal precedent for prosecuting cases of wife abuse started in 1871 when the 
Alabama State Supreme Court ruled against a man charged with assault and battery. George 
Fulgham had been “disciplining” one of his children when his wife, Matilda, tried to stop the 
abuse. George then turned on his wife and beat her with a board. She, in turn, defended herself 
with a switch. The defense claimed a husband had the right to chastise his wife and could not be 
convicted on assault and battery charges “unless he inflicts a permanent injury or uses excessive 
violence or cruelty.”337 The Alabama State Supreme Court denied this right declaring the 
defense’s argument as a “relic of barbarism.”338 Women were not, Judge Peters argued, “the 
husband’s slave” but rather an individual recognized by the law, even within marriage. Just as 
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     338 Ibid. Since George and Matilda Fulgham were African American, some scholars contend 
the courts sought to regulate the “lower classes” and people of color; however, in the trial court, 
Judge Peters cut across class and race lines in his ruling denying any “special privilege” before 
the eyes of the law.338 He argued, “The law for one rank is the law for all ranks of the people, 
without regard to station.”338 The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the lower court judge’s 
opinion.338 Southern courts, while concerned with class and race, did extend protection, rights, 
and the status of womanhood to abused wives. For arguments about Fulgham as a means of 
social control over lower socioeconomic classes and people of color, see Reva Siegel in “Wife 
Beating Prerogative and Privilege,” Peter Bardaglio in Reconstructing the Household, and Laura 
Edwards in “Women and Domestic Violence in Nineteenth-Century North Carolina,” in Lethal 
Imagination: Violence and Brutality in American History, (New York: New York University 





slaves once had no legal protection but gained political rights in the postbellum decades, women 
too gained legal personhood after the war. Moreover, the ancient privilege of chastisement was 
no longer accepted justification for a husband assaulting his wife. In using the term “slave,” 
Judge Peters recognized slavery as no longer acceptable and used this analogy to show how 
wrong and antiquated the male privilege of chastisement was by 1871. Instead of being 
protecting men who were violent against their female partners, the criminal courts in the 
postbellum decades ruled against men charged with assault and battery for being guilty of 
intimate-partner violence. 
 
Criminal Law and Legal Marriage 
 Before the Civil War, only two states passed legislation specifically on intimate-partner 
violence⎯Georgia and Tennessee.339 In Georgia’s 1857 “Whipping Wife” law, the criminal 
code simply stated: “If a man shall whip, beat, or otherwise cruelly maltreat his wife, he shall be 
deemed guilty of misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished.”340 Tennessee’s law was 
similar, but neither law contained specific penalties for violations. Even after the Civil War, 
criminal statutes in the majority of the United States did not specifically mention intimate partner 
violence. Since most states did not pass legislation specific to intimate-partner violence during 
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International Journal 4 (1979): 60-74.	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the nineteenth century, criminalization and prosecution of intimate-partner violence took place 
within the court system and was fleshed out by case law.341  
By the mid-1870s, judges reinterpreted criminal statutes already on the books to apply to 
wife beaters. Many state statutes on assault contained a vague definition focusing on the intent to 
cause harm, regardless of the sex of the assailant or victim. This enabled a district attorney to 
press criminal charges against an abusive husband, and given the demands from abused women, 
local communities, and organizations, that the legal system address intimate-partner violence, 
courts followed by successfully prosecuting and punishing wife beaters. In Louisiana, dockets 
for criminal court cases against abusive husbands cited Section 796 of the Revised Statues of 
Louisiana, which contained a genderless, open-ended definition of assault and of punishment, 
which left both to “the discretion of the court.”342  
Judges used personal discretion, influenced by new social attitudes on gender and 
marriage. Recorder court judges in Louisiana questioned both the plaintiff and the defendant in 
assault and battery cases. Occasionally, the questions asked convey some bias. In 1884, Adelina 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     341 While some states did pass legislation around the turn of the twentieth century 
criminalizing what they termed “wife beating,” most did not. The general belief in the United 
States held spousal abuse to be illegal after 1871 (see Pleck’s Domestic Tyranny), but courts 
were left to interpret the law as it stood to include intimate-partner violence. Louisiana, for 
instance, had a legislator W.S. Posey (D) propose a law to define and punish wife beating in 
1886, but it never made it to the House floor. However, not all states uniformly ruled on the 
issue. Louisiana had no law on wife beating, but criminal court dockets on assault and battery 
indicated husbands were routinely arrested and tried for beating their wives. See also Elizabeth 
Pleck, "Wife Beating in Nineteenth-Century America," Victimology: An International Journal 4 
(1979): 60-74. As I seek to show in this dissertation, the country generally tried to prosecute 
abusive men under assault and battery charges during the postbellum period. The current legal 
system does define a separate criminal statute for “domestic violence,” but those changes stem 
from more the mass conscious raising efforts of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Louisiana’s most current statute is based on legislative changes made in 2000.  
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Lee gave testimony to the local judge after her husband Ben beat and choked her till she passed 
out. Adelina stated, “He beat me all up and down my side…. I had been away from home all day 
to keep him from fighting me.”343 Her neighbor, Sarah Colbert, also gave testimony, stating, “I 
heard him ask her for something to eat and she said she had nothing.  He threw the plate of 
victuals at her. He beat her and choked her until she was unconscious.  She couldn’t speak. I 
called watch and when the whistle blew on Clio Street he stopped.”344 Despite the plaintiff’s 
account of the events, which were verified by a witness, the judge still asked, “Had he any right 
to beat you?”345 The question suggests the judge might have let the abusive husband go if the 
wife gave any reason that she somehow provoked Ben. Adelina responded with one word, 
“no.”346 Adelina clearly articulated her husband had no right to beat her, despite the judge’s 
question to the husband’s right. As a result, Ben Lee was sentenced to two months in prison and 
to pay court costs.347 The Ben Lee case suggests judges did sometimes have lingering views on 
the male privilege of chastisement but could be influenced by the victims seeking legal help. 
As judges witnessed shifts in gender expectations, they began to employ different tactics 
in the courtroom instead of waiting for the legislature to change existing laws. The majority of 
the states during the 1870s and 1880s did not specifically criminalize spousal abuse, but the 
courts increasingly protected women’s rights to be free from violence extending beyond simple 
paternalism. Paternalism would imply courts wanted to show male strength by protecting those 
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considered weak, but the courts expressed a right of women to be free of violent attacks. 
Louisiana Recorder’s Courts and trial courts relied on the abused wife’s sworn description of the 
incident, even though Section 1712 of the Louisiana criminal code denied a wife’s testimony 
against her husband.348 Consequently, examining case law as decided in the criminal court 
system contains vital information for understanding the state’s intervention in the family and 
application of new gender expectations.  
 Among one of the most frequently pressed charges, assault and battery totaled 
approximately twenty-two percent of all criminal court cases in Orleans Parish between 1880 
and 1932.349 Assault and battery cases resulted from barroom brawls, lack of manners, money 
issues, race-based attacks, boredom, jealousy, domestic conflict, and retaliation for verbal insults 
(to name a few). Sometimes the assailant only used his or her hand or fist, but oftentimes axes, 
cotton hooks, chairs, pots, knives, and guns were involved as well. The exact charge could be 
listed as “assault and battery,” “assault and wounding,” “assault with a dangerous weapon,” or 
“assault with intent to murder,” for example. While “assault with intent to murder” and those 
attacks resulting in life-threatening injuries might be better filed as attempted murder at present, 
the court system in postbellum Louisiana generally charged a person who sought to inflict any 
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     349 About 10,181 of 46,474 court cases from the 1880 to 1932 period in Orleans Criminal 
Courts involved charges of simple assault, assault and battery, assault by wounding and cutting, 
assault with a dangerous weapon, assault by willfully shooting at, assault with intent to commit 
murder, and assault with intent to rape. Assault cases, then, accounted for 22% of the total 
number of cases during the period. 
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sort of harm on another party with assault and battery.350 Of the assault and battery charges, 
cases that involved intimate-partner violence comprised approximately sixteen percent.351 While 
not a majority, intimate-partner violence related assault and battery charges were far from 
negligible. Courts did not overlook violence in a home, even if the couple was legally married. 
Instead, the states actively pursued and prosecuted “uncivilized” men for abusing their 
partners.352 
 The number of cases in Orleans Parish from 1870 to 1900 illustrates the legal response to 
the public’s social awareness about the problem of intimate-partner violence. In the appendix, 
table A.1 breaks down the two hundred and two criminal cases tried between 1870 and 1900 by 
year. From 1870 to 1879, twenty-six cases of intimate-partner violence (or approximately 
thirteen percent of the sample size) were tried. During the 1880s, however, the courts witnessed a 
surge in cases with a total of one hundred sixty-five cases (eighty-one point five percent). In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     350 This is also why I refer to various assault cases as well as the assault and battery incidents 
under the collective phrase “assault and battery.” The courts seemed to view assault only cases as 
assault and battery in their sentencing. The punishments on assault cases and assault and battery 
cases were generally the same with only the intent to murder leading to a more severe fine or 
longer jail time. Moreover, often the assault only cases involved bodily damage, so 
differentiating between assault only and assault and battery cases is problematic and would 
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     351 From a random sampling of 1,228 assault and battery cases, 202 (16%) involved intimate-
partner violence (courtship violence, abuse against a common law wife, and wife beating). 
 
     352 For the majority of cases, I do not discuss the race of the defendants and plaintiffs. The 
main reason is because of the limitation of the records. The court had no mandatory reporting of 
race or ethnicity of the people involved in any of the documents. Sometimes I could tease out the 
race based on testimony, but there were no other clues. Only the address and name of the people 
involved were recorded. I tried to match these against Census records, but the limited 
information recorded prevented me from locating and definitively establishing race in the vast 
majority of people in question. From those cases I was able to establish race, I did not see a 
difference in prosecution during the 1870s and 1880s. Other historians, such as Bertram Wyatt-
Brown, and legal scholars, such as Carolyn Ramsey, noted prosecution of wife beating during 
this period frequently included wealthy, white men.	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South, the 1870s and 1880s were the height of legal concern for intimate-partner violence. 
Gender expectations remained heavily contested. The 1890s, however, mark a sharp decline in 
court cases for intimate-partner violence.  
 Often criminal courts relied on witnesses to prove the word of the plaintiff; otherwise, the 
case became a he said/she said situation. Many courts, however, sometimes waived the need for 
witnesses. Intimate-partner violence frequently took place in the home, particularly the kitchen 
and bedroom, so a third party could be difficult to find. Rather than throwing out the wife’s 
testimony or believing the man over the woman, as would be expected in an intact patriarchy, 
courts, such as those in Louisiana, gave priority to the wife’s testimony in intimate-partner 
violence cases. Most had no legal right to do so, but under criminal statutes of assault and 
battery, the judge could use his own discretion. Many interpreted this in the 1870s and 1880s to 
include recognition of the wife’s testimony. In 1884, Adeline Lee pressed charges against her 
husband Ben for a second time. In her statement to the recorder’s court, she relayed what 
happened:  
I was in the yard washing and he went in the kitchen and we had some words about milk.  
He told me to hush and I told him I wouldn’t and he hit me three times with his fist once 
in the nose once in the side of the face and once in the arm.353 
 
No witnesses were present nor were they required in this case. Adeline blatantly challenged the 
concept of a patriarchy and female passivity. She refused to “hush” when told to do so by her 
husband, and she pressed charges for spousal abuse. For his crime, Ben served ten days in the 
parish prison and had to pay court costs. Adeline’s testimony was accepted as legal, and despite 
her husband’s denial of the incident, the judge believed Adeline and convicted Ben. Sometimes 
in the court documents, recorders wrote that the plaintiff showed her bruises or cuts from the 
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abuse or the judge asked about the obvious physical markers. The Lee case had no record that 
visible evidence was presented. Perhaps the transcriber neglected to mention any marks, but 
since Adeline went to the court three weeks after the incident, the judge seemed to have relied 
exclusively on testimony. The court extended the rights of womanhood to Adeline even though 
she did not have a witness and even though she did not display complete submissiveness. 
 While women who were physically abused seemed to have better grounds for pressing 
charges, women frequently discussed emotional and verbal abuse in their testimony of the event. 
For the courts, verbal abuse helped depict the batterer as a brute, but for the wife, the verbal, 
emotional, and physical abuse inflicted all figured significantly into their testimonies. With the 
changes in gender expectations, emotional happiness mattered to these women, and men were 
expected to reflect that new expectation in their behavior. In one instance in 1886, Emma 
Seldner sat on the porch talking with her mother and a female friend until Emma’s husband 
Nicholas started to yell at everyone. In her testimony, Emma stated, he “then came back and 
began abusing me and then he struck me a blow in my face.”354 In the mother’s testimony, 
Sophie Langs claimed Nicholas “had never treated her [Emma] as a wife” and called Emma “a 
whoar [whore] and a dam bitch.”355 Emma spent more time discussing the name calling than her 
husband punching her in the face, indicating that she seemed to prioritize the verbal abuse as the 
most significant grievance. She went on to describe how he had already called her mother “an 
old bitch” and did not respect any of her female family members.356 While being hit mattered to 
Emma Seldner, so did the curse words. Some scholars may read this as Emma portraying herself 
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as a lady, who was offended by such language, but the court records show Emma tried to choke 
her husband and possibly hit him with a brick while Nicholas was restrained and being taken 
away by the police.357 To seek legal redress, women could have portrayed themselves as ladies 
and passive victims, but this was not always the situation, as evidenced by Emma.358 Her 
testimony and actions reveal she expected the right to be free from violence, both physical and 
emotional. The judge listened to everyone and found Nicholas acted as a fiendish husband by 
insulting and beating his wife, and Nicholas spent three months in the parish prison.359 
Husbands, the court suggested in its ruling, could not resort to physical or verbal abuse without 
being subject to legal punishment.  
 
Criminal Law and Extramarital Relationships 
Women’s emerging sense of self and sense of autonomy did appear slightly more marked 
in victims of intimate-partner violence outside of the legal institution of marriage. While 
intimate-partner violence cases in legally recognized marriages comprised sixty-one percent of 
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     358 Ibid. Those that discuss women having to fulfill the role to get successful prosecution 
include Laura Edwards in “Women and Domestic Violence in Nineteenth-Century America,” 
Elaine Tyler May in Great Expectations, Ann Lloyd, Doubly Deviant, Doubly Damned: 
Society’s Treatment of Violent Women, (London: Penguin Books, 1995), and Reva B. Siegel, 
"'The Rule of Love': Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy.” Moreover, Emma Seldner did 
not deny or justify her attempt to choke Nicholas Seldner, although she claimed not to have had a 
brick in her possession. Moreover, Sophie Langs pushed him off her porch during the incident. 
Neither Langs nor Emma sought to cover up, deny, or justify that either. Still, the court convicted 
the husband for assault and battery. While gender expectations as well as racial and 
socioeconomic class bias played into the courtroom decision, judges seemed more preoccupied 
with punishing abusive husbands than enforcing a rigid hierarchy of class, race, and gender. 
Also, the decision suggests that the courts seemed less influenced by paternalism but rather, as I 
argue, proving themselves by punishing “uncivilized” men. 
 




the cases examined, they accounted for seventy-six percent of those where the charges were 
dropped.360 Non-marital intimate-partner violence cases, on the other hand made up thirty-nine 
percent of the sample size and only twenty-four percent of the nolle prosequi cases.361 Although 
not an immense difference, the fact that non-married women more successfully prosecuted their 
abusers does hint at a different situation and mentality between those legally married and those 
not. Legal reform in the crusade against intimate-partner violence included addressing abuse in 
relationships outside of the institution of marriage, even if the law perceived unmarried women 
differently.  
 Girlfriends and common law wives quickly realized, aside from some benefits, such a 
relationship came with limitations. Either party of the relationship could not utilize the civil 
courts to seek divorce, alimony, or maintenance for separate room and board. Not regarded as a 
“real” marriage, the legal system in Louisiana did not consider there to be community property 
that needed to be divided.362 Economically, then, women who were dependent upon their 
significant other’s income in informal marriages tended to be more economically vulnerable. 
Torts were sometimes, although rarely, a useful recourse, but generally, the criminal courts 
offered the only legal solution for abused women in common law marriages.363  
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     361 Of the sample, 79 (39%) of intimate-partner violence cases were non-marital (common 
law marriage, courting violence, etc). Non-marital intimate-partner violence cases comprised 8 
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 Courts actively prosecuted men who abused their female partners, whether the victims 
were in a common law marriage or simply courting. The right to be free from violence extended 
to all women, as shown in the Green case. In April of 1885, Lizzie Jones went out with a group 
of friends, but the night ended tragically with her admittance to Charity Hospital. A man she was 
seeing, William Green, followed Jones and her friends for a while. At one point in the evening, 
he tried to join the group and become affectionate with Jones, but when his advances were 
refused, Green responded violently. Lizzie Jones testified, 
The accused attempted to put his arms around me. I objected and he struck me over the 
head with his coat that he was carrying in his arms. We had a few words there. When we 
left and walked up as far as Nashville Avenue where we had some more words. Then the 
accused broke a jailing off a box around a tree and struck me violently on my left side 
with it.  He dropped the stick and struck me several blows with his hands. I told him I 
would have him arrested when he said they could only give him thirty days for it and 
when he came out he would kill me. 364 
 
Green’s actions suggest he felt entitled to a certain amount of compliance and intimacy from his 
girlfriend, and his supposed “right” permitted him to force Jones into submission. The courts, 
Green believed, would only give him a slap on the wrist, recognizing a man’s right to chastise 
his female partner. Contrary to his belief, the courts found William Green guilty of assault and 
battery and sentenced him to four months in the parish prison.365 Granted, Green’s actions were 
extreme, beating Jones with an object to the point she was confined in the hospital for seven days 
and in bed at home for another ten days.366 Courts generally responded in accordance with the 
severity of the assault and were more likely to punish someone based on the damage inflicted. 
The Green case obviously qualified as serious given Jones required seventeen days of bed rest 
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after the assault, but this case also showed the courts drawing a distinction between what was 
acceptable and what was not.  
 Lizzie Jones’s experience shows that single women could and did use the legal system to 
deal with intimate-partner violence, and the courts responded by prosecuting the abuser. Lizzie 
Jones knew she had the right and ability to press charges against William Green for beating 
her⎯even if she had been romantically involved with him, and she warned him as much. The 
new womanhood brokered a different dynamic between men and women, one in which women 
expected the right to be free from violence. If men violated the expectations, then women could 
seek justice through the courts.  
Sometimes the courts continued prosecution when women attempted to have the charges 
dropped. In 1886, Henry Gibbons argued with his common law wife Emma Connors, accusing 
her of being out all night drinking. At one point, he threw a kettle at Emma, and somehow she 
landed on the furnace and burned her leg. A young African American child named Lizzie 
Missouri worked for the Gibbons’ family washing their laundry. She witnessed the attack but did 
nothing at first. She knew Henry had a history of being abusive, and Emma tended to drop 
charges. Although Lizzie may have not directly intervened, she shamed them by saying, “Look 
at you two fighting” and then ran to get a watchman, even though Emma told her not to do so.367 
Emma attempted to have the court drop charges as she had done in the past, but the state, in 
removing the choice from her, continued its prosecution. Emma’s common law husband faced an 
arraignment, plead guilty, and served ten days in jail. Female agency in intimate-partner violence 
during the postbellum period was more complex than simply empowering the victim. Women 
could and did press charges of assault and battery against their abusers, and the majority of these 
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women did not drop their suits. Sometimes, however, the victim’s voice lost out to other men 
and women in the community. The fact that the court refused to drop the case suggests the local 
judge and district attorney felt the history of abuse necessitated the state intervening and 
mandating consequences. The legal system in the Gibbons case took it upon themselves to 
address the social problem of intimate-partner violence, even without the consent of the abused 
woman. Intimate-partner violence had become a public concern, and the high level of awareness 
about the problem required the law to act when evidence of abuse was presented to local 
authorities. 
Courts became more active in the 1870s and 1880s, addressing the problem of intimate-
partner violence, and they even extended legal protections to women engaged in interracial 
relationships. Despite the increasing stigma against interracial couples, the courts broadened 
protections to white and black women who were in relationships with men of another race. In 
1886, Kate Siddell pressed charges against her African-American boyfriend Richard (Dick) 
Sheldon. He monitored her activities on the day of October 7 and waited outside the building 
where she rented a room. The owner, Josephine Bernard, told Siddell that Sheldon was outside, 
and Siddell tried to make him leave. Sheldon hit her, knocked her down, and then hit her again 
with a stick.368 After Sheldon was arrested, Siddell went to the station to give a statement, and he 
ran up to her yelling, “You damn white bitch.” Despite his outburst, she still pressed charges. 
Bernard served as a witness and testified Sheldon often “made trouble.”369 Sheldon indeed had a 
prior history of abuse. The previous year, his African-American girlfriend Ernestine Kent had 
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pressed charges against him for assault and battery, and he had served a month of jail time.370 
Given the overwhelming evidence and prior conviction, Sheldon pled guilty and was sentenced 
to a month in jail. Interestingly, the court’s sentence for Sheldon was comparable to those in 
relationships of the same race. 
In another interracial relationship, the court upheld a woman of color’s right to be free 
from violence when the abuser was white. Ellen McClellan pressed charges against her estranged 
husband, Gehart Koester, in 1887. Before a trip to Texas, Koester “asked an improper 
question.”371 When McClellan declined, he demanded she sit on his lap, which she again refused. 
Koester then took out his pistol and shot five shots, with one hitting McClellan in the leg. He was 
arrested and sentenced to four years in prison. Three days after the criminal trial, the local civil 
court granted McClellan a legal separation. In the civil trial, McClellan used prior arrests of 
Koester for physical abuse in July of that year as well as verbal cruelty for him calling her a 
“damned nigger whore.”372 While Koester’s actions could be viewed as attempted murder and 
therefore more extreme than the Sheldon case, Koester was guilty of intimate-partner violence, 
which led to the courts granting a legal separation and imprisoning him.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  370 State v. Richard Sheldon (1885) CRDC# 7353. The formal punishment was 10 days in the 
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     371 State v. Gehart Koester (1887) CRDC# 10213. The closest census records to match the 
couple are from the 1880 census. A “G. Koester, Jr.” lived in New Orleans, Louisiana and was 
married to an Ellen Koester in 1880. They inhabited a mixed neighborhood with immigrants 
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birthplace as Louisiana, making him at the very least a second-generation immigrant if he was 
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During the 1870s and 1880s, courts intervened in intimate-partner violence similarly 
across race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class. Women, regardless of rank or color, possessed 
the rights of womanhood, at least as it applied to protection and intimate-partner violence. 
Officers called the victims “ladies” when they referred to them in the court transcripts, even if 
the woman was not white or from the middle to upper classes.373 The rhetoric of protection and 
changing gender expectations created a narrow but definite space for strengthening female 
identity without the divide of race, class, or marriage status. 
 
The Whipping Post Debate 
By the 1870s, the alternative of the whipping post emerged as a punishment for wife 
beaters. Only Maryland passed legislation permitting abusers to be whipped before the turn of 
the twentieth century, and the law was largely symbolic and infrequently used.374 Still, many 
states debated the merits of a whipping post for wife beaters, and newspapers throughout the 
country carried coverage denouncing or praising the whipping post.375 The Wheeling Register of 
West Virginia openly supported such legislation. Whipping an abuser was the “natural 
punishment,” especially since  
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     374 For more information on whipping post regulations, see Elizabeth Pleck, “Wife Beating in 
Nineteenth-Century America,” 4 Victimology (1979): 60-74; and Elizabeth Pleck, Domestic 
Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy Against Family Violence from the Colonial Times to the 
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four times out of five the poor bruised woman will come to testify in his favor…She does 
this because she and her children will suffer hunger and cold if he loses his wages by 
imprisonment. He will go to a comfortable prison; she will suffer vastly more than 
he….There is something in nine and thirty well laid on that lingers in the memory, and 
helps to make drunken husbands well behaved.376  
 
Interestingly, The Wheeling Register recognized the complexity of intimate-partner violence and 
the problems in holding the abuser accountable. Prison sentences compounded the victim’s 
difficulties since she would be without a vital source of income. With the majority of women 
remaining at home until the 1980s, many women throughout American history depended upon 
their partner’s wages.377 Even in working class families, men earned a larger income. The 
whipping post offered a potential solution to the social problem without compounding the 
victim’s sufferings.  
Other states took notice. In 1879, Missouri and Kentucky legislators introduced a 
whipping post bill, which led to heated discussions. The mid-1880s also witnessed a notable 
increase in legislative debates over the whipping post largely due to the highly publicized 
account of the second use of Maryland’s whipping post law.378 In 1882, a lower Baltimore court 
sentenced a white man by the name of Frank Pyers to fifteen lashes and six months in jail.379 
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debated whipping post legislation. See Elizabeth Pleck, Domestic Tyranny, 113. In Louisiana, a 
legislator (Cordill) announced he would propose whipping post legislation, but he never did. See 





Described as “a thick-set, muscular man of about 30 years, who was formerly the brakeman on 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,” Pyers had been convicted for beating his wife and causing her 
to miscarry.380 Even after the public whipping, Pyers protested his innocence and stated no white 
man deserved such treatment.381 He tried to sneer or smile during his incarceration, but when 
Pyers returned to his cell and was treated for the lacerations, he told the doctor, “That’s a d---- 
hard punishment.”382 Pyers spent the rest of the day in tears “from the realization of his 
degradation” and remained in a “dazed and half stupid condition.”383 Reportedly, Henry Myers, 
another white man recently convicted for assault and battery of his wife and sentenced by 
Maryland’s whipping post law, sat frightened in his cell as he heard Pyers receiving his lashings. 
As a result of having broken the spirit of the abusers, the local sheriff claimed the whipping post 
a success. This punishment attracted so much attention because the abuser was white while the 
first Maryland flogging had been of an African American man. Discussions on the merits of the 
whipping post filled newspapers. Some, such as The Philadelphia Inquirer, claimed it necessary 
“for the brutal and cowardly ruffians who beat their wives.”384 The whipping post would make 
the abuser “be reclaimed and society have restored to it a human being in place of the wife-
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beating brute.”385 Still, while several legislatures debated whipping post bills and newspapers 
bandied about its usefulness, advocates for abolishing corporal punishment won in the majority 
of states. Legal remedies, then, rested primarily in whether the courts would try and punish the 
assailant for assault and battery in incidents of intimate-partner violence. 
 
Nolle Prosequi 
 Overwhelmingly women exhibited agency in using the legal system to uphold the right to 
be free from violence, but intimate-partner violence involved complex issues. Consequently, not 
all married women could be completely defiant. Approximately sixteen percent of the intimate-
partner related assault and battery cases were marked as “nolle prosequi,” a term that meant the 
plaintiff dropped charges.386 Women stopped the cases for a number of reasons varying from fear 
to economic need. Sometimes the ideal that a woman had the right to be free from violence lost 
to the reality of everyday life. Annie Hannewinckle testified when her case went to trial that she 
did not wish to prosecute anymore by stating, “I want peace that is all.”387 Since her husband had 
not made bail and had been sitting in jail for over a week, she felt he had served enough time. 
Any more time in jail would not be needed to learn his lesson, Annie concluded. Moreover, she 
needed him out of jail so he could contribute to the family income. Immediately after her wish 
for peace, Annie said, “For every dollar he made, I made half.”388 Annie argued she contributed 
to the family, but her income paled in comparison to his. As a family dependent on two incomes, 
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she needed his help to provide for the children and these needs made her enter a nolle prosequi 
plea.  
Similar to the Hannewinckle case, Mrs. Blondeau had her husband Gaston arrested for 
slapping her after a dispute over money, but five months later she dictated a letter to the District 
Attorney asking for the case to be dismissed.389 She wrote, 
I am unable to appear in court tomorrow at 9 AM as I am expecting to be confined every 
day at any moment.  I do not want to prosecute my husband, and I beg you to have mercy 
on me and my two children and excuse him as this is the first time that it happened, and 
he is my only support.  If you punish him myself and children will be the sufferers.  He is 
good to us and it will not happen again.  I made the affidavit in passion, and I am sorry 
for it now hoping you will grant me this favor.390 
 
Gaston had served nineteen days in jail before he made bail and had been back at home for the 
last few months of her current pregnancy. Mrs. Blondeau articulated a common problem with 
breaking the cycle of violence when the husband is the breadwinner because her family 
depended on her husband’s income. As Gaston sat in jail, he did not bring in money, and the 
wife and children suffered. With a third child due “at any moment,” Mrs. Blondeau relied on her 
husband. When faced with the choice of getting by financially or starvation by making her 
husband stand trial for beating her, she chose the economically prudent route. Solving the 
problem of intimate-partner violence was and is a complicated issue. Unless other social issues 
are remedied, unintended consequences often result from legal attempts to address intimate-
partner violence. Mrs. Blondeau begged for mercy for herself and her children when faced with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  389 Mrs. Blondeau was illiterate and had to make “her mark” with an “x” instead of a 
signature. The letterhead was that of the city court indicating she had dictated the letter to a clerk 
who handwrote it and then submitted the letter to the DA. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  390 State v. Gaston Blondeau (1886) CRDC# 8757. She was fourth months pregnant at the 
time of the abuse. Her first name was never used in any of the documents. She was constantly 
referred to as Mrs. Blondeau. 
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losing Gaston’s income. She considered it a favor for the district attorney to no longer press 
charges. Clearly, wives understood charging their husbands with criminal assault and battery 
could impact them and their children negatively, so they dropped charges, not because they 
believed their husbands had the right to hit them, but because other social inequities forced them 
to make tough decisions. 
 Women also dropped charges because they feared the response of their husbands when 
they were released. In 1888, Cecila Carter’s husband Ike asked her for money. She gave him a 
dollar, but when he asked for more, she refused. He responded by hitting her “hard enough to 
make a gash.”391 Initially, she had him arrested for assault and battery, but when he made bail 
later the same day, she rushed into the court and begged for them to stop prosecution. The court 
recorder asked her why, and she plainly stated, “Because I had made a charge against him and I 
thought he might do something to me for it.” Fear of retaliation caused women to stop the legal 
process. A wife could have her husband arrested for abuse, but the maximum sentence was three 
months imprisonment. Eventually, he would be released. If the abuser harbored a grudge, he 
would repeat the beating again to “teach” her not to press charges again. The fear of retaliation 
caused some women to revise their testimony after having their husbands arrested. In 1888, 
J.O.C. Wallis came home and beat his wife. She went to the local police station and asked 
Corporal Lethegue to press charges. After her husband made bail, she testified in court, “I attach 
no blame to him whatever it says in my testimony.”392 Despite being beaten and sustaining two 
major cuts on her forehead, Mrs. Wallis told the court she did not want to prosecute any more. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    391 State v. Ike Carter (1888) CRDC# 10995.  
 




Likely, his presence influenced the change in her decision. Intimidation and threats of repeated 
abuse caused women to stop proceedings.  
 Some women feared what criminal proceedings would do to their public images. Women, 
regardless of socioeconomic class, pressed assault and battery charges on their husbands. While 
wealthier wives possessed other means to remedy intimate-partner violence, they still utilized the 
criminal courts, but such a resource came with drawbacks for even the well-to-do. On Tuesday, 
March 25, 1884, Augustus Richards attempted to throw away the dinner his wife Martha had 
cooked. When she tried to prevent him from doing so, Augustus choked Martha and then 
attacked her with a gimlet knife saying, “I will make a Kate Townsend out of you.”393 Augustus 
Richards’s use of Kate Townshend was a reference to a New Orleans madam who ran an upscale 
brothel, perhaps the most expensive in New Orleans at the time. In 1883, Kate Townshend was 
stabbed to death by her lover. The comment, then, was not only a threat but also an insult by 
likening Martha to a madam. Martha was able to ward off the blow by raising her hand, but the 
knife cut her thumb some in the process. Augustus threatened Martha’s life, hit her, and 
compared her to an infamous New Orleans prostitute who met a bloody end. She pressed 
charges. Augustus, however, quickly made the five hundred dollar bail, which suggests the 
Richards family was well-situated financially.394 Although many cases involved poorer couples, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     393 State v. Augustus Richards (1884) CRDC# 4703. For more information on Kate 
Townshend, see James Gill, Lords of Misrule: Mardi Gras and the Politics of Race in New 
Orleans, (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1997): 138. 
  
     394 State v. Augustus Richards (1884) CRDC# 4703. Typically, bail for assault and battery fell 
at $250. $500 usually meant the assailant attacked with a dangerous weapon or had the intent to 
murder. Richards did not make bail from a lending agency but rather from a friend, Charles Fox. 
Given Richards connection to someone with the means to raise $500, Martha’s ability to read 
and write, and their household at 1922 Tchoupitoulas near Henry Clay Avenue (a nicer 
neighborhood in New Orleans during the 1880s), the Richards’ household were arguably at least 
a middling sorts and not within the poorer socioeconomic class.  
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Martha was not atypical for the period. Legal professor Carolyn B. Ramsey recognizes, “wealthy 
and middle-class husbands were compelled to appear in court on domestic assault and battery 
charges more often than scholars have realized,” and their charges “were deeply distressing to 
the men involved” to the point the “prominent male defendants sometimes filed libel suits.”395  
The public character and name of people mattered, even at the turn of the twentieth century, but 
that public status could influence women to drop charges. On May 2, Martha personally wrote to 
the District Attorney asking for him to cease prosecution arguing “By doing this a family scandal 
will be avoided and a favor will be conferred on.”396 Martha may have dropped charges for other 
reasons, such as pressure from her husband, but her letter claimed the primary reason as avoiding 
“a family scandal.”397 She feared for the reputation of her family if Augustus stood trial even 
though he threatened to stab her to death. Complicating the desire to end the violence, women 
from wealthier socioeconomic classes had to choose sometimes between the family name and 
seeking help from the criminal courts. 
 Divorce laws and economic inequality in the nineteenth century tended to fuel a woman’s 
dependence on her spouse, and given the psychological and emotional component in intimate-
partner violence, battered women sometimes took abusive husbands back.398 Occasionally the 
case failed because the husband became apologetic, swearing he was a changed man and 
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     398 See Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman, (New York: Harper & Row, 1979) and The 




pleading for another chance.399 Odelia Nelson experienced the difficulties involved in extricating 
oneself from a violent marriage. She lived in fear of her husband Henry and testified to the court, 
“He is always threatening my life; he is always beating me… He choked me himself.”400 Odelia 
pressed charges against him after one incident in February of 1887. While in jail, Henry 
promised his undying love and never to harm her again as he wrote, “I am sick and if you love 
me like I love you, you would come and get me out of this place….You is my wife and you is 
the only one that will do for me and I will never ill treat you like I have been doing.  I will 
respect you as long as I like.”401 But, when Odelia was not moved enough to drop charges, he 
wrote a longer and more emotional letter. 
 My dear wife Odel, 
I love you and I will stick to you as long as I live but I will never be means to you as I 
was before…You is my wife and I will die for you because you is good and kings for me. 
I was fighting for you Monday when I seen that you did not come I says I am shore [sure] 
that my wife is sick.  My dear wife I am grieving myself to death about you.  I am in all 
that rain and on them wet stones suffering.  I hope that when I will come out that I will 
treat you better than before and I will worke and give you money and help you along and 
try to like what you like.  Wife and husband I love you and I will stick to you tell I die. If 
you please my dear wife come Friday and bring something to eat and do not bring my 
close [clothes]..All the people in here treat me like a dog.  My knees is sore from 
scrubbing. Please kiss little Charlie.402 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     399 This is commonly recognized as a part of the cycle of violence in intimate-partner violence 
and partially explains why the victim has a difficult time leaving a violent relationship. For more 
information see Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman, (New York: Harper and Row, 1979). 
Nineteenth century Americans held a basic grasp of the pattern of violence as show in 
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Henry sought to manipulate his wife’s emotions. He tried to elicit sympathy by describing his 
hard conditions in jail and his sickness. He also tried charming her by resurrecting any lingering 
emotional attachment Odelia had, a tactic commonly used by batterers. Henry appears to have 
believed if only Odelia would remember how much she loved him, she would feel sorry for him 
and release him from jail. And so he praised her for being “kings” to him. Henry claimed he 
would go so far as to die for his wife because she was so good to him. He promised profusely 
that he would change everything⎯the abuse, stinginess with money, and dislike of her personal 
interests. If all else did not work, perhaps his last line would. Henry ended by asking Odelia to 
kiss their son for him, showing he indeed was repentant and would uphold the southern 
masculine role of being a kind and protective father and husband. The case subsequently ended 
as nolle prosequi. Manipulating several different emotions, batterers could influence wives to 
drop charges, complicating the ability to stop intimate-partner violence.  
Of all the assault and battery cases, only three women expressed the belief in the privacy 
of the family or the husband’s right to chastisement. This accounts for approximately one and a 
half percent of all assault and battery cases and only six percent of those that ended in nolle 
prosequi.403 In 1882, police dragged James Gillen to a Recorder’s Court to answer for abusing 
his wife. Mrs. Gillen never sought to press charges, but the watchman in the neighborhood 
arrested James anyway. When asked to testify on the incident, Mrs. Gillen stated, “I didn’t wish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     403 The cases in which women expressed a belief that the husband had some sort of right 
totaled 3, which is 1.5% of intimate-partner violence cases from the sample. In 33 nolle prosequi 
cases, 2 cases or 6% had women who believed they had done something wrong (one of the cases 
still resulted in conviction). I think both statistics are helpful. The first (1.5%) helps to show how 
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had the right of chastisement. Nolle prosequi cases, therefore, do not undermine the argument of 




to prosecute him…He wanted his way, and I wanted mine.  It was my fault as much as his.”404  
When the judge asked where she received her black eye, Mrs. Gillen responded, “It was done in 
the family.  I didn’t wish to go against my husband.”405 Despite the police having witnessed the 
abuse and pressing charges, Mrs. Gillen insisted she was accountable. She kept avoiding a 
detailed description of the events and gave vague responses, upholding the concept of the 
privacy of the family. She insisted she did not want charges pressed since it was a family affair, 
and eventually, the court consented. The case ended without finding the abusive husband guilty. 
Similarly, in 1887, Celestine Clark charged her husband George with “assaulting and 
wounding.”406  When required to testify, Celestine hesitated. The court pushed her by asking if 
she had given him cause for the beating, and she replied, “Yes, sir, I was in the fault.”407 When 
asked what caused George to become violent, she stated, “Little family fracas.” Celestine 
appears to have internalized the message that her disobedience necessitated George’s physical 
behavior. Moreover, she seemed to think family disagreement served as enough of an 
explanation to the court for what happened. To her, the court did not need to know the details of 
the incident but rather it should uphold the ideal of family privacy and allow her to drop the 
charges. The case ended in a nolle prosequi.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  404 State v. James Gillen (1882) CRDC# 2911. Mrs. Gillen’s first name never appears in the 
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Similarly in 1888, the police arrested Warren Powell for assault and battery. Warren 
broke into his wife, Annie’s bedroom and caught her being intimate with another man.408 A 
witness convinced Warren to put down the knife in his hand, and instead, Warren used his fist to 
punch his wife twice. When asked to testify, Annie refused to blame Warren. She said, “I was in 
fault. He came in and caught me in bed with a man. I am the only one in fault. I did not ask my 
step-father to have him arrested. I gave him some back talk.”409 She held herself deserving of the 
violence since she “back talk[ed]” and committed adultery. Despite her pleas and her position as 
an adulteress, the court convicted Warren and sentenced him to twenty-four hours in jail. The 
state found his behavior unacceptable and acted without the wife’s consent for the betterment of 
society. Although women such as Mrs. Gillen, Celestine Clark, and Annie Powell internalized 
some sense of guilt or privacy of family, clearly most women did not buy into that a patriarchy 
included total female submissiveness. Gender ideals had changed too much to resurrect such 
antiquated views, and the courts recognized the shift. 
Intimate-partner violence was and is overwhelmingly a gender-based problem, but 
husbands can be victims of spousal abuse too. They faced a far less sympathetic community and 
court. These men struggled with their own masculinity in having their wives hauled before court 
for assault and battery, and the courts seemed to question a man’s prosecution of his wife. Men 
could not resurrect a complete patriarchy, but their position at the top of the social hierarchy 
meant they had to hold onto their position and not be physically dominated by anyone, 
particularly their wives. In 1884, a police officer dragged Sarah Hodges to the station for assault 
and battery. Her husband Elijah had asked for dinner when his wife took an ax and hit him in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     408 State v. Warren Powell (1888) CRDC# 10434. 
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face. Elijah sustained injuries including a cut lip and two loosened teeth, but insisted he did not 
want to press charges.410 Sarah pled not guilty and was found not guilty despite the serious 
physical damage her actions caused. In 1888, Jennie Robinson struck her husband Henry in the 
stomach with a stone knocking the wind out of him. He pressed charges but admitted his 
reluctance to do so. The judge asked, “You are not very anxious to prosecute this woman?” to 
which Henry replied, “No, sir.”411 These men reluctantly found themselves testifying about their 
wife’s abuse. The judges, in turn, reluctantly heard the cases and did not prosecute husband 
beating like wife beating. The testimony is brief. The wives did not even seek to cross-examine 
the plaintiffs, and the courts decided exclusively on what the husband said. These should have 
resulted in easy convictions, but judges acted in accordance with social views in the situation of 
an abused husband. How could a husband be a “real” man if he could be beaten by a woman? 
The question seemed to boggle newspaper reporters and judges. As a result, men did not 
commonly achieve success prosecuting their wives for assault and battery, particularly in the 
South. The Hodges and Robinson cases show the difficulty of pressing charges for male victims 
of intimate-partner violence given the prevailing gender expectations in society and the court 
system.  
 In both the criminal and civil courts, judges rejected the husband’s right of chastisement. 
By the 1870s, “The rule of love has superseded the rule of force.”412 Abusive men flagrantly 
disregarded new gender expectations, and they invoked public outcry for violating their role as 
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husband. Instability between married partners threatened the foundation of civilization. Society 
tore down the veil of privacy for the betterment of the whole, and they demanded something be 
done to bring abusive husbands in line with modern views of gender and marriage. Following 
case law clearly shows the shift in mentality and reform in the legal system. More commonly, 
women pressed charges against abusive spouses for assault and battery and sued for legal 
separation or divorce. Still, intimate-partner violence related criminal court cases had a ninety-
two percent conviction rate.413 Clearly, the courts viewed spousal abuse as wrong and within the 
state’s right to regulate. The new gender expectations presented women with an opportunity to 
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RACIALIZATION AND DECLINE OF SOUTHERN INTERVENTION IN INTIMATE-
PARTNER VIOLENCE 
 
[T] he good [Negroes] are few, the bad are many, and it is impossible to tell what ones 
are ... dangerous to the honor of the dominant race until the damage is done…..If it is 
necessary every Negro in the state will be lynched; it will be done to maintain white 
supremacy. ⎯  James K. Vardaman (1897)414 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, James K. Vardaman served as state senator and 
governor of Mississippi. In the senatorial and gubernatorial elections, Vardaman campaigned on 
white supremacy. He touched on issues important to many southerners in the 1890s, particularly 
the supposed threat blacks posed to whites morally, politically, and economically. Vardaman was 
not alone in his desire to” fix” southern society through strengthening white control over African 
Americans. White southern Democrats in general utilized race and the failure of Populism to rise 
to power in the last decade of the nineteenth century, and through their fear mongering, race 
became the dominant issue in the South, surpassing every other problem the region faced, 
including intimate-partner violence.415  
 
The Tenuous Cross-Racial Alliance in the 1870s and 1880s 
Under Radical Reconstruction, the federal government supported local Republican 
governments and tried to punish white supremacists who violated Republican rule or African 
Americans’ rights. The 1870 Enforcement Act enabled the federal government to arrest and 
charge individuals for depriving African Americans of political or civil rights. Consequently, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     414  Greenwood Commonwealth July 15, 27, 1897 (Mississippi); as quoted in Michael 
Newton, The Ku Klux Klan in Mississippi: A History, (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland & Co, 2010): 
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example, in Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction, 
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led to crackdowns on the Ku Klux Klan and charges of approximately two thousand people each 
year during 1872 and 1873 for violating African Americans’ newly gained rights.416 One of the 
men arrested from the Colfax Massacre took his case to the U.S. Supreme Court. In United 
States v. Cruikshank (1875), the Supreme Court, however, backed away from Radical 
Reconstruction and overturned the conviction of two white men who participated in murdering 
black men in the Colfax, Louisiana. The ruling stated the 1870 Enforcement Act, which based its 
legal standing on the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, did not apply to 
“one citizen against another.”417 Prosecution of violent white supremacists in other states 
practically ceased after Cruikshank, and the level of violence against African Americans 
increased with few victims finding justice. Even before the infamous Compromise of 1877 that 
ended Reconstruction, the federal government had tired of Reconstruction and became amenable 
to reconciliation. 
When whites were questioned about racial relations in the South, such as in the 1880 
Report and Testimony of the Select Committee of the United States Senate to Investigate the 
Causes of the Removal of the Negroes from the Southern States to the Northern States, they often 
played down the violence. When Andrew Currie of Shreveport, Louisiana, spoke of elections in 
the 1870s, he denied having seen any violation of African American rights at the voting poll or 
elsewhere. He discussed many points, including how often Republican speeches were publicly 
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given and how “marvelous” he believed them to be.418 When asked about his participation in the 
state militia during the Bossier riots in 1868, Currie argued with Senator William Windom about 
the number of deaths.419 Windom claimed Executive Document Number 30, House of 
Representatives, Forty-fourth Congress, Second Session in its eight hundred sixty-eight lines on 
Bossier Parish proved at least two hundred and thirty African Americans had been killed while 
Currie fervently insisted on only five. When pressed, Currie flippantly replied, “You do not seem 
to appreciate the truth.” Windom retaliated in kind by stating, “I do not, from some quarters, 
because I hear it so rarely.”420 Despite inquiries into race relations and violations of African 
American rights, southern whites had, for all intents and purposes, regained control of the South 
with the withdrawal of federal troops after 1877.  
By the late 1870s, power shifted from Republicans to Democrats in the South, and the 
Reconstruction Amendments and Enforcement Act were deliberately being misconstrued by 
southern whites. The case of a black woman, Mrs. John Simms, illustrates just how much. A 
local election in Wilson, North Carolina, took place in 1878. Mrs. Simms told her husband, John, 
to vote for James Edward O’Hara, but on his way to the polls, John was attacked by a group of 
white men on horseback, beaten, and forced to drink until intoxicated. The men then made sure 
John voted for the white Democrat on the ticket. Fearing what he had done, John hid in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     418 Report and Testimony of the Select Committee of the United States Senate to Investigate 
the Causes of the Removal of the Negroes from the Southern States to the Northern States, 
Senate Report 693, 46th Cong., 2nd Sess., part 2, pp. 89.	  
	  
     419 Windom was a Radical Republican from Minnesota. For more information, see 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000629.  
 
     420 Ibid., 91. Other whites testified there was no racial strife in the South, such as W.P. Ford 
saying, “as a whole, great friendliness of feeling exists between the colored and the white 
men…they live on the most amicable terms.” See Report and Testimony of the Select Committee 
of the United States Senate to Investigate the Causes of the Removal of the Negroes from the 
Southern States to the Northern States, Senate Report 693, 46th Cong., 2nd Sess., part 2, pp. 166. 
	  
165 
woods for several days. When he returned home, John Simms confronted an angry wife, who 
beat him with a hickory stick. Local officials heard of the spousal abuse and arrested Mrs. Simms 
not simply for assault and battery but also for impugning her husband’s Fifteenth Amendment 
right. Rather than try the group of white men, the state twisted the situation to prosecute a black 
woman, further reinforcing white supremacy. North Carolina’s case against Mrs. Simms 
attracted attention and applause throughout the South. An article printed in Louisiana’s The 
Daily Picayune stated, “The Democratic House will cheerfully appropriate the fees of special 
counsel in this case [for the prosecution of Mrs. Simms].”421 With power shifting back to white 
male Democrats, gender, at least in this case, became the central issue.  
The pivotal event that transformed southern society and was utilized to consolidate white 
power centered on the failure of Populism. The multiple economic depressions in the postbellum 
years hurt farmers still struggling to recover from the Civil War. Exports, something in which the 
South depended upon, dropped all the while credit tightened. Consequently, smaller landowners 
found surviving more and more difficult. They formed organizations, such as the Grange, 
Patrons of Husbandry, and the Farmers’ Alliance, to discuss productive farming methods. Others 
recognized real change could occur if a political body was formed, which was realized with the 
Populist Party. The Democratic Party felt threatened by reforms proposed, such as the 
subtreasury plan, as well as the loss of rural whites who were leaving the Democratic Party for 
the Populist Party in large numbers.422 When the Populist Party fused with the Democratic 
Party’s candidate in the 1896 presidential election, the Populist Party lost any sort of cohesion 
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and crumbled as a political group.423 Democrats used the failure of Populism to create white 
solidarity, blaming black farmers who had also been strong supporters of Populism for the 
massive fraud and political corruption. Many rural whites returned to the Democratic Party, and 
with white supremacy unifying white men across socioeconomic classes, southern whites created 
an oppressive racial era that sought to deprive African Americans of the rights gained under 
Radical Reconstruction. 
 
The Rise of an Oppressive Racial Order 
The last decades of the nineteenth century gave rise to the oppressive racial order known 
as the “Jim Crow” Era, but as C. Vann Woodward argues, this shift was a choice rather than an 
inevitability.424 Neither immediate upon the end of Reconstruction or the only alternative, white 
southerners chose to deny African Americans civil and political rights. Whites first sought to 
consolidate authority through stripping African-American men of newly acquired legal rights, 
such as voting. The vote was viewed as an integral part of citizenship and the means to achieve 
total equality. After reclaiming the majority of political offices, white southerners legally 
deprived African American men of the vote through “color blind” laws. Politicians could not 
exclude individuals from voting solely on race, not with the Fifteenth Amendment in effect, but 
they could find loopholes. Mississippi pioneered the southern strategy to disenfranchise black 
men. In the 1890 Mississippi Constitution, politicians limited voting through a number of ways. 
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Specifically denying women, “idiots,” “insane people,” “and Indians not taxed,” the 1890 
Mississippi constitutional convention also stipulated voters must pay a poll tax of two dollars 
(ostensibly for public schools) and “be able to read any section of the constitution of this 
State.”425 Literacy tests and poll taxes circumvented the Fifteenth Amendment not by using race 
as a category for exclusion, but the intended target group felt the impact nonetheless. In 1867, 
seventy percent of African-American men in Mississippi were registered to vote. By 1892, only 
six percent of black males in the state were still registered.426 Because of its “color blindness,” 
the laws could and did disenfranchise poor whites. To remedy the situation and maintain white 
solidarity, Mississippi created a grandfather clause enabling those whose ancestors voted before 
the Civil War exemption from the new voting regulations. This aimed at maintaining the vote for 
all white men.  
In 1890, the Colored American Citizens of the United States formed and issued a 
proclamation to the President, asking for the federal government to intervene. Among the many 
injustices faced by African-Americans, the organization pointed to disenfranchisement as the 
most significant injustice. Participants at the 1890 convention argued the situation in the South 
made African Americans position “worse than abject slavery.”427 Still, nothing had been done. 
Groups tried to mount legal challenges. In 1898, the Supreme Court of the United States heard 
the case Williams v. Mississippi, which challenged Mississippi’s new voting requirements. 
Instead of ruling in favor of African Americans, the Supreme Court stated in its opinion, “They 
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[Mississippi statutes] do not on their face discriminate between the races, and it has not been 
shown that their actual administration was evil, only that evil was possible under them.”428 The 
judges acknowledged officials could pervert the state’s legal requirements to vote, but this, they 
argued, did not mean the state of Mississippi intended any form of racial discrimination.  
Alabama, Virginia, and South Carolina soon debated Mississippi’s methods for 
disenfranchising African Americans. White southerners believed intimate-partner violence had 
been eradicated from the white community, leaving it only a problem among blacks. Alabama’s 
1901 Constitutional Convention illustrates this belief. President of the Convention John B. Knox, 
gave a speech on the “importance” of the meeting.429 He stated, “the southern people, with this 
grave problem of the races to deal with, are face-to-face with a new epoch in Constitution-
making.”430 Crediting Mississippi for being a “pioneer” in the process, Knox declared Alabama 
must act “within the limits imposed by the Federal Constitution, to establish white supremacy in 
this State.”431 Virginia’s 1901 Constitutional Convention began much the same way. At one 
point in the proceedings, Glass claimed, “Discrimination! . . . [T]hat exactly is what this 
Convention was elected for . . . with a view to the elimination of every negro voter.”432 Including 
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wife beating as a measure to disenfranchise would, Virginian legislators believed, aid in the goal 
to “eliminate the darkey from our body politic.”433 
Upholding part of the Compromise of 1877, the Supreme Court allowed the South to deal 
with African Americans as each state saw fit. Without federal intervention, southern states 
quickly deprived black men of their right to vote. Alabama even devised new techniques by 
requiring a potential voter to be “regularly employed in some lawful occupation” and imposing a 
character evaluation, whereby the person must demonstrate they “understand the duties and 
obligations of citizens under a republican form of government.”434 The combination of laws, 
fraud, and extralegal violence throughout the South effectively limited the franchise. By the early 
1900s, African American voters in the South virtually disappeared. 
   In order to limit the rising aspirations of the black community, southern whites also 
argued that African Americans existed as a threat to white women, leading many white women 
to prioritize race over gender. Black men raping white women⎯ referred to as “The New Negro 
Crime”⎯ created panic in many whites. Against the supposed menace of the “black fiend,” 
white women sided with white men in the campaign to instill racial dominance over African 
Americans.435 Newspapers helped create this panic by frequently publishing stories on the rape 
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of a white woman or child by an African-American man.436 Each story told gruesome details 
about young white females raped and murdered by black men. “A Young Lady Assaulted, 
Mutilated and Murdered” was about one such young white female named Ada Gross, who was 
from a respectable family in Arkansas. Gross’s body was found not far from her parents’ home 
“riddled with buckshot” and her face “hacked by a hatchet in a terrible manner.”437 Instead of 
waiting “for the slow process of the law,” friends and family members went after the accused 
and cut off his head, arms, and legs before burning him.438 Stories like this reinforced racial 
stereotypes of African Americans as primitive and hypersexual. It created terror in both white 
and black communities, and it helped to maintain white solidarity and dominance.439  
The “new wave of racial violence” emerged not during Reconstruction but in the 1890s 
as the number of lynchings surged.440  Terrorist mobs targeted Republicans, African Americans, 
drunkards, and wife beaters in effort to coerce community members into upholding their racial 
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and social values. Lynchings at the turn of the twentieth century had a “blatant connection” with 
race.441 Despite attempts to refute this by W.E.B. Du Bois and Ida B. Wells, the racialized view 
of African Americans as hypersexual and violent continued.442 People labored under the 
assumption, Wells argued, that white women would not consent to sex with black men, which 
meant any actual sexual interaction had to be rape. Miscegenation laws sprang up in larger 
numbers around the South in the postbellum period, declaring interracial sexual relations and 
interracial marriage illegal.443 Historian Peggy Pascoe argues, “Miscegenation law was… the 
foundation for the larger racial projects of white supremacy and white purity.”444 Miscegenation 
kept the races separate and declared that the mixing of white and black bloodlines was 
“unnatural.”445  
With these shifts, womanhood could no longer be extended to African-American women. 
Racial solidarity and the supposed protection of white womanhood required stereotyping blacks 
as bestial. Even white women who did consent to sex with black men faced ostracism and legal 
consequences. Historian Martha Hodes shows how some women falsely cried rape when their 
interracial liaisons were discovered. Their male partners, of course, were often met with violent 
reactions once the relationship became public. Ida B. Wells declared that white women were 
often wrongly “paraded as a victim of violence” to justify racial violence, and when some white 
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women refused to claim rape, they were “compelled by threats if not violence, to make the 
charge against the victim [their sexual partner].”446 The rhetoric of protecting white womanhood 
proved so strong that it cloaked racially motivated crimes against African Americans. Even when 
fabricated, claims of a black man raping a white woman incited white southerners and provided a 
socially acceptable excuse to lynch an African American. White women who had previously 
campaigned for protecting women regardless of race redefined womanhood as only white by the 
late 1890s. Despite Rebecca Felton’s prior pleas to extend womanhood tenuously to women of 
color, she gave a speech in 1897 that touched on the fear of black men’s supposedly aggressive 
sexuality. Felton cried, “If it needs lynching to protect woman’s dearest possession from the 
ravening beasts⎯then I say ‘lynch;’ a thousand times a week if necessary.”447 Black women, on 
the other hand, were left without legal or social protection from sexual assault. In January 1890, 
two white men from Georgia raped an African American teacher, Victoria Day. No one but 
Washington, D.C.’s The Washington Bee covered the story, and despite Day having reported it to 
the local authorities, the police did little about it.448 Black activist publications like The 
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Washington Bee and the Georgian Sentinel demanded justice from the governor of Georgia, but 
their demands fell on deaf ears. The rapists, despite being identified, never faced trial. 
Womanhood no longer incorporated African-American women, and any prior protections 
disappeared. 
 
Rolling Back Reform on Intimate-Partner Violence 
Race dominated most issues in the South by the 1890s, including intimate-partner 
violence. Many people believed intimate-partner violence could only be found in the black 
community because whites were so superior and civilized that they had eradicated the crime. 
Newspapers claimed intimate-partner violence was rampant in African-American households. 
South Carolina’s The State asked in one article “Is Wife Beating Still In Vogue?” The writer 
argued that since the subject “of negro farm hands… whip[ping] their wives… comes up for 
general conversation in a matter of fact way” only the black community faced this problem 
anymore.449 After all, The State went on to say, “there is yet a lot of semi-barbarity among these 
[African American] people.”450 Since intimate-partner violence was already known as a barbaric 
crime, intimate-partner violence provided an easy way to uphold white supremacy and regulate 
African Americans. Racial order rested, in part, on the arguments that whites and blacks were 
enormously different and whites were far more advanced. To deprive African Americans of 
political and civil rights granted under Reconstruction, a threat had to be present⎯ a threat of 
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being outnumbered by supposedly uncivilized beings. As one legislator in Virginia declared, “It 
was a question of self-preservation…a question of maintaining white civilization,” one in which 
a white man “never hesitated to vindicate the moral right of brave white men who should not be 
overwhelmed by an inferior race.”451 How could whites claim to be better if some male members 
of their race still engaged in the barbarity of wife beating? Politicians and newspapers 
endeavored to validate racial superiority by making intimate-partner violence a problem among 
African Americans alone.  
Articles suggesting the connection between the black community and intimate-partner 
violence appeared as early as the mid-1880s. One article stated that intimate-partner violence 
was “terribly on the increase among members of that [African American] race.”452 White men, 
the article intimated, did not engage in wife beating nearly as much. By the mid-1890s, 
newspaper descriptions shifted from calling black wife beaters “brutal” and “uncivilized” to 
using racialized descriptors, including “blood-thirsty Negro,” “bad nigger,” “bad Negro,” “the 
coon,” and “notorious hoodlum.”453 While negative portrayals of abusive husbands were 
common in newspapers during the 1870s and 1880s, the racist depictions of African-American 
abusers surged during the 1890s, coinciding with the rise of an oppressive racial order in the 
South that ran the gamut from racial violence to segregation to disenfranchisement. Gender no 
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longer outranked race in the court records. Rather, race took priority in almost every issue, 
including intimate-partner violence. 
While abuse still undoubtedly occurred in white marriages, the image presented indicated 
intimate-partner violence was rare among whites.454 Newspaper articles seldom mentioned the 
race in the title of the article, particularly if the abuser was white, but by the 1890s, a few 
headlines sprinkled the papers, stating “White Wife Beater.”455 One particular article told of Sam 
Bell, who beat his wife to the point she was expected to die from the abuse. Given the infrequent 
coverage for intimate-partner violence cases in white couples, the headline suggests the situation 
was considered rare. In 1904, another newspaper included the arrest of two white men who had 
abused their wives. The headline read “Alleged Wife Beaters Arrested on Warrants Sworn out by 
Wives - Said to Have Been Drunk.”456 This was one of the first to include the word “alleged” in 
front of the crime the men committed. Moreover, the men in this instance were charged with a 
lesser crime disturbing the peace rather than assault and battery, despite testimony showing they 
had beaten their wives and children. African-American abusers, on the other hand, were still 
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reported as “A Bad Wife Beater. Negro Convict Made an Assault on the Guard.”457 Now more 
than before, race mattered in the legal treatment of intimate-partner violence. 
Associating intimate-partner violence with African Americans also served as an excuse 
for white southerners to lynch black males. In 1893, the Idaho Daily Statesman article discussed 
a lynching of an African-American man and described it as southern “justice.” David (also 
known as Dave) Jackson supposedly committed the crime of wife beating in Abita Springs, 
Louisiana, and was summarily lynched. Once northern and western newspapers started 
publishing the incident as a racially motivated act, Covington citizens denied knowledge of the 
lynching. 458 Southern papers claimed no one even knew Jackson had been missing from the jail 
until October 18 (after the first reports of the lynching). Deputy Sheriff George Cook testified at 
the coroner’s inquest that he “knew nothing” about Jackson’s removal from jail.459 The lynching, 
they claimed, was mysterious. No one supposedly knew anything until Jackson’s body was 
found in the river. The coroner ruled the death a murder by persons unknown, and the case 
remained unsolved.  
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     458 Idaho Daily Statesman, (Boise, Idaho) October 13, 1893. Some of the other articles on the 
David Jackson lynching are as follows: “Southern States Items Of Interest Gleaned by the 
Picayune's Corps of Special Correspondents. Covington Enlivened,” The Daily Picayune (New 
Orleans, Louisiana) October 11, 1893; “Jackson Was Not Lynched, But His Career of Crime 
Will be Cut Short by a Term in the Penitentiary,” The Daily Picayune (New Orleans, Louisiana) 
October 13, 1893; “Thrown In The Tchefuncta [sic]. The Negro Dave Jackson Hanged by 
Unknown Parties,” The Daily Picayune (New Orleans, Louisiana) October 29, 1893; “Coroner’s 
Inquest on Dave Jackson’s Body. Cook’s Disappearance,“ The Daily Picayune (New Orleans, 
Louisiana) October 31, 1893. 
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In her 1895 publication “A Red Record,” noted anti-lynching activist Ida B. Wells 
referenced Dave Jackson’s murder. She titled the chapter “Lynched for Anything or Nothing” 
and said,  
In nearly all communities wife beating is punishable with a fine, and in no community is 
it made a felony. Dave Jackson, of Abita, La., was a colored man who had beaten his 
wife. He had not killed her, nor seriously wounded her, but as Louisiana lynchers had not 
filled out their quota of crimes, his case was deemed of sufficient importance to apply the 
method of that barbarous people.460  
 
Seeing through the claim of wife beating, Wells condemned southern society and its lynchings. 
She noted the reason for the lynching was not actually intimate-partner violence but rather racial 
animosity and an act of a “barbarous people.”461 Despite northern scrutiny from whites and 
blacks alike, locals vociferously denied any wrongdoing. Instead, they claimed Dave Jackson 
had been at fault for the crime of wife beating and “was a mean and notorious negro.”462 
The crime of intimate-partner violence was also used by whites to disenfranchise African 
American voters. Mississippi’s 1890 state constitution targeted crimes they believed specific to 
the black community, including theft, rape, bigamy, burglary, and wife-beating, and used these 
crimes to deny black men the right to vote.463 During the same year, South Carolina’s legislature 
passed a law that had the same effect as Mississippi’s new constitution.464 Intimate-partner 
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violence qualified as misdemeanor assault and battery, and believing it no longer an issue in the 
white community, Mississippi and South Carolina included it in list of crimes that excluded 
someone from the right to vote. A decade later, Alabama followed other southern states by using 
supposedly black crimes to disenfranchise African-American men. Some Alabama politicians 
wondered if that would be effective. John Burns infamously declared, “The crime of wife beating 
alone would disqualify sixty percent of the Negroes.”465 Legislator Knight agreed, commenting 
wife beating by itself “would settle the vexed question of negro suffrage” in Hale County.466 
Clearly, Burns, Knight, and other white politicians believed intimate-partner violence was so 
prevalent in the black community and could be used to eliminate the majority of black voters. 
Voting disqualifications based on intimate-partner violence, then, deliberately served as a means 
of enforcing white supremacy, and the legal system had an incentive to prosecute black abusers 
and not white ones.  
By the 1890s, southern courts responded by prosecuting white abusers as less frequently. 
The 1896 Annual Report of the Chief of Police of Columbus, Georgia, for instance, reported a 
hundred percent decrease in arrests for accounts of wife beating compared to the prior year.467 In 
Columbus, Georgia, then, no crimes of intimate-partner violence supposedly took place, which 
would be a radical change from the previous year. The Orleans Parish local courts show the same 
decline. Only nine out of the sample size of two hundred two intimate-partner violence cases 
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were brought to court during the 1890s (see Appendix). The Orleans Parish court cases illustrate 
a serious decline from the previous decade.  
 
Table 6.1 Intimate-Partner Violence Cases in Orleans Parish By Decade, 1870-1900 
Decade Total Number of Cases Percentage Change 
1870-1879 26 N/A 
1880-1889 165 +534.5% 
1890-1899 9 -94.5% 
 
Clearly, in Orleans Parish as in Columbus, Georgia, something generated a decline in the 
prosecution of intimate-partner violence lawsuits. Had legal intervention truly solved the 
problem within a decade or two? Were practically no men abusing their wives in the late 1890s? 
In a search of southern newspapers from 1890 to 1900, twenty-seven articles covering a court 
case involving intimate-partner violence mentioned the race of the abuser, which testifies at least 
to the fact that the problem still existed. Of those twenty-seven, twenty (seventy-four percent) of 
the perpetrators were African Americans.468 Moreover, in a court case to decide the 
constitutionality of jury selection and disenfranchisement practices in Mississippi, the 
Mississippi State Supreme Court in Ratliffe v. Beale argued,  
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By reason of its [African Americans’] previous condition of servitude and dependence, 
this race had acquired or accentuated certain peculiarities of habit, of temperament, and 
of character, which clearly distinguished it as a race from that of the whites—a patient, 
docile people, but careless, landless, and migratory within narrow limits, without 
forethought, and its criminal members given rather to furtive offenses than to the robust 
crimes of the whites.469 
 
African Americans, the court argued, were supposedly prone to petty crimes used in the new 
methods of disenfranchising black men. The list of misdemeanors that Mississippi, South 
Carolina, Alabama, and other southern states used as color blind methods to deprive African-
American men of the right to vote included, among other offenses such as rape and bigamy, the 
crime of “wife beating.”470 The courts, then, agreed with southern politicians and newspapers 
that intimate-partner violence was a problem in the black community. Given the solidification of 
the Democratic Party and the racial concerns in the decade, white supremacist views influenced 
legal intervention as well as social attitudes in intimate-partner violence. Racializing it as a black 
problem, concern over abuse dwindled except as another means to disempower African-
American men.  
Denying legal personhood of black men had implications for recognition of women as 
autonomous individuals in a marriage. Some southern states resurrected antebellum cases as 
precedents to deny women the right to be free from violence. The 1890 case of Commonwealth v. 
Sapp, for instance, rejected testimony of white women against their husbands in the majority of 
assault and battery cases. In Sapp, William Sapp sprinkled arsenic poison on a piece of 
watermelon in full view of his wife and then gave her the piece to eat. She filed charges against 
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him, but the only evidence the prosecution had was the wife’s testimony. The appeals court in 
Kentucky affirmed the right of privileged communication between husband and wife. Citing a 
legal scholar, the appeals court’s opinion declared, 
The great object of the rule is to secure domestic happiness, by placing the protecting seal 
of the law upon all confidential communications between husband and wife, and 
whatever has come to the knowledge of either by means of the hallowed confidence, 
which that relation inspires, cannot be afterwards divulged in testimony.471 
 
Marriage, the judges argued, required a veil of privacy. Sapp conceded only rare instances 
permitted a wife to testify against her husband, but this was not one of them.472 For precedent, 
they cited the 1852 State of North Carolina v. Hussey, which allowed wives to give witness 
against their husbands only if permanent injury occurred.473 Sapp influenced other cases by 
denying women the right to act as witness against their husband. This impacted even civil trials. 
Citing Sapp, Fightmaster v. Fightmaster (1901) ruled a wife as ineligible to stand trial against 
her husband in divorce cases that involved physical abuse.474 Often without any witnesses, wives 
found they were unable to press charges against abusive spouses and sometimes unable to obtain 
a divorce. By the turn of the twentieth century, some states not only stopped criminal 
prosecutions for intimate-partner violence but also ceased to grant divorces for physical abuse.475 
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Women could not testify against their husbands anymore after 1890. Turn-of-the-twentieth-
century courts in the South showed a regression from the legal intervention against intimate-
partner violence during the 1870s and 1880s.   
Popular literature of the time reflected the shift in intimate-partner violence. Few wrote 
about spousal abuse, and those who did, tended to do so indirectly. Unlike the majority of writers 
during the period, Alice Moore Dunbar-Nelson published a short story in 1890 that dealt directly 
with intimate-partner violence in the South. Despite her attention to female victimhood, she 
painted a terribly bleak picture for women who suffered from abuse. Published in 1899, The 
Goodness of St. Rocque, and Other Stories contained the short story “Tony’s Wife.” Set in New 
Orleans, Louisiana⎯ Dunbar-Nelson’s birthplace⎯the story centered around a working-class 
Italian/German couple. They owned a small shop on Prytania Street that sold everything from 
oysters to coal. Described as a “great, black-bearded, hoarse-voiced, six-foot specimen of Italian 
humanity,” the husband, Tony, treated his common law wife brutally.476 The wife remained 
nameless in the story, only called Mrs. Tony, and depicted as “meek, pale, little, ugly, and 
German” with “drawn in sleek, thin tightness away from a pinched, pitiful face, whose dull cold 
eyes hurt you, because you knew they were trying to mirror sorrow, and could not because of 
their expressionless quality.”477 Mrs. Tony worked doggedly during her relationship. She ran the 
store, dealt with customers, cleaned house, shucked oysters, and even made lace to sell to the 
locals for an additional income. The abuse was no secret, but despite widespread awareness, no 
one intervened to stop the abuse, not even Mrs. Tony’s mother. The young children upon 
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York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1899): 22. 
 




noticing the bruises only muttered, “Poor Mrs. Tony.”478 When her husband became sick, Mrs. 
Tony begged him to formalize their marriage to the priest, but he refused. Upon Tony’s death, 
his brother inherited the shop, including the money Mrs. Tony had made from her sewing. She 
was forced to leave the home and shop with nothing but “her bundle of clothes.”479 Despite 
having acted as an obedient wife and endured Tony’s abuse, Mrs. Tony received no protection 
from spousal abuse or poverty.  
In “Tony’s Wife,” Dunbar-Nelson illustrates the vulnerability not only of women in 
common law marriages but also immigrant women of lower socioeconomic classes. Mrs. Tony 
was at a disadvantage for not being legally married. Without the state’s recognition of her 
common law marriage, she inherited nothing, leaving her economically devastated. She also 
faced prejudice because of her working-class status and ethnicity. Despite New Orleans’s large 
immigrant population, discrimination against “non-whites”, particularly Italian, rose in a period 
when nativism dominated. Although Mrs. Tony was not African American, Dunbar-Nelson made 
clear her critique of racial and ethnic prejudice. Dunbar-Nelson also drew from other elements of 
her personal life. During her engagement to her first husband, the poet Paul Dunbar, Alice was 
raped by Dunbar.480 He continued to abuse her both verbally and physically after their 
marriage.481 She endured four years before separating in 1902, and only with Paul’s death did 
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she achieve her complete freedom from the abusive marriage. Arguably, her affluent status 
enabled her to secure a separate life from him, including another home, but Dunbar-Nelson could 
not dissolve her marriage because of changes in southern treatment of intimate partner violence. 
Like Mrs. Tony in the story, many southern women in the last decade of the nineteenth century 
lost social support and legal recourse for addressing abuse. The picture for women facing 
intimate-partner violence in the South became increasingly bleak after the 1890s. 
“Tony’s Wife” presented the reality experienced by many southern women by the end of 
the nineteenth century. As intimate-partner violence became racialized, all abused women 
suffered. Racialization of intimate-partner violence meant African American women received 
legal assistance only as a method of maintaining white, male power. Often intervention took 
place as an excuse to disenfranchise or lynch black men, and attention to African-American 
abusers helped whites to label people of color as barbaric and primitive. Women fortunate 
enough to have money could seek separate room and board and perhaps (if married) a full 
divorce, but they were denied any other civil and criminal action. The shift impacted white 
women as well.  
Racializing intimate-partner violence meant people had to deny the real presence of 
violence among white couples. After all, southerners claimed, intimate-partner violence had been 
eradicated in the white community, so what need was there to raise awareness or legal resources 
for white women? In instances where white men were found to be excessively violent, courts 
funneled such cases to Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and family courts, 
which prioritized family stability above fixing the problem of intimate-partner violence.482 
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Intervention became unnecessary in white couples since, one newspaper claimed, intimate-
partner violence was a “rare crime” and women resented interference given “the fact that the 
women whipped by their husbands seem to enjoy it.”483 Socially and politically, white men 
benefitted, and their dominance was secured for another few decades. Women, regardless of race 
or socioeconomic classes, lost. On the most intimate level, women remained vulnerable to the 
dynamics of power, concentrated in the hands of men, until the Women’s Liberation Movement 
of the 1970s. For several decades, the veil of privacy would protect the white southern male 















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





THE DECLINE OF INTIMATE-PARTNER INTERVENTION IN THE NORTH 
 
Mr. and Mrs. W were 36 and 32 years of age, respectively, when they became known to 
the organization. They had been married 14 years at the time and had four children…The 
wife complained that her husband was abusive, had a very hot temper, and a venereal 
disease. Mr. W countered with the accusations that his wife was immoral and a bad 
housekeeper. ⎯Chicago caseworker from case no.1517 (1926)484 
 
To address the W’s marital problems, the Court of Domestic Relations sent social 
workers to the house to interview, assess, and provide a solution that would make the marriage 
more stable. The caseworker spoke to both parties, noting each spouse’s issue with the other, and 
found that the couple had “gotten into the habit of quarrelling.”485 The counselor implemented a 
course of treatment, which involved sending a visiting housekeeper to instruct the wife in home 
economics. No attempt was made to address the well-documented anger problems of the 
husband. Instead, the caseworker argued, abuse was only a symptom of a larger issue, for which 
the woman held accountability and had to change.  
The case of the W’s illustrates the new intervention in intimate-partner violence. At the 
turn of the twentieth century, Progressives believed experts in individual fields knew the most 
effective solutions to the problems American society faced, and these professional authorities 
increasingly provided new policies for a host of social ills. As expertise mattered, science drew 
renewed attention and grew in specializations, such as psychology and social work. Institutions 
such as the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty of Children (SPCC) began staffing social 
workers and adopting their scientific methods for intervening in the family. Courts also relied on 
psychologists and social workers to fix the problems in marriages thereby effectively transferring 
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intimate-partner violence from the authority of the courts to the realm of science. Family 
counselors during the period, instead of holding the abuser accountable, looked to the individuals 
in the marriage to find internal conflict that manifested itself in violence. For the W’s, treatment 
took the form of teaching the wife how to be a better housekeeper. The caseworker provided no 
counseling to the husband for being abusive since trends in psychology viewed the violent 
behavior as a symptom and not worth addressing. This meant the victim of intimate-partner 
violence faced anything from psychotherapy to instruction on sexual hygiene⎯  all aimed at 
changing the woman. 
 
The Field of Science and Views of Gender 
The ideological trend in psychology and social work during the turn of the twentieth 
century tended to view gender expectations very conservatively. Experts in science increasingly 
vocalized their dislike of general changes between the sexes as advocated in the Suffrage 
Movement and the National Women’s Party (NWP). Granting women’s right to vote, in 
particular, drew the ire of some experts. American biologist Dr. William T. Sedgwick 
pronounced “feminist propaganda” of suffragists as the “best example of biological bosh.”486 
Sedgewick and other anti-suffragists, such as W.L. George, argued the equality of the sexes 
denied the “natural” biological principle in which the male asserted dominance over the female. 
Moreover, they claimed, such “revolutionary” ideas “would mean degeneration and degradation 
of the human fibre,” including “total destruction of wifehood and the home.”487 If women 
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continued to demand change, they argued, society would suffer. Women voting would upset the 
“natural” balance of power between the sexes and bring chaos to society by destroying the most 
basic social unit⎯ the family. To biologists and others in the medical and scientific profession, 
nature dictated the relationship between men and women. The home supposedly needed a 
dominant male. 
Natural law and the resistance to the modern woman formed the basis for many scientific 
arguments on the roles of the sexes. Another doctor, Abraham Myerson, stated in his 1920 book, 
The Nervous Housewife: “The husband differs from the wife in this fundamental, that essentially 
he is not a house man as she is a house woman.”488 The book discussed women suffering from 
physical and mental complaints that resulted from different neuroses. Myerson found several 
reasons for female disorders with most caused by the tension over modernity. He also found the 
strain over women adopting “manly” behaviors and dress⎯a concept he called feminism⎯to be 
a common problem that led to a multitude of diseases that harmed marriages. Myerson resolved 
the solution to marital problems saying, 
If only one will is expected to be dominant in the household, the man's, then there can 
arise no conflict. If the form of the household is unaltered, but if the woman demands its 
control or expects equality, then conflict arises. If a woman expects a man to beat her at 
his pleasure, as has everywhere been the case and still is in some places, if she considers 
it just, brutality exists only in extremes of violence. If she considers a blow, or even a 
rough word, an unendurable insult, then brutality arises with the commonest 
disagreement. In other words, it is comparatively easy to deal with a woman expecting an 
inferior position…it is very much more difficult to deal with her modern sister.489  
 
To Myerson, abuse was a relative term that only younger women of the modern 
generation identified as a problem. If women accepted “natural” gender roles, then domestic 
harmony would reign. Although he did not advocate spousal abuse as pointedly as others did, 
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Myerson weakened anti-intimate-partner violence arguments by claiming recent changes in 
women’s expectations created the problem, not the abuse itself.   
Some extended the rationale of the law of nature and argued male domination in the 
home meant resurrecting and protecting the male privilege of chastisement. In 1913, Dr. William 
F. Waugh, Dean of Bennett Medical College and chief surgeon of the Jefferson Park Hospital in 
Chicago, declared “wife beating as a wholesome and proper discipline.”490 Like George and 
Sedgewick, Waugh believed marriage rested on “natural” biological differences between the 
sexes. Once married, Waugh advised, “rule her… When she awakens your jealousy, beat her; she 
needs it.”491 For Waugh, fear and power rested as the cornerstones of every good marriage. If a 
wife feared her husband, she would be devoted and the marriage would be a success (defined as 
stability, not harmony). Women in marriage, to these experts, did not need protection or legal 
recognition as autonomous individuals because doing so would compromise the husband’s 
position and thereby the marriage itself. Abuse, then, served as a method to maintain a 
supposedly good marriage based on natural law.  
Other articles at the turn of the twentieth century also tapped into the scientific 
community’s fascination with masculinity and men’s primitive roots; these specialists sought to 
redefine gender expectations based on male dominance and female obedience. American 
psychologist G. Stanley Hall and others in the profession like Waugh believed industrialization 
and civilization placed manhood in danger. Men became sick and developed nervous diseases, 
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such as neurasthenia, from becoming too civilized and consequently too effeminate. To recapture 
their masculinity, Stanley advised men to embrace their primitive heritage during childhood and 
emerge as an adult with a defined, aggressive masculinity.492 Waugh agreed stating, “There is a 
constantly thickening coat of varnish of civilization formed over the man and the woman, but 
underneath it they are identical with the cave man and the cave woman, unchanged at heart.”493 
Men and women were ultimately, Waugh argued, no different from cave dwellers from centuries 
ago, and for their own mental health, they should accept their primitive instincts and this 
“natural” order of society. This included men’s privilege of chastisement since spousal abuse 
was, Waugh declared, “natural.” His argument and medical authority helped to gain acceptance 
for curtailing anti-intimate partner violence efforts by supporting conservative gender 
expectations and placing wife beating beyond the scope of the law. At the root of rolling back 
reform were experts utilizing their professional authority to redefine gender expectations yet 
again. Although such medical and scientific views facilitated the retreat from intervening in 
instances of wife beating and punishing the abuser, the real damage to anti-intimate-partner 
violence efforts came with the alliance between the medical profession and the family courts. 
 
The Growth of Psychology and Social Work 
Psychology and psychotherapy gained momentum in Europe during the mid to late 
1800s, but the United States did not develop the scientific specialization until closer to the turn 
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of the twentieth century.494 Shaped in large part by the advocate for aggressive 
masculinity⎯Stanley G. Hall⎯Americans created clinics, medical literature, and professional 
degree programs for psychology in the 1880s. Hall also founded the American Psychological 
Association in 1892, and served as the first president to further promote interests of 
psychologists and to consolidate professional authority. Influenced by Sigmund Freud’s work, 
some American practitioners decided to create the Journal of Abnormal Psychology in 1906, 
which was dedicated exclusively to Freud’s theories and psychoanalytic methods. The popularity 
of psychoanalysis led many professionals to fear non-medical laypersons would practice the art, 
decreasing the medical authority and respect of the rising field. To keep professional authority 
exclusive to psychologists, the American Psychoanalytic Association (APA) was created in 
1910. The APA quickly issued training requirements and guidelines for the emerging specialty, 
and psychology and psychotherapy gained considerable influence in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century.  
Social work, closely related to the growing field of psychology, blended reformers’ goals 
with psychology. Social work initially sought “to bring about social reconstruction…[with] the 
family as its unit.”495 The individual mattered as much as the person could be brought to “the 
best adaptation within the present social order.”496 The treatment social workers in the early 
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1900s applied, then, revolved around the family and family stability, since Dr. Ernest Mowrer 
and Harriet Mowrer argued, family was “an asset to social organization and well-being.”497 
Originating in 1898, universities offered more and more classes on helping children and the 
family through home visits until 1904 when it was made into a formal field with a graduate level 
degree. With its newly formed expertise in marriages, social work, along with psychology, 
dominated new solutions for intimate-partner violence.  
The fields grew so rapidly that specialized clinics, such as family therapy and marriage 
counseling, started appearing as early as the 1910s and 1920s. To solve issues, whether they 
were personal discontent or social problems, these specialists used a counseling method that 
taught people to reflect on inner conflicts. Even victims of violence were told to find suppressed 
desires, usually sexual, and come to terms with them. Typically, suggestions for personal change 
accompanied the treatment, which sent abused women on a host of personal makeovers to please 
their husbands. None sought to punish the abuser. Mental healthcare workers wanted to 
reconstruct the family instead by having individuals examine themselves and see how they could 
change in order to better the relationship. Success, Dr. Ernest Mowrer and Harriet Mowrer 
agreed, resulted when the individual had met “conformity of overt behavior to the dictates of the 
group.”498 Essentially, a stable family mattered more than individual needs.  
 
Declining Assistance in Institutions 
In part, the Progressive Era’s movement to fix social problems through the use of the 
government and experts enabled further growth of such agencies as the SPCC, but by the second 
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decade of the twentieth century, organizations adopted scientific experts’ advice to uphold 
conservative gender expectations. Consequently, the SPCCs shifted their focus from “cruelty to 
that of prevention.”499 Physical violence, then, took a back seat on finding the factors that 
supposedly created abuse in the first place, such as poverty and more egalitarian relationships 
between the sexes. In doing so, they signified not only a change in approach but also a change in 
the scientific experts’ views on gender, family, and violence, particularly intimate-partner 
violence.  
By 1912, the SPCC organizations expanded their definition of child abuse to include 
physical neglect and believed physical abuse to be a less significant issue. The Beverly Branch of 
the Massachusetts SPCC declared in the 1912 annual report, “As in other years and other 
districts we have both moral and physical neglect and a few instances of old-fashioned 
cruelty.”500 With “few instances of old-fashioned cruelty,” physical abuse, they argued, was no 
longer as pressing as neglect.501 The annual overview went on to stress the change, stating, 
“Throughout the district the major part of the work deals either directly or indirectly with cases 
of neglect of children, as no doubt it will until society has found a way to remove conditions 
which create the neglect problem.”502 By 1916, neglect ranked the second most frequent factor 
cited for Massachusetts SPCC intervention after temperance and abuse third.503 Neglect occurred 
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in forty-four percent of the cases that year and abuse (physical cruelty) only six percent.504 By 
1917, the Massachusetts SPCC noted, “The principle concern of the Society is with neglected 
children.”505 Ranking the issues to combat in the community, the 1917 annual report mention 
neglect, followed by poor health care, “sex immoralities,” “use of drugs,” child support, children 
with special needs, bastardy, and lastly, physical abuse.506 Neglect, not abuse, began to be the 
new focus.  
Along with the shift from abuse to neglect, the SPCC began staffing social workers for 
their organizations, which resulted in an analysis of why individuals did what they did and how it 
could be prevented in the future. Prevention no longer pointed at the abuser but sought to address 
social conditions that supposedly caused the problem. Solutions ranged from “interest of a 
friendly visitor, the influence of the church, a latent love of children, fear of prosecution and 
sometimes the actual prosecution itself.”507 Jail time and removal of the abused wife or child, 
however, was not thought to be the best method to solve the problem of intimate-partner 
violence. The Massachusetts SPCC prided itself in reducing the number of cases that went to 
court from one in four cases in the early 1900s to only one out of six cases in 1920.508 These 
cases resulted in legal action primarily for child support rather than assault and battery. Viewing 
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child neglect as preventable, the Massachusetts SPCC decided they had “not been interested 
principally in the punishment of the offender, but in the reshaping of the ideals of the family and 
the conditions under which the children lived, so that the family and home might be saved for the 
child whenever possible.”509 This meant serious changes to how the abuser was dealt with as 
well as how the abuser was viewed. 
As the goals changed in SPCCs, other reform organizations, such as the WCTU, also 
reworked their approaches in a way that reduced the focus on intimate-partner violence in the 
early 1900s. Temperance laws, the WCTU continued to argue, were effective in combatting 
crime, including intimate-partner violence. A 1908 study of Kansas City claimed “gambling 
[decreased] seventeen percent, burglary and grand larceny [decreased] thirty three percent, 
vagrancy [decreased] forty percent, [and] wife beating [decreased] seventy percent” in a year’s 
time because of local prohibition laws.510 The objective, then, in banning the sale of alcohol 
remained the central focus of temperance organizations. The WCTU, however, changed its 
tactics. By the turn of the twentieth century, the WCTU virtually abandoned its campaign against 
the image of a brutish, alcoholic husband, which had long helped raise social awareness to both 
problems with alcohol and intimate-partner violence. Instead, the WCTU argued alcoholism was 
now understood as a sickness and the consequence of economic conditions.511 The temperance 
movement’s primary goal of banning alcohol would help alcoholics from engaging in a host of 
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vices, such as wife beating or gambling. But, instead of addressing intimate-partner violence as 
the WCTU had in the past, the solution then became a preventative measure through the attack 
on poverty.  
Social workers agreed with the WCTU’s new views on alcohol. By 1917, SPCCs worked 
alongside temperance organizations and argued more hospitals for inebriates were needed in 
order to “deter and cure” those with drinking problems, not jail time.512 Poverty too became a 
new objective to prevent child neglect. A collection of cases, Darkness and Daylight, discussed 
Helen Campbell and Colonel Thomas W. Knox’s experiences serving the poor in New York 
City. Their descriptions of the cases illustrate the changing mentality towards abuse in the wake 
of the new scientific field of social work. They focused on the tenement house itself as if it, by 
its physical existence, brought about social problems. Inside tenement districts “squalid misery 
abounds on every hand…Ignorant, weary, and complaining wives, cross and hungry husbands, 
wild and ungoverned children, are continually at war with each other.”513 At one point in the 
narrative, the authors described a husband attacking his wife. The couple’s argument escalated 
from shouts and verbal insults to throwing furniture. Campbell and Knox described the man’s 
“raging cry of demoniac passion” as a “wild beast rage.”514 After yelling for a while, the husband 
proceeded to beat his wife, and despite witnesses, including the authors and the downstairs 
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neighbors, “no one went to her.”515 After all, Campbell and Knox claimed, “the house was well 
used to such demonstration.”516 Tenement housing districts, to those like Campbell and Knox, 
bred sin and vice. Reformers viewed the living conditions of “lower” socioeconomic classes with 
disdain, believing those conditions created alcoholism, abuse, crime, and disease.  
Collectively, organizations altered their view on the role of abuse in society. Other 
factors, which served to prevent social ills, became the focus. As a result, intimate-partner 
violence dwindled in reform organizations’ priorities, and women lost resources that they had 
utilized in the past. As institutions rolled back their reform in intimate-partner violence, the 
influence of scientific experts reached to the state, and the legal system again changed its policies 
towards abused women. 
 
Rolling Back Legal Reform  
In 1910, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the role of experts by removing 
intimate-partner violence from the domain of courts to reaffirm the sanctity of family. Jessie 
Thompson sued her husband, Charles, in Washington, D.C.’s civil court, attempting to collect 
$70,000 in damages for assault and battery when she was pregnant. Despite undeniable proof of 
abuse, Jessie lost the case. Wives of the time generally did not succeed in torts against their 
spouses, but the Supreme Court’s ruling went beyond denying Jessie the right to collect money 
for damages caused by her husband. Many states passed legislation allowing married women to 
contract business separately, provide testimony against their husbands in felony cases, and hold 
possessions as individuals. These laws permitted women some level of economic and legal 
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autonomy, but in the 1910 Thompson case, the justices declared “At the common law the 
husband and wife were regarded as one. The legal existence of the wife during coverture being 
merged in that of the husband.”517  
All the late nineteenth-century changes towards legal autonomy of a married woman did 
not, according to the Thompson decision, include the right to sue her own husband, even if she 
suffered permanent damage. The Supreme Court argued the right of a wife to sue her husband 
would set a “radical” precedent and lead to “destruction by the statute of the unity of the married 
relation.”518 Essentially, such a legal right would destroy the institution of marriage. Moreover, 
the Chief Justice claimed, it would “open the doors of the courts to accusations of all sorts of one 
spouse against the other and bring into public notice” domestic issues.519 With Thompson, the 
highest court in the country reaffirmed the privacy of family and set back decades of work in 
combating intimate-partner and family violence. The Supreme Court categorized intimate-
partner violence as a private issue and beyond the scope of the criminal and civil court system. 
Allowing the public into a couple’s relationship, the Thompson decision stated, to promote “the 
public welfare and domestic harmony is at least a debatable question.”520 The statement 
insinuated marital peace could best be achieved by protecting family stability through protecting 
privacy, which hindered the ability to hold abusers accountable. Legal reform regressed, and 
after four decades, the veil of privacy fell back over the family. 
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Heavily cited in the years following, Thompson established a legal precedent for rolling 
back the wave of marital violence reform.521 The same year as Thompson, the state of Minnesota 
heard a similar case in which a wife attempted to sue her husband for damages. In Drake v. 
Drake, Minnesota’s courts decided against both the husband and wife’s claims. The husband 
sought to enjoin his wife for “nagging” him, but the Minnesota court found the examples vague 
and without legal basis.522 The wife countered that her husband was a habitual abuser and the 
level of violence entitled her to a divorce. The court dismissed her as well, claiming nagging and 
intimate-partner violence were “matters of no serious moment” because if only the couple slept 
on it, the events “would silently be forgiven or forgotten.”523 The court declared the public had 
no right to intervene in their supposedly petty problems and that the woman, despite recent 
legislation granting her economic rights, was subsumed under her husband’s identity according 
to the common-law definition of coverture. Drake, like Thompson, confirmed spousal immunity 
from torts, the common law definition of married women as coverture, and the privacy of family, 
but Drake also reduced wife beating to “trivial family disagreements.”524 Serving as a legal 
affirmation to social attitudes, Thompson and Drake illustrated American interest in addressing 
intimate-partner violence had officially ended. 
Even as the criminal and civil court system declined to address intimate-partner violence, 
abuse still posed a threat to the stability of the family unit, and as a result, many states created a 
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new type of court to deal specifically with issues relating to the family and give experts the 
power to solve the various problems categorized as marital discord. The first family court 
emerged in Buffalo, New York, to deal with a wider range of family problems, and they grew in 
number so that by the late 1920s much of the country had at least one family court in each 
state.525 Family courts primarily sought, as historian Elizabeth Pleck observes, to “preserve the 
family, act in the best interest of the child, and offer a curative rather than punitive approach to 
family problems.”526 
Despite the Chief Justice’s claims in Thompson that women could seek divorce in civil 
courts, the creation of family courts aided the retreat from addressing intimate-partner violence 
even there. The new courts actually decriminalized violence between family members. After all, 
Progressives believed family violence was caused by preventable conditions, such as poverty. 
Abuse, then, was not a focus or real issue of the new courts. Increasingly, they started to rely 
upon the professionals in science and medicine, who influenced the discussion on spousal abuse 
by asserting their expertise. Some criminal courts more explicitly denied the right of anyone to 
interfere by the first decade of the twentieth century, but when most courts began referring cases 
of intimate-partner violence to family courts, the impact was the same.527 Intimate-partner 
violence became sidelined as a lesser issue or result of poverty and immorality.  
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Family courts utilized these new social and mental healthcare workers and their methods, 
often assigning newly trained psychologists and social workers to handle cases. Abuse rated as 
the highest reason for court mandated psychological therapy in the 1920s.528 Psychologists, 
however, did not seek to treat the abuse but rather sought to uncover a reason for conflict. In 
their analyses, Sigmund Freud’s views on subconscious desires and repressed sexual urges 
influenced treatment for marital discord. Professionals pointed to sexual adjustment and loose 
gender roles as the two most frequent underlying problems for intimate-partner violence. The 
solution, then, was to teach women to be obedient and dutiful wives. 
One Chicago case sent for therapy involved a Mr. and Mrs. “A,” who had been married 
for eleven years. After their sixth child, Mrs. A left her husband and returned to live with her 
parents, claiming Mr. A was abusive. She told the caseworker that she believed returning to her 
husband “would only mean more children for whom they cannot provide adequately.”529 To 
solve the problem, the caseworker provided the wife with birth control and sexual hygiene 
information. No attempt to counsel the husband was made. To the courts and psychologists, the 
solution lay not with stopping the violent husband from abusing his partner but with the wife’s 
ability to limit the family size and keep her genitals clean enough to meet her husband’s 
olfactory and sexual desires. She had to change, and the family had to be maintained.  
Even in cases with chronic alcoholism and physical abuse, social workers placed higher 
value on family stability (keeping a marriage intact) than stopping the violence. In the case of 
Mr. and Mrs. G, therapists worked with the couple for over fifteen years. Mrs. G complained her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  528 The Mowrer sample focused on data from the United Charities of Chicago and the Jewish 
Social Service Bureau of Chicago. Abuse topped the list of diagnostic factors with 41% of all 
cases. See Ernest Mowrer and Harriet R. Mowrer, Domestic Discord: Its Analysis and 
Treatment, (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1928): 40. 
	  
     529 Ibid., 152.  
	  
202 
husband was an alcoholic and abusive, and Mr. G countered that his wife was immoral and a bad 
housekeeper. Mr. G’s problem with alcohol was well documented as he had spent time in the 
Chicago Psychopathic Hospital for drunkenness, always discharged as cured. Mrs. G showed her 
bruises as evidence of physical violence, but the husband continued to deny any abuse. The 
caseworkers attempted to affect change when they “tried to arouse his pride in the fact that he 
was not drinking now and there was no excuse for his being brutal.”530 Here the caseworkers 
directly commented on his violent behavior (a tactic typically avoided), hoping that by praising 
him for not drinking, he would stop getting intoxicated and thereby solve the secondary issues. 
They failed. Mr. G was forced by the local criminal court into the Elgin Hospital for the Insane a 
few days later for being an “alcoholic in a deteriorating condition.”531 After his stay in Elgin, the 
caseworkers tried to force a reconciliation to repair the family. They urged the wife “to try and 
make a home now for Mr. G and the children, to live peacefully and train her children 
properly.”532 Despite repeated refusals, the psychologists pleaded and finally made Mrs. G 
accede to their requests. The caseworkers closed the case, and they felt satisfied that despite 
continued conflict the couple still lived together.  
As shown in this case, social workers, like temperance advocates in the early 1900s, 
viewed alcoholism as a sickness in need of addressing. Mr. G needed medical attention, even if 
he had to be coerced to go to a hospital for treatment of alcoholism. The other problems would 
fix themselves by correction of the primary issue. Nowhere in the caseworker’s notes did the 
woman’s right to be free from violence factor into the course of treatment. Even with a long 
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history of alcoholism and physical abuse, the caseworkers insisted the wife continue to live with 
her husband and preserve the marriage. Maintaining the most basic social unit superseded any 
violation of a woman’s right. 
In another long-term case, the courts and social workers followed a Mr. and Mrs. B for 
eleven years, trying to keep the couple together. The husband and wife found themselves in the 
Chicago family court after being denied a legal separation. Like many of the other cases, the wife 
claimed the husband abused her and had a violent temper, and the husband accused his wife of 
bad housekeeping and nagging. The caseworkers visited the home and found the house “in a 
terrible condition, the bed was unmade, everything was dusty and dirty, and the children were 
dirty and half-dressed.”533 Mrs. B asked for help to leave her husband since the abuse and 
conflict was too much for her to endure anymore. The caseworkers refused. Instead of helping a 
victim of abuse, they found the party at fault to be the wife. The caseworkers called her selfish 
and jealous. They told her she nagged her husband too much and needed to “realize her 
responsibility as a wife and mother” by having her husband’s meals on time and by learning 
good housekeeping “if she wishes to command the respect of her husband.”534 Here, as in the 
other cases, the medical profession wielded authority to shape public policy and ensure the 
family remained together. This new goal directed intervention, and women found the courts less 
capable of providing a real solution. No longer did legal intervention provide assistance for a 
separation, for criminal punishment or counseling of the abuser. In social workers’ and the new 
family courts’ view, intimate-partner violence mattered less than preservation of the marriage.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     533 Ibid., 169.  
 




The new trend in medicine and the law also took responsibility away from the abuser and 
redirected blame towards the wife. Victim blaming pointed to a larger issue. If the legal, medical, 
and social resources for abused women did not seek to solve the problem, then what purpose did 
they serve? By the 1920s, they effectively acted as a method of controlling gender expectations 
and dynamics in marriage. Many men resented changes in women’s roles from increased 
participation in the work force to demands for the right to vote, and punishing wife beaters 
chipped away at what had been for centuries a male privilege. Rolling back the reform to end 
spousal abuse helped, in some way, to re-solidify male authority in the home. At the very least, 
men were not being demonized or punished for their violence, which reaffirmed a basic level of 
power over their female partners. Mental professionals and legal officials further upheld 
conservative gender expectations by training women on the standards of good housekeeping and 
submissiveness.535 Reclaiming an aggressive, powerful masculinity effectively eroded some 
gains women made in the late 1800s, particularly the right to be free from violence. 
In the late 1800s, the North possessed multiple different resources for abused women. 
Like the South in the 1870s and 1880s, criminal courts charged abusive men with assault and 
battery or with the specific crime of wife beating, many major cities possessed Progressive 
organizations that could offer additional help, such as the SPCCs. Chicago even established a 
shelter for battered women called the Woman’s Club. Arguably, Progressive agencies, like the 
SPCC, offered qualified help, and while the effectiveness could be debated, they offered some 
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sort of assistance, treating the abuser as a brute that forfeited his rights as a man.536 Society 
viewed wife beaters as a social pariah, deserving everything from a whipping to jail time, and the 
victims as deserving aid through a separation or treatment to make their partners stop the abuse. 
The movement enabled women some recourse for intimate-partner violence at least until the 
early 1900s. 
By the first decade of the twentieth century, scientific experts directed new public 
policies that dealt with family violence. Wielding influence to impact intimate-partner violence 
either positively or negatively. Influential experts contested gender expectations again, claiming 
natural law required men to be the dominant ones and women to be submissive. Violence in a 
marriage, some argued, became but a method of control and was again the male privilege of 
chastisement rather than a violation of a woman’s right to be free from violence. The criminal 
and civil courts resurrected the concept of family privacy and relegated intimate-partner violence 
to the family courts, psychologists, and social workers.  
Family courts and the medical profession helped to establish a new method to “treating” 
intimate-partner violence. Abusers no longer were the focus, but rather victims came under 
scrutiny. In court-mandated therapy, mental health professionals examined the intra-psychic 
tensions of the individual. After all, Mowrer claimed, domestic conflict came from 
“disorganization of the personality [and] leads to greater emphasis upon the persona 
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development and social experiences” of the couple.537 Often, however, the only partner who 
attended counseling sessions was the wife, which meant treatment revolved around changing her. 
These women, they claimed, needed to become good housekeepers and sexually available to 
their husbands, and so counselors led wives down a long, never-ending path of self-excavation, 
asking what she could change to make the marriage better. In doing so, the North co-opted 
efforts to end intimate-partner violence and kept real reform for abused women from happening 
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GENDER AND INTIMATE-PARTNER VIOLENCE 
 
Between 1865 and 1920, men and women continued to contest the definition of 
womanhood. How did society expect a woman to behave? What rights did a woman have? How 
would power be distributed in a woman’s relationship with a man? These questions yielded 
different answers over the course of fifty-five years as competing images of manhood and 
womanhood clashed. These varying gender expectations that dominated across the decades 
influenced the socio-legal response to intimate-partner violence and abused women. 
During the Civil War, men and women’s experiences tested their assumptions on gender 
expectations. Men in battle questioned the ideal of manhood and dying the good death. Others 
lost control of restraint and “delight[ed] in killing.”538 War tested the ability to act civilized and 
yet fight to protect one’s country and family. Once home, these men struggled to adapt to civilian 
life, particularly those who suffered amputations or shell-shock syndrome. Civilians stared at 
amputees as a spectacle, and men with shell-shock faced a society largely unaware and not 
accepting of the disorder.539 The unstable postwar economy provided more difficulties for 
veterans, and these men who suffered physical or mental injuries faced a harder time of finding a 
job and providing for their families.  
For women, the war brought different experiences that challenged the antebellum notion 
of womanhood. Many women stepped out of the home and served as nurses. Nursing brought 
close contact with the horrors of war, but so did staying on the homefront. With so many men 
fighting in the war, women frequently took over positions men held whether working in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  538 Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008): 37. 
	  	  
     539 Frances M. Clarke, War Stories: Suffering and Sacrifice in the Civil War North, (Chicago: 




munitions factory, running a plantation, or managing the household affairs. In the war torn 
South, women faced occupying Union soldiers and more severe economic hardship. Regardless 
of the location, women realized the drawbacks to complete dependence on men and emerged 
from the war with awareness of the drawbacks of antebellum gender expectations.540 
After the war, women renegotiated gender expectations to allow for a more reciprocal 
relationship between the sexes. Men remained the dominant sex, but this dominance came with 
limitations. Women possessed “the inalienable right [to] dignity and respect.”541 Part of right 
included the end to intimate-partner violence. Women expected men to recognize their right to 
be free from violence. Whether courting, engaged, common law married, or legally married, 
many women rejected the antebellum male privilege of chastisement. Some physically fought 
back.542 Others turned to family and neighbors to uphold their right to be free from violence. 
Family members and the community responded by intervening in abusive relationships. 
While intervention by family primarily took place in the home, the expanding number of public 
spaces in the postbellum period enabled the community to intervene. Crowds gathered, and some 
helped to remove women from the abusive situation.543 Many risked their own well-being in a 
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determined effort to stop the violence.544 Other times, crowds gathered and threatened to 
physically harm the abuser if he continued to act violently towards his wife.545 Community 
intervention, moreover, showed how cross-racial alliances sometimes formed over the issue of 
intimate-partner violence.546 Overall, the level of extralegal intervention testified to an American 
society internalizing a woman’s right to be free from violence. 
The next level of intervention came from institutions. In the last few decades of the 
nineteenth century, American underwent a “search for order” and looked to perfect society 
through bureaucratic means.547 Organizations formed to address the problems in society. One of 
the social ills these groups attempted to solve was intimate-partner violence. The WCTU helped 
raise social awareness for intimate-partner violence by creating the powerful link between 
alcohol and abuse. Alcohol made men brutes, the WCTU argued, who went home and beat their 
innocent wives and children.548 Through newspapers, the media reiterated the message of 
abusive men as brutes.549 Intimate-partner violence became a public problem with a public policy 
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necessary to address it. The National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), led by Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton, and later the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) lobbied 
local governments to loosen divorce laws so that women in abusive marriages could escape. The 
success varied across the states, but many civil courts began recognizing physical and mental 
cruelty as a legitimate reason for legal separations and full divorces.550 Societies for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children, although formed to end child abuse, provided services to 
abused women as well. They fought for rights of dependents and legal protection. Collectively, 
these institutions pressured the state to act.  
With the 1871 precedent setting case Fulgham v. the State of Alabama, the legal system 
responded through jurisprudence.551 Few states passed laws criminalizing intimate-partner 
violence specifically. Instead, judges reinterpreted gender-neutral language in assault and battery 
statutes to prosecute abusive men. Through case law, intimate-partner violence became a crime, 
and the courts recognized women’s right as autonomous individuals to be free from violence. 
Gender expectations, then, influenced the law. Judges no longer viewed women as completely 
civilly dead upon marriage. While the personhood of women was not fully recognized in the 
postbellum decades, the law acknowledged women as autonomous individuals, who had the 
constitutional right as human beings not to be beaten. The new interpretation of criminal law was 
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not an empty threat since ninety-two percent of intimate-partner violence cases considered in this 
study resulted in a conviction.552 
By the 1890s, however, the South pulled back from addressing the problem of intimate-
partner violence. Southern white Democrats campaigned on white supremacy and made race the 
central focus of southern society. As Democrats increasingly took political positions (through 
legal elections, through fraud, or with violence), politicians denied African-American men rights 
through supposedly color blind laws. Since intimate-partner violence had already been associated 
with being uncivilized and brutish, white southerners increasingly associated wife beating with 
the black community. Politicians, then, used intimate-partner violence as a means of 
disqualifying a voter because, Alabama legislator John Burns declared, “The crime of wife 
beating alone would disqualify sixty percent of the Negroes.”553 Disenfranchisement for the 
misdemeanor of intimate-partner violence, then, deliberately served as a means of enforcing 
white supremacy. By the 1890s, prosecutions fell as the South lost interest in the problem of 
intimate-partner violence and became obsessed with legalizing an oppressive racial order for 
African Americans.554 
The North held onto concern for intimate-partner violence a little longer, but with the rise 
of experts by the early 1900s, northern states rolled back reform. People continually contested 
gender expectations in the postbellum decade. Many scientists at the turn of the twentieth 
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century argued women were naturally inferior and needed (if not wanted) to be dominated by 
men.555 This, some stated, included the need for physical coercion. If women wanted to avoid 
being beaten, then, psychologists and social workers urged, women needed to examine their 
personal issues and learn how to be an ideal wife for her husband. In the 1910 landmark case, 
Thompson v. Thompson, the U.S. Supreme Court relegated intimate-partner violence to the 
domain of professionals. “Domestic harmony” through recognizing privacy of the family meant 
no more addressing the problem of intimate-partner violence, and judges in criminal and civil 
courts resurrected the antebellum male privilege of chastisement.556 As Progressives increasingly 
turned to professionals to devise more effective public policies for problems, psychologists and 
social workers influenced SPCCS and newly created family courts. In these institutions, experts 
upheld male dominance and family stability. Even in the WCTU, abuse mattered increasingly 
less. Temperance advocates viewed alcoholism as a disease and intimate-partner violence as a 
secondary problem to the primary issue of alcohol abuse. Without alcohol, the theory went, wife 
beating would not even be an issue. With the ratification of the 18th Amendment in 1919, 
prohibition promised a cure to a host of issues, including intimate-partner violence, and the 
concern for intimate-partner violence further dwindled. Collectively, these changes meant loss of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     555 George MacAdam, “Feminist Revolutionary Principle is Biological Bosh,” New York 
Times, January 18, 1914, sec. 5:2; Votes for Women Put Temporarily in the Background: 
Whether to Beat or Not to Beat Your Wife is the Latest Controversy in Order,” Angelica 
Advocate, August 21, 1913 (Angelica, New York); Abraham Myerson, The Nervous Housewife, 
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     556 Thompson v. Thompson 218 U.S. 611 (1910). For more on the impact of Thompson on 
women’s rights, see Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the 




alternatives for abused women, and experts, whether in as social workers in the SPCCs or as 
counselors in the family courts, encouraged women to stay with their abusive husbands. Reform, 
for all intents and purposes, ended by the 1920s. 
Examining intimate-partner violence during the postbellum decades reveals the interplay 
of complex factors. As the historian LeeAnn Whites writes, “gender matters.”557 In the lives of 
these women, the social construction of gender had real, tangible consequences. During the 
1870s and 1880s, the fluid definition of womanhood permitted some sense of agency to claim 
their right to be free from violence, but by the 1890s in the South and 1910s in the North, 
society’s view of women enabled men to use nonlethal violence against their female partners 
without fear of punishment. This had serious implications for women’s emotional and physical 
well-being.  
Social expectations for men and women are significant because they affect people’s lives. 
These gender ideals are more than abstractions that provide mental exercise; they matter because 
they can influence who has the fundamental right to be free from violence. People interpreted 
and reinterpreted gender, and they interpreted and reinterpreted the proper method for addressing 
battered women and abusive men. Sometimes, society recognized the right of a woman to be free 
from violence and demanded governmental intervention to punish the abuser. Other times, 
people thought women caused the violence, and the courts utilized intimate-partner violence as a 
measure of social control. Gender expectations influenced social responses to problems as well 
as legal reform, and those social views on gender both advanced and reversed progress.  
Contrary to popular opinion, the history of intimate-partner violence did not follow a 
linear progression towards eradicating the problem. Intimate-partner violence did not initially 
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emerge from the shadows in the 1960s and 1970s. Instead, Americans in the late 1800s 
addressed the problem of intimate-partner violence and pursued some sense of justice for 
victims, if only for a few decades. The problem of intimate-partner violence had been brought 
out into the open and addressed. Women gained concrete advances in the 1870s and 1880s 
towards the right to be free from violence. Abusers faced social condemnation and legal 
punishment for their actions. But then, by the 1890s, intimate-partner violence was permitted to 
slip back under a veil of privacy and silence. Like a wave, the reform had crested and receded, 
negatively altering women’s position before the courts and in their relationships with men. Turn-
of-the-twentieth-century solutions for intimate-partner violence became a perverted method for 
social control, posturing as a righteous cause but all the while privileging one group at the cost of 
another. Rather than displaying a steady momentum towards a solution to gender-based violence, 
the erratic history of intimate-partner violence illustrates the drawbacks in perceiving the passage 
of time as the equivalent of progress. Such a mentality glosses over the lived realities of people, 
such as abused women in the early twentieth century, and in doing so, perpetuates a harmful 
myth of progress. 
This dissertation applies the lens of gender to intimate-partner violence from 1865 to 
1920 and offers important insight to the history of gender and the law. It shows not only that 
gender is a process, created and recreated by the public, but also that the social construction of 
gender has real consequences for men and women. Moreover, this dissertation complicates the 
view that time is progress. Rather than a straight line, the path towards ending intimate-partner 
violence appears more like a wave with advancements and major setbacks. Change was not 
steady, and the social problem did not become incrementally better over time. This perhaps does 
not offer solace to the modern-day movement against intimate-partner violence, promising things 
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will get better over time, but it does encourage more critical analysis of the multifaceted problem 
of intimate-partner violence, and the way evolving beliefs about gender have shaped American 
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